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This practice-based research sets out to explore new ways of visualizing and 
conceptualizing the notion of aura in art. It departs from Walter Benjamin’s widely 
known critique of aura, the thesis of which is that aura as ‘uniqueness’ of an 
artwork decays with the rise of technological reproducibility. Benjamin affirms with 
the decay of aura also the loss of the transposition of religious projections of 
distance onto fascist politics. His thesis had a major influence on contemporary 
critical theory where aura is still approached with great reservations. These concern 
a relapse into religious structures, which mirror, so the thesis argues, the fact that 
aura has been, also in Benjamin’s ambivalent conceptualization, left ‘territorialized’ 
in a regime of transcendence in art.  
The main research question has been: What could aura mean for painting in 
the expanded field, especially in relation to digital imaging? The outcomes of this 
research are paintings, works on paper (both involving the input of digital sources), 
digital films and writings. The thesis develops a reading and visual ‘mapping’ of 
aura in the framework of Gilles Deleuze’s (and Félix Guattari’s) ontology of 
immanence where difference and its repetition as differentiation replaces the static 
metaphysics of ‘origin’ or ‘essence’.  
Splendor Solis, a series of book illuminations from the Northern Renaissance 
proved to become a major visual source for experimentation. Aura is introduced in 
this alchemical work as the ‘splendour’ of Becoming, the deframing power of the 
differential processes that accompany individuation.  
As a sensation experienced in intuitive art practice, aura affects and is affected 
by a field of interacting multiplicities and the potentiality of temporal 
differentiations, which reach beyond any ascertained subjectivity into virtual 
collective questions and problems. Aura suggests as an ‘echo’ of Becoming an 
involvement with affects, and the research follows strands between qualitative 
intense moments that activate a ‘wound’ and extend to what Deleuze calls a ‘wound  
    ii 
that existed before me’, an experience related to the synthesis of future, which 
confronts an individual with its emerging double.  
Constructing, or ‘mapping’ aura as visuals on an axis that involves media of 
‘uniqueness’ and digital technology gives those outcomes an ontological status of 
‘simulacra’ or assemblages, far from the traditional associations aura would evoke. 
Touching both experience and experiment, so the thesis argues, aura in immanence 
can provide an access to the virtualities of the ‘new’ in art practice.  
The research introduces a visual scenario or ‘conceptual persona’ for intuition, 
which as method of this research folds both practice and writing. Friedrich 
Hölderlin’s unfinished play Empedocles at Etna, provides a metaphor or 
metamorphosis encompassing aura’s and intuition’s involvement with immediacy 
and duration.  
The practice documentation of the thesis reflects the strands of the research as 
plurality of its differentiations, allowing the dynamics of its method in action to 
reflect the dynamics of aura. 
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 The practice-based research presented here proposes, from the angle of an 
ontology of immanence, new ways of visualizing and conceptualizing a notion that, 
since Walter Benjamin’s interventions, has gained a problematic status in 
contemporary criticism due to its religious associations: aura in art.  
Walter Benjamin’s conception of aura concerns the ‘uniqueness’ of an artwork, 
its inherent dynamic of a historical constellation; it appears as a ‘strange tissue of 
space and time: the unique appearance of a distance, however near it may be’ 
(Benjamin 2002b, 104). The notion, apart from its reference to a somewhat 
meaningful encounter with an already existing artwork’s ‘radiance’, extends in this 
research, being practice-based, to a not at all uncommon sensation in art practice 
that explores, like the practice element of this research, foremost ‘intuitive’ 
elements.  
Involving intuitive or ‘chaotic’ mark making into practice (with the different 
materialities, in this research of paint, pencil and the digital) opens a process, which 
seems accompanied or guided by an indeterminate yet dynamic sensation, which 
only at an unpredictable yet certain point will come to a standstill, when a work 
‘feels’ becoming an ‘outcome’. In hindsight, the outcome might reveal an entirely 
unexpected yet meaningful ‘perspective’ on a (often not consciously posed) 
question: it seems to embody, to condense layers of a fluent relationship between an 
emerging visual and conscious decisions, of an open yet dynamically charged 
paradoxical simultaneity of closeness and distance, an ‘in between’. This sensation 
of ‘otherness’ as integral to the process, which dynamically seems to animate the 
process of making or the encounter with, can be associated with aura perhaps 
exactly because it concerns a ‘magical’ or ‘numinous’
1 aspect of making art, which 
touches ‘intuitive’ drawing/painting practice and the ‘haptic’ aspect of digitally 
produced visuals
2 not less than a viewer’s experience with art. 
Benjamin’s critique of the aura in art targets mainly its magical elements 
which, excluded as the ‘sacred’, build the base for religious regimes and extend 
from there to the rituals of aestheticized political power, most contemporary for 
Benjamin to ‘humankind[‘s] own annihilation as a supreme aesthetic pleasure’ 
                                                 
1 See footnote 7 in chapter 1.1 (p. 19) 
2 Laura Marks calls images haptic those ‘that invite a look that moves on the surface plane of the 
screen for some time before the viewer realizes what she or he is beholding. Such images resolve into 
figuration only gradually, if at all’ (Marks 1999, 162). Marius von Brasch    Introduction 
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coming with the unstoppable rise of fascism. In his 1936 seminal essay The Work of 
Art in the Age of Its Reproducibility, he states that the decay of aura in art 
historically coincides with the rise of technological possibilities of reproduction and 
dissemination. When he appreciates this decay of uniqueness in art practice as a 
historical interruption of contemplative interiority, which attaches itself to a model of 
teleological ‘progress’ prevalent in his contemporary environment, he does so in 
order to revolutionize the social function of art from a Marxist point of view: ‘Instead 
of being founded on ritual, it is based on a different practice: politics’ (Benjamin 
2002b, 106). Simultaneously, he reviews and develops the critical potential of 
radically opposed Jewish strands of cabalistic tradition and its redemptive Messianic 
potential of irruptions in time ‘on the stage of history and within the community’ 
(Scholem 1971, 1). From the perspective of Messianic critique, ‘progress’, apart from 
initializing and supporting the aggressive expansion of power and supremacy, 
negates the force of first Language (Truth) that fragmented with history into shards, 
became contorted in its involvement with translations and installations of politics 
and exploitative injustice. Benjamin’s critique of aura is thus also a test of the 
critical potential of Jewish Tradition in its dialogue with Marx’s critique of progress.  
However, it is obvious that Benjamin’s project of ‘profane illumination’, ‘the 
true, creative overcoming of religious illumination […], a materialistic, 
anthropological inspiration’ (Benjamin 1999, 209), remains ambivalent. It half-
heartedly reduces aura’s gaze of transcendence to the projection of social 
experience onto nature yet does not commit to the line of critical contexts that 
connects the notion of aura merely to Marx’s description of ‘mist-enveloped regions 
of the religious world’ extending to the fetish character of commodities (Marx 2000, 
473); it leaves aura oscillating at the blurred borders between enchantment and 
disenchantment. In a recent essay on Aura of the Digital for example, a Marxist line 
is consistently kept when the illusion of unceasing capitalist accumulation and 
abundance is named as aura, enabled by digital technologies producing a 
supposedly infinite virtual space of representation, thus, so artist researcher Michael 
Betancourt claims (2006), enveloping and transfiguring production as magic. The 
notion of aura in such contexts is dismissed typically as an illustration or cunning 
deviation from reality as ‘illusion’; it becomes an addendum to human efforts to 
compensate cultural lacks and damages by constructing religious instances as also 
laid out in Freud’s The Future of an Illusion (Freud et al. 1961). But such assessments 
tend to foreclose the potential of further ‘profaning’ those dynamics (like inherent in 
aura) that have been, historically and ideologically, appropriated by religious 
interpretation.  
In contrast, the present research attempts to find out more about the potential 
of a profaned aura and argues for deterritorializing aura’s solidification or Marius von Brasch    Introduction 
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containment, for dissolving its mask of being a somewhat abject mediator of 
hierarchies between ‘original’ and ‘copy’. The strategy taken here follows Benjamin’s 
idea of ‘purging’ aura, though not focusing on the strands of his Marxist-Messianic 
critique; it works with the question how aura could be described within a framework 
of immanence. French philosopher Gilles Deleuze developed an intricate network of 
innovative concepts starting from the question of how to avoid the separation 
between Being and beings, thus dealing with ontological questions. His move 
liberates difference from its position of a ‘hinge’ between Being and beings whereby 
difference traverses as repetition of itself temporally i.e., as differentiation Being and 
beings simultaneously, dissolving the separated Being/beings into univocity. 
Becoming is this differentiation of differentials, of virtual dynamics, of desire-
couplings actualizing in the real world, being ‘identical’ only as objects for a mind. 
Becoming in the univocity of immanence thus ‘produces nothing other than itself 
[,…and] lacks a subject distinct from itself’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 262), it 
produces a subjectivation (rather than a subject) dealing with the impulses and 
questions of virtual dynamics. Immanence is thus the domain of the reality that both 
the virtual and the real are and of time, both as continuous flux and formalised 
syntheses that constitute the actualizations of Becoming. Time interlinks 
permanently actualizations between continuity (flux) and discontinuity (stasis) and 
thus commits both movement and stasis to transformation. At this point opens a 
place for questions about the encounter with aura in a creative process, in its 
relationship to Becoming in the middle of the foldings of virtual/real and the 
‘events’, which emerge like dice-throws from virtual intensities. Aura concerns then 
less as ‘illusion’ than as qualitative and powerful incisions of internal time (duration) 
in a line of time that seems straight but effectively becomes labyrinthine with the 
challenge that any moment with its futurity holds for the process of subjectivation 
and emergence - also in art practice.  
The research develops from the question: What could aura mean for painting 
in the expanded field
3 of contemporary art practice focusing on an ‘intuitive element, 
especially in relation to digital imaging? It proposes that a profaned aura, taken out 
of its framework of ‘sacredness’ and installed within an ontology of processual 
unfolding of difference in immanence could provide a key for the understanding of 
the sensation of intuition that for some artists is the departure point and focus of 
                                                 
3 Rosalind Krauss developed the term in her essay ‘Sculpture in the Expanded Field’ (in: Foster 
2002), published in October 8 (Spring 1979), showing how in postmodernism the practice of individual 
artists and their use of a medium experience a particular rupture, setting both apart from the modernist 
purity ideals. ‘ … what appears as eclectic from one point of view can be seen as rigorously logical from 
another.’ (46) Krauss assumes already in 1979 that painters will expand their practice into media 
supported by technology: ‘The postmodernist space of painting would obviously involve … a set of terms 
… that would probably turn on the opposition uniqueness/reproducibilty’ (47). Marius von Brasch    Introduction 
    4 
their practice. It proposes that aura in such a philosophical framework leaves the 
separation between the ‘sacred’ and the ‘non-sacred’ behind and points dynamically 
at the creative potential of Becoming. Echoing the material differentiations of 
Becoming, it traverses a field of immanent production of desire in a fold of 
‘subjectivation’ and pre-individual, collective and problematic dynamics. Aura as an 
animated sensation in ‘intuitive’ art practice concerns then a differentiating 
multiplicity of practice rather than a division between an artist and an object. 
Touching on pre-individual and collective questions and ‘wounds’, so argues the 
thesis, the sensation of aura can mediate and contribute to meaningful experience 
within the ambivalent economy of the digital. 
In order to see if Benjamin’s assessment of the ‘cult-object’ as static 
placeholder for aestheticized political power (as ‘uniqueness, authenticity’) is 
consistently tenable, it seemed promising to involve older picture sources that 
visualize aura directly into the practice part of this research and to interlink them 
with the heterogeneous strands of traditional and digital media. A decision was 
made to use Mathis Grünewald’s iconic Resurrection, a part of the Isenheim Altar 
pieces, and Splendor Solis, a series of book illuminations for treatises on alchemy 
dating back to Northern German Renaissance. Both sources deal visually very directly 
with how aura ‘works’, one of them painted for a church, the other an esoteric, 
‘private’ document for initiates of alchemy. A main part of the practice became to 
digitalize and fragment the sources’ apparent uniqueness (all of the source pictures 
are reproductions, which nevertheless could trigger enough affect to begin 
researching with them) and use these processed new image files as the base for the 
emergence of new paintings, drawings and videos.  
Working closer with Splendor Solis that provides a depiction of aura from 
heretical alchemy from an undoubtedly eclectic background (Christian, Jewish, 
Cabbalistic, philosophical), allowed steps to remove aura out of its context of static 
representations of an origin as (ontologically contorted, as in Benjamin) copy. Here, 
aura’s processual character, which works ‘through’ the frames of single images of 
the series, links to the deframing power of Becoming. It showed itself to be in closest 
connection to Becoming, being inherent in the single images, which function as 
fragments of the flux (process) that leads to an image of aura depicted, as much as 
in the whole series that culminates eventually in becoming the ‘radiance of the sun’, 
Splendor Solis.  
But rather than a result, as such teleological order might suggest, aura 
traverses the series at any point. It subverts the chronological order of the ‘Great 
Work’ by layering and fragmenting what appears as disjunctions from the start. 
Instead of an uncontaminated light, the ‘Great Work’ suggests a continuous 
transformation within a continuously folding ‘chiaroscuro’. The actual final depiction Marius von Brasch    Introduction 
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of aura appears thus almost to be deflecting from its processual quality, as it is the 
result of an attempt to capture what is always and already traversing as strands of 
Becoming. However, Becoming needs to be framed exactly in order to disrupt what it 
has framed. Splendor Solis as a sequential order of images ‘following’ the disjunctive 
becoming-aura documents this paradox. 
‘Mapping’ less visible or defining strands of aura in an image, either in the 
distribution of forces as visual elements or references from one image to another, 
led to the methods of practice documented in chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. It 
suggested making inherent flows in the source images more visible and enhancing 
the aspect of their being framed fragments; to ‘break’ the given frames in favour of 
‘mapping’ virtual intensities coming along with the sensation of aura during the 
process of making. Questioning aura’s place between original and copy suggested 
exposing the fragments to the polarity between a supposed original (the handmade 
oil painting) and digital technology as medium of dissemination. Becoming within the 
framework of Deleuze’s philosophy of difference proposes asymmetrical processes 
between virtual intensities and multiplicities and thus does not support separating 
technological advances like the digital from humanity (as ‘nature’ versus 
technology); as part of contemporary life, digital technology provides an ambivalent 
tool or medium, which points at the responsibility for its use within micro-political 
practice. The digital is involved throughout the entire research: in drawing and 
paintings indirectly via projections of digitized, manipulated source fragments onto 
paper or canvas, which traverse the multiplicity of the practice, a field including 
materials, artist, forces etc; in films directly as ‘tool’ that enables ‘smooth’, not yet 
fixed and manageable states of transformation, which are stored digitally as striated, 
fixed versions of a film. 
As a painting or drawing, the layers and strands that map Becoming in time 
build ‘crystal images’ that can hold ‘the present [as] the actual, and its 
contemporaneous past [as] the virtual image’ (Deleuze 2008a: 76). In films, this 
crystal quality is distributed onto a timeline, result of an editing process that breaks 
down a straight narrative in favour of enabling a visual experience for the viewer that 
leaves more space for own experience.  
The practice showed an increasingly conscious engagement with achieving 
greater closeness to the mediation of the ‘instant’ that encompasses and holds not 
only the impact of materiality of the media applied, but also features an ‘agent’ of 
differentiation. Deleuze’s notion of Becoming relates to such an agent in the figure 
of alchemical Hermes/Mercury in Splendor Solis, a messenger mediating and linking 
heterogeneous worlds who, with the delivery of a message (the composition and 
manifestation of the image), vanishes or dies. The heterogeneous zones are 
contained by the symbolic image of the alchemical Hermaphrodite where they build Marius von Brasch    Introduction 
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a conjunction of opposites, an unstable, continuously returning and refracting 
equilibrium that affirms the potential and resilience of the tendencies of Becoming 
against permanent solidification. Not just affirming that the individual emerges 
within a process of individuation as psychological hybrid of male/female, the 
Hermaphrodite, holding the world egg with its pre-individual tendencies (as anima 
mundi or Body without Organs), points at the challenge given with the 
interconnecting desiring-machines and their production of ‘not one or even two 
sexes, but n sexes’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 296). Aura as unfolding ‘radiance’ 
of the Hermaphrodite, as an intuitive experience with art (practice) suggests with its 
transgendered quality also the dynamics of Becoming as escaping any binarity, thus 
moving away from a central position (which traditionally aura would refer to as ‘rays’ 
of the sun, the Idea, divine face/eyes/mouth). 
Aura as an echo or intuitive perception of the deframing power, of continuous 
yet disjunctive foldings of Becoming in an outcome as fragment of a potentially 
ceaseless flux is, so argues the thesis, part and sensation of differentiation, of 
difference in movement, which is reflected in artistic practice by refolding, by 
making it conscious or creating modes of interpretation around it.  
Expanded art practice, which experiments with this movement and the 
dynamics between uniqueness and dissemination, and between flux and fragment, 
touches on the question of how to capture the line between flux and fragment, how 
to capture what intuitively appears as ‘immediacy’ on a static support or in time-
based media and how to understand it. Such open-endedness in art practice meant 
reconsidering an understanding of ‘finishing’ an outcome, which suggests itself, 
while focusing on ‘immediacy’, with an increasing awareness of aura’s function of 
‘guiding’ through differentiation.  
The status of works emerging from such practice as ‘originals’ is destabilised 
by various factors: with regard to pictures ‘based on’ the Renaissance work Splendor 
Solis, they appropriate and fragment source images, which themselves contain 
fragmented (then) contemporary appropriations; the new appropriations submit to 
digital manipulations, which then are traced, not literally but integrating the impact 
of materials and affects. Although a new outcome can differ so strongly from the 
source images that references may appear to be unrecognizable for most viewers, its 
status is one of being a fragment of a process of differentiation, which creates 
outside of systems based on origin. As such, the new image is likely to embody a 
‘simulacrum’, not as ‘degraded copy’, but with a ‘positive power which denies the 
original and the copy, the model and the reproduction’ (Deleuze 2004c, 299; 
Deleuze's italics) and involves carefully considered decisions and selections with 
regards to materiality and contexts involved. ‘Arbitrariness’, traditionally associated 
with the simulacrum, resonates with a rebellious indifference toward serving visual Marius von Brasch    Introduction 
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mediations between divine and mundane systems of order. In Deleuzian ontology, 
the simulacrum or assemblage is less arbitrary than a composite of materials, 
actualized virtual intensities engaging with questions and problems and selections of 
an artist engaging with these ‘desiring machines’ (being one oneself). The 
simulacrum is thus the outcome of an act that attempts to leave the contraction of 
an instant as open as possible for the complexity of the multiplicities involved in it. 
For an artist this means to act, as Arnaud Villani puts it, as ‘letting oneself act, to let 
the virtual infuse, without forcing it’, to practice ‘an appropriating depropriation’ 
(Villani 2010, 77). The outcomes of such a process of Becoming, which in the 
practice element here seems ‘guided’ or assisted by the sensation of its echo or 
vibration (aura) could be seen as punctuations, ‘occasional points of dynamic 
equilibrium’ (Sellars 1999, 16).  
However, as the course of the research proposes, the decisions and selective 
awareness, which are elements of ‘following’ aura in the sense described above, are 
intricately bound up with specific moments in time or responses to qualitative 
‘events’. This aspect became prominent through an affective, in the case described 
here, quite painful impact of reaching to a ‘wound’ at first not determinable. It 
suggested that the sensation of aura might not emerge from an attitude of 
indifference or detachment but coincides with instants of quality, of a Stoic 
‘propitious’ moment in time that allows tapping a potential of the ‘new’.  
The ‘new’, taken seriously, can deliver its promise only outside of a teleological 
model of future with its inherently restricted possibilities (in contrast to potentialities 
that jeopardize the teleological objective); thus, if aura mediates the potentially 
‘new’, it can not rest on either ‘origin’ or ‘fulfilments’ of eschatological models but 
must emerge with open-ended and immanent differentiations. It encompasses both, 
the completely unexpected ‘new’ and the fragment with its historical signature, the 
moment when the fragment appears as melancholic ruinous shard.  
These two faces reflect the polarities, updated by Deleuze, between Chronos as 
the ordered, castrated time of succession and the ‘event’ or Aion as the ‘royal child’, 
which is introduced in one of Heracleitos’ fragments (Diels/Kranz B 52) as: ‘Eternity 
[aion] is a child at play, playing draughts: the kingdom is a child’s’ (Barnes 1987, 
50). As non-intentionality of ‘being-with’ emergence, the openness for the aleatoric 
becoming-present (Chronos) of a past that has never been presence, it eternally 
returns as repetition of differentiation. 
In this research, such a significant moment actualized a personal ‘wound’. 
However, in the set-up of the expanded practice introduced here, a personal wound 
becomes simultaneously a mediator or thread to, as Deleuze puts it, a ‘wound that 
existed before me’ and that refers to a specific condition of modern consciousness 
(thus not ‘eternal’ but historical), when it faces the alienating double of the self that Marius von Brasch    Introduction 
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the next moment, the return of a need of synthesizing the self, holds. To realize the 
differentiations along this connection, so the result of this aspect of the research, 
mirrors the differentiation from emotion to affect. 
The wound ‘that existed before me’ in art can be visualized as a caesura or 
fissure, which presents ceaselessly the impossibility of instantaneity as an identity of 
emergence and representation.  
The step of introducing Hölderlin’s unfinished ‘mourning-play’ Empedocles at 
Etna provides a visually inspiring ‘conceptual persona’ for the caesura on the one 
hand and allows a closer look at the relationship between aura and intuition on the 
other. Aura is an sensation connecting to intuition that makes it difficult to describe 
it. However, intuition itself can become method when the differentiations in time as 
duration, which such experiences provide, are mapped and described, a method 
concerned with the visualization and description of ‘a plurality of acts, a plurality of 
efforts and directions’ (Deleuze 1999a, 43) and followed throughout this research. 
Philosophically, intuition as method and as proposed and applied by Henri Bergson 
and Deleuze, strives for letting each ‘thing’, each state to be traced or mapped and 
described, become its own concept. As practice-based research, the process of 
painting/drawing/editing in its tension with conceptualization has such a strong 
weight on the sense and affects involved that it felt right to develop a conceptual 
persona rather than a concept, keeping thus the particular strand of embodiment. 
Empathizing with or inviting closer the ‘distance’ that comes with the intuitive 
awareness of aura as an objective of art practice, and this includes the input of 
digital media and manipulation, reflects the intuitive element and produces a 
particular kind of outcome: an embodiment (painting/drawing/film) of tracing 
Becoming as differentiation that is simultaneously the application of intuition as 
method. The outcomes and the writing fold into each other with a differentiator in 
between, an echo holding both together in one ‘conceptual persona’. 
‘Profaning’ aura as proposed in this research is certainly a speculative, 
contentious step; however, it proposes also an angle on intuition that provides with 
an indeterminate yet meaningful (‘numinous’) sensation a doorway for experience, a 
subject at the heart of both Benjamin’s and Deleuze’s thought. Where Benjamin 
observes the irretrievable loss of experience (which coincides with the decay of the 
aura) as taking hold of what happens to us i.e., as an act of refolding that grants an 
experience of ‘self’ in capitalist information society, Deleuze’s philosophy targets, 
with its inherent demand to continuously construct experience via experiment as the 
‘new’, the crippling redundancy of communication and information language and 
imagery, which is always based on fixed, thus already possible dispositifs. When the 
research thus engages a ‘vitalist’ position for the notion and sensation of aura, it 
does so it with a very clear scope of ‘human and non-human limitations’ (see Lash Marius von Brasch    Introduction 
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2006, 328) and the strands that lead from artistic subjectivation to collective 
problematic questions. In terms of dealing with the digital, this latter point of 
meaningful differentiations interrupts what Bill Nichols called already 1988 a 
fetishization of processuality which, in contrast to the appropriation of objects in 
reproduction, comes with the potential of simulation (Nichols 2003). The folds of 
practice and writing and of writing and practice interweave practice with material 
and social contents from the angle of immanent univocal differentiation.  
The axes explored by the practice, allow experiments and experiences 
resulting in outcomes that build fusions and tangible hybrids between 
heterogeneous media (the digital and the analogous) and practices 
(Renaissance/alchemical and contemporary art practice). Experimenting 
experientially with these strands suggests a relativity and at the same time 
singularity of the ‘new’ that, in its tension with the ‘old’, can actualize virtual yet 




The written thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 1 provides and prepares the conceptual background of this project by 
introducing its key elements: Walter Benjamin critique of what he calls aura; 
methods and particular perspective of the practice element of this research; the 
alchemical picture sources from the Renaissance, which provides a link to aura in a 
framework of immanent Becoming; an overview of Gilles Deleuze philosophical 
conceptualization of Becoming and its relevance for this project; some implication of 
the axis between painting and digital technology envisaged. 
Chapter 2 documents the practice-based element of the research. It is based 
on notes taken during the practice and follows chronologically the project’s gradual 
development. 
Chapter 3 continues by proposing a conceptual persona or ‘masked’ concept in 
the middle of the fold between practice and theory in art research. It is ‘intuition’, 
which in this practice-based research involves with aura as practice as much as it 
holds the key for a method of conceptualizing its differentiations.  Marius von Brasch    Methodology 




This project is informed by reflexive practice and Sullivan’s notion of visual 
arts as knowledge: transformative as a continuously widening process, constructivist 
as a consequence of the integration of theory, contextual as information entering 
into knowledge of users/viewers and conceptual as being grounded in the practice 
of making that uses knowledge available (Sullivan 2010, 100). The research engages 
a cross-firing of, or rhizomatic strands between, an open-ended post-discipline 
practice and critical discourse. Creative practice is understood here as 
simultaneously guided by protocols and intuition; discourse as hermeneutic 
investigation of texts and images, based on the development of a specific 
ontological position, following the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. 
 
By engaging with aura in art, a notion hovering on the borders between art, 
philosophy and history of religion, this project aims to contribute with new ways of 
visualization and contextualization towards a non-religious, ‘purged’ concept of 
aura. As this research is practice-based, it commits to contextualization as much as 
to the impact of senses, imagination and affects. It builds thus a hybrid in-between 
the task in art to extract affects and percepts and the task in philosophy to extract 
concepts (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 24). 
An advantage of applying a practice-based research to the subject of aura is 
given by the ‘ability to understand something instinctively, without the need for 
conscious reasoning’ that ‘intuition’ (according to Oxford Dictionaries) as an integral 
element of art practice provides. Intuition, a common factor of art practice that is 
often left conceptually vague, relates effortlessly to aura in art as already Walter 
Benjamin’s description demonstrates: a ‘strange tissue of space and time: the unique 
appearance of a distance, however near it may be’ (Benjamin 2002b, 104)  
As research, art practice becomes part of a rigorous framework that affects 
directly its intuitive elements. An intuitive notion and subject of knowledge-to-be-
gained like aura can gain more clarity exactly at the point where the tensions 
between analytical positions (in this case contemporary philosophical key concepts) 
and practical approaches (experimentally engaging intuition) meet or ‘clash’. 
At the heart of this project are thus creative tensions generated by paradoxes 
that evolve with instinctive understanding and ‘doing’ on the one hand and 
discursive contextualization and creative planning on the other hand. These tensions Marius von Brasch    Methodology 
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concern the subject, aura itself, as much as the overall structure of the thesis as a 
coherent project.  
In a framework of Becoming with its inherent problematic of flux and 
fragmentation, the tensions suggest axes of inherently unstable polarities, which 
require methodologically to be reflected in the choice of media (involved in this case 
is the axis between handmade painting and digital in an expanded field) and 
contexts (connecting ancient art with the digital, alchemy with contemporary 
Deleuzian metaphysics, digital film with Pre-Socratic philosophy etc.).  
Such axes allow transdisciplinary constructions of metamorphoses, both in 
practice (in form of sequential outcomes in painting/drawing or time-based 
outcomes in film) and writing (the strands of questions evolving from one proposed 
research question). Working on such axes responds to the observation that they 
generate from what aura provides as an experience ‘in-between’ with its 
associations to connectivity and an allusion of something to be discovered between 
connected points.  
It would have been possible to explore the aura as ‘experience’ within a 
psychoanalytic or phenomenological framework. However, already looking at 
Benjamin’s description reveals an engagement of a non-subjective element, a 
vividness of nature or art that suggested leaving the restriction of ‘subjectivity’ 
behind and to see how far I could go operating with art practice as an assemblage of 
‘multiplicities’, a Deleuzian concept that dilutes a psychoanalytically framed 
subjectivity and allows exactly the conceptual approach to connectivity I was looking 
for. The research results showed that subjective factors concerned mainly questions 
of responsibility, which rise with the emergence of the ‘new’ (in the sense of 
outcomes and media involved).  
The question, how a core aspect of the practice element of this research that 
transcends the experience of the return of the repressed and rather suggests an 
affirmative creative flow that is the dialogue with the evolving piece of work, could 
be contextualized and supported by contemporary theory, concerned a specific 
methodological approach. It led to a known problem of research that plays a much 
bigger role for this project than initially anticipated: the more or less conscious 
subscriptions to specific ontological frameworks that deeply influence the choice of 
subjects and subsequently methodologies referred to (Love 2002)
4.  
                                                 
4 A few years ago Terence Love argued that the traditional five chapter model of postgraduate 
dissertations was flawed. He proposed that the traditional grounding of the model in ‘research 
methodology’ should be replaced by a model where candidates have to account for their ontological and 
epistemological perspectives before they offer a methodological perspective on which their research 
methodology (and then the particular research methods) is based.’ (Garner 2008: 22) Marius von Brasch    Methodology 
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The decision to creatively adapt Deleuzian key concepts for this project is, of 
course, such an ontological ‘subscription’ to a philosophical model that supports a 
‘case’ of testing whether aura can be explored outside its traditional religious 
framework so as to rescue some aspects of significance for contemporary practice 
and conceptualization.  
The main research question has been: What could aura mean for painting in 
the expanded field, especially in relation to digital imaging? It remained the germ 
cell throughout the whole project, from which the other questions with their axes 
and polarities spread out.  
To reflect the emphasis on an unfolding process required considering how to 
structure the thesis, its written part, the exhibition of the visual outcomes and their 
mutual relationship. As a continuously widening process, a ‘discovery of a ground 
behind every other ground’ (Deleuze 2004b, 80), the research deals with attempts to 
grasp the immediacy of Becoming, which differs as visuals or text. Thus, I decided to 
present it in two different aspects: as a time-line of documenting the results of 
contextualization (the written part from chapter 2 onwards) and as an assemblage, 
an exhibition (of the visual outcomes) embodying the rhizomatic connections 
between the works. 
Clearly outlined philosophical (ontological) positions and protocols, as well as 
intuitive disruptive and unpredictable elements, are applied to both, practice and 
writing. Thus, those polarities are equally important and function mutually as 
parerga, being beside (par-) a larger work (ergon), as ‘hybrid[s] of outside and 
inside’, as Jacques Derrida outlines in The Truth in Painting; they build each ‘an 
outside which is called to the inside of the inside in order to constitute it as an 
inside’ (Derrida 1987, 63).  
The first chapter introduces (conceptual) key elements of this research, 
including an introduction to Deleuze’s notion of Becoming. It seemed important to 
place a conceptual argument for reading/visualizing aura in Deleuze’s framework in 
front of the following second chapter, which builds less systematically than the first 
on notes taken during the artistic practice. This step allowed on the one hand a more 
concentrated introduction into Deleuze’s inventive and multi-layered vocabulary (or 
concepts), which lead consistently away from assumptions of objectivity in favour of 
perspectives encompassing temporal differentiations within fields of forces; on the 
other hand, it allowed more freedom, on the basis of a preparation, for the following 
practice documentation and some of the surprising turns that a project engaging 
Becoming promised. The text is thus designed to make knowledge more accessible 
for the reader and the documentation mirrors, keeping the chronology of the 
research, Deleuze’s notion of linear time (Chronos) with its inherent constant Marius von Brasch    Methodology 
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changes, which come from its involvement with non-linear time, the intervention of 
qualitative, irruptive ‘events’. 
The exhibition, which presents the visuals, is freed from such linearity, 
although some viewers might wish to reconstruct it. The visuals will not be 
chronologically presented but build what Deleuze calls ‘lines of flights’, those 
dynamics, which are parts of the works themselves and their temporarily fixed 
arrangements yet work inherently against them through their interaction and 
interference. As parerga, the structure of the two parts of the thesis integrates two 
aspects or ‘folds’ of Becoming and aura, their involvement in linear and non-linear 
time as outlined in the text (Chapter 3.1). 
Towards the end of the course of this research it became clear that from the 
start, by attempting as consistently as possible to clarify the intuitive element 
involved in aura, a method had been applied that to accept as method seems 
literally counter-intuitive at first: intuition. The method refers to practice with its 
focus on flux and ‘immediacy’ as well as its contextualization in writing, builds the 
hinge for both, folds them. 
Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze argue that intuition allows for more accurate 
descriptions of experience
5. Focusing in research on the immediacy of reflective 
awareness will show the temporal dimension of observation that presents its subject 
as a continuously changing, differentiating one. The presence of a thing presents 
itself as a returning appearance, changed in itself in a changed consciousness. This 
means, we observe and describe objects as multiplicities of change within time and 
can avoid by inclusion of intuition as method a point of observation that segments 
the world of objects and habitually will need to refer to ‘essences’. Intuition neither 
supports an idealist nor realist position, which both are derived from the status of a 
‘consciousness of’, but introduces for Deleuze the movement (or repetition) of 
‘difference’ as ‘being’. The problematic of the attempt to describe duration with 
language lies in the complexity that continuous and unpredictable differentiations 
provide. Intuition is thus a problematic method but, so the position taken here 
reveals, productive for the subject dealt with. The research shows that it is the 
potentiality of time-related differentiations in consciousness as ‘duration’ that aura 
addresses.  
                                                 
5 Henri Bergson writes in The Creative Mind: ‘Instead of a discontinuity of moments replacing one 
another in an infinitely divided time, [intuition] will perceive the continuous fluidity of real time which 
flows along, indivisible. Instead of surface states covering successively some neutral stuff and maintaining 
with it a mysterious relationship of phenomenon to substance, it will seize upon one identical change 
which keeps ever lengthening as in a melody where everything is becoming but where the becoming, 
being itself substantial, has no need of support.  No more inert states, no more dead things; nothing but 
the mobility of which the stability of life is made. A vision of this kind, where reality appears as 
continuous and indivisible, is on the road which leads to philosophical intuition’ (Bergson 1946, 127) Marius von Brasch    Methodology 
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As method, intuition states problems by inventing questions that allow for the 
exploration of singular states or differentiations. A research question as developed 
at the very beginning of this project is thus not designed to ask for essences (‘what 
is…’) but to allow for further strands of questions about how complexes and 
singularities linked to the question differentiate. Intuition thus ‘proposes to us a 
plurality of acts, a plurality of efforts and directions’ (Deleuze 1999a, 43) that allow 
to observe and to respond to observations in parameters of ‘tendencies’. 
The introduction of the ‘conceptual persona’ Empedocles at Etna in the third 
chapter is designed to provide a metaphor in the form of a scenario, both in practice 
and writing; a stepping-stone on the way to a philosophical concept such a 
conceptual persona ‘carries out the movements that describe the author’s plane of 
immanence, and […] play[s] a part in the very creation of the author’s concept’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 63). It attempts to involve or ‘embody’ the methodology 
applied in this project in a model of aura developed in the text and visuals, showing 
that aura invents its methodology inherently. This means that writing and visual 
outcomes become differentiations of the method, merging in its becoming 
‘metaphor’, the Empedocles scenario. The decision to re-present the course of 
research as its Becoming, reflecting its two temporal aspects (linear/non-linear), 
allows the dynamics of the method in action to merge with the dynamics of aura. Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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Chapter 1 provides and prepares the conceptual background of this project by 
introducing its key elements: Walter Benjamin’s critique of what he calls aura; 
methods and particular perspective of the practice element of this research; the 
alchemical picture sources from the Renaissance, which provides a link to aura in a 
framework of immanent Becoming; an overview of Gilles Deleuze philosophical 
conceptualization of Becoming and its relevance for this project; some implication of 
the axis between painting and digital technology envisaged. 
 
1. Departure Points 
 
1.1 Aspects of Walter Benjamin’s Critique of Aura 
 
In a contemporary critical context aura in art is referred to with a characteristic 
ambivalence: while a sensation with ‘otherness’ in art as possible experience both 
for viewer and producer is admitted, problems start with what such an experience 
could refer to. Historically anchored in art’s role to visualize, mediate fix religious 
spheres or ideology, the acknowledgment of aura with its strands that seem 
consistently to lead back to a (transcendent) ‘origin’ would equal a regress into pre-
modern religious beliefs and their subsequent social and political structures.  
The following quote from the online journal Transformations seems very 
typical for such ambivalence:  
 
‘… aura and auratic experience is accelerating in intensity and scope, as the 
phantasmagoria of capitalist consumer culture becomes ever more deeply embedded 
in new technological forms. Aura has taken on an aspect of the real that now 
requires renewed efforts on the part of critical theorists and creative artists alike, to 
unpack its illusory structures and to expose its power to deflect sensory experience 
into pseudo-presence, or false origin.’ (Mules 2007) 
 
But is it enough to dismiss aura as illusion? The notion of ‘illusion’ assumes 
criteria of ‘reality’ and ‘truth’, which themselves depend on varying frameworks 
(empiricist, mechanical-materialist, critical, psychoanalytic etc.) around the 
disposition of reason and an assessment of the human ability to achieve ‘non-
illusory happiness’ on grounds of knowledge (Ritter et al. 1971, vol.4, 214).  
What would remain if the desire that ‘illusion’ holds and that aura provides 
was taken seriously outside its framework of transcendence, outside the realm that 
constitutes the institutions of ‘judgment’, derived from, as Gilles Deleuze writes, ‘the Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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judgment of God [that] is nothing other than the power to organize to infinity’ 
(Deleuze 1998, 130, my emphasis)?  
Less than focusing on an analysis of a lack and its illusory makeshift 
compensation that an already reified image of aura might promise to fill, this 
research endeavours to find elements for an understanding of aura within an 
ontology of immanence, i.e. from an angle of un-grounding it from references to 
transcendent organizing ‘judgments’. This is a fragile, yet consciously undertaken 
risk of such a research: any findings, especially as they are based on experience and 
might lead to some affirmative results, which cannot be yet assumed, lead to an 
organization and reification within the framework of this thesis.  
The conceptual departure point here must be a closer look to Walter 
Benjamin’s notion of the aura, which probably underlies any dealings with aura in 
contemporary critical context. A difficulty is faced with Benjamin’s enormous and 
eclectic output as a writer, essayist and literary critic who dealt with subjects as (to 
name a few) German/French literature, theory of language and history from the 
(simultaneous) angles of Marxism and Messianic-Judaism in various forms: from 
newspaper articles, treatises, poetic writings to a few published works on literature 
and a substantial archive of excerpts and fragments for the hidden history of 
collective broken dreams of the 19
th century. The notion aura appears within this 
work, which is difficult to specify, at different places, within the development of his 
thinking changing and not consistently conceptualised. The following paragraphs 
can only attempt to chisel out some strands showing how far Benjamin’s aura can be 
used for a non-transcendent approach. 
Aura became a ‘notion’ in critical theory with the publication of Walter 
Benjamin’s seminal The Work of Art in the Age of its Reproducibility, in German in 
1955, in English (in the collection of Benjamin texts Illuminations) in 1968 (Benjamin 
et al. 1973). This first posthumous publication is the third version from 1939 (in: 
2003) of an essay already written in 1935 (in: 2002b). It had great influence on the 
reflections on art in the years around 1968, supporting the perception of a shift 
from art’s supposed autonomy (‘uniqueness’) to its subsidiary function within the 
construction of the social world of productivity and technological reproducibility.  
In 1970, praising Benjamin for the groundwork he provided with his essay and 
his thesis of the loss of aura in the age of reproducibility, Hans Magnus 
Enzensberger wrote: ‘Artistic productivity reveals itself to be the extreme marginal 
case of a much more widespread productivity, and it is socially important only 
insofar as it surrenders all pretensions to autonomy and recognizes itself to be a 
marginal case’ ('Constituents of a Theory of the Media', in: Wardrip-Fruin and 
Montfort 2003, 272). But Benjamin’s aura, in context to other references in his 
writings, holds a place in a much subtler network. Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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Facing the reality of fascism and its elaborated manipulations around 
charisma, Benjamin states and celebrates the potential dissolution of the auratic 
elusive distinctions of sacred objects that prepared and psychologically induced 
political power structures. Referring to a ‘better’ world and its contemplative 
appeasements, the aura becomes a tool of a ‘degenerated’ bourgeoisie (Benjamin 
2002b: 119) oriented towards aggressive accumulation. As ‘charisma’, it has an 
aesthetic potential that camouflages calculated violence as aesthetic experience, 
thus laying the ground for an aesthetization of politics that inevitably heads toward 
war.  
Benjamin examines the political potential of the work of art liberated from its 
traditional roots as ritual and ‘cult object’. As such it had been a symbolic reminder 
in possession of numinous power, representing the underlying religious matrix of 
political hierarchies. This aspect of the sacred or cult object echoes in Benjamin’s 
description of aura: ‘A strange tissue of space and time: the unique apparition of a 
distance, however near it may be’ (Benjamin 2002b: 104) [‘Ein sonderbares Gespinst 
aus Raum und Zeit: einmalige Erscheinung einer Ferne, so nah sie sein mag.’]. 
Benjamin comments in a footnote to the third version of the essay: ‘The essentially 
distant is the unapproachable. Unapproachability is, indeed, a primary quality of the 
cult image […] The nearness one may gain from its substance [Materie] does not 
impair the distance it retains in its apparition.’ (Benjamin 2003, 272) The word 
‘Ferne’ alludes here to ‘distance’ in both a spatial and a temporal sense, as 
‘faraway’, ‘far-off’. The German ‘sonderbar’ means ‘strange’ but also ‘divisible’, 
which gives more depth to ‘Gespinst’ as ‘weaving’. Benjamin would then allude to a 
possible interweaving of paradoxical strands in a simultaneity of opposites.  
For Benjamin, the technologically advanced methods of reproducibility and its 
use for the arts manifest a potential ‘decay’ of aura, opening up a space for shock 
and new ways of playful and self-directed production of art. This new collective art 
will be a positive mirroring of the proletariat’s needs and identity. Mimesis and its 
key elements, semblance and play, are thus released from their previous ties to 
‘mastery over nature’. Art works as ‘cult objects’ had constituted metaphysical 
semblance and thus put art in an a-historical context. The potential of reproducibility 
appears as a wake-up call, a shock, and looking at other texts by Benjamin, this 
shock would tear apart the alleged security of an attitude towards the spiritual that 
denies the rupture. 
The conflicts of mastering nature as dealing with desire and aggression seem 
with advanced technologies, with camera and film, the ‘transportable’ image of 
appearance more appropriately resolved (Benjamin 2002b: 113): as a lens for the 
optical unconscious, able to interweave and zoom heterogeneous perspectives, 
technology provides for a preventive and therapeutic dealing with mass psychoses, Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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integrating the individual unconscious with the masses by staging it as a collective 
and experience and montage. It is the ‘forced development of sadistic fantasies or 
masochistic delusions’ that holds laughter as collective catharsis and education, 
mirrored by slapstick ‘figures of collective dream’ like Mickey Mouse and characters 
played by Chaplin (Benjamin 2002b: 118). The influence of Brecht and his concept of 
‘epic theatre’ seem obvious here. Theatre, instead of providing charisma and staged 
catharsis, should be the place of emancipation, avoiding the entanglement of 
semblance and subjectivity limited to the viewer’s contemplative identification with a 
plot.  
In contrast to foremost technological connections, Benjamin’s notion of the 
aura is anchored in images of nature: ‘To follow with the eye – while resting on a 
summer afternoon – a mountain range on the horizon or a branch that casts its 
shadow on the beholder is to breathe the aura of these mountains, of that branch’ 
(ibid.: 105). This poetic description stays within a materialist framework, moving the 
cultural element into the object matter. But it is because the object is still animated 
by ‘breath’ and thus aligned to metaphysical, non-materialist associations that 
Adorno suggested linking the aura instead to the commodity fetish as memory of 
human labour, as ‘forgotten humanness’; Benjamin did not follow this route and 
answered him 7.5.1940: ‘But even if, in fact, the issue is a “forgotten human 
something” in the aura, the issue is not necessarily what is actually present in the 
work. The tree and the shrub vouchsafed to people are not made by them. Thus 
there must be something human about objects that is not bestowed by the work 
done’ (Benjamin 1994, p. 692). In earlier protocols from 1930, which Benjamin wrote 
down after experiments with hashish, we find ‘genuine aura’ put into an even wider 
context as it ‘appears in all things, … changes completely with each movement made 
by the object [… with a] distinguishing feature […]: the ornament, an ornamental 
periphery in which the thing or being lies fixed, as if confined in a sheath’ (Benjamin 
1977). As embedded in a visual and animated surplus, the things or beings seem 
attached to aura indissolubly without taking on the more common image of ‘rays’: 
the term ‘ornament’, emphasized by a reference to the orbs in Van Gogh’s late 
paintings, reduces spiritualist visualizations of splendour, exclusively attainable to 
initiates of this then (and still) fashionable movement, to an aesthetic accessory
6; yet, 
                                                 
6 Benjamin explicitly targets theosophy and the promises of ‘great universal harmony in which all 
individuals are subsumed’ (Benjamin 1999, 655). In the book review of an occultist book from 1932, Light 
from the Obscurantists, Benjamin observes a parallel between the advertisement techniques veiling 
commodities and the discourse of occult groups (here especially Rudolf Steiner’s Anthroposophy). 
Common to both is the dissociated ‘scattering of pieces of factual information’ let commodities appear as 
if they ‘drape themselves in the world of knowledge and the human spirit, in order to stand out more 
alluringly’. The review peaks the remark: ‘If one [advertisement] has mastered the art of transforming the 
commodity into an arcanum,, the other is able to sell the Arcanum as a commodity’ (Benjamin 1999, 653-Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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despite the attempt to dissociate from spiritualist appropriations of what Benjamin 
felt worth fighting for, it remains a mystical experience. The quote above could even 
allude to ‘thing and being’ as emanations of an encircling aura that keeps them 
enclosed, material, flexible and protected at the same time. 
Benjamin’s description shows a strange vagueness about where the 
closeness/distance or subjective experience of it is to be located: viewer and 
emanation are mutually involved via the ‘look/gaze’: ‘To experience the aura of an 
object we look at means to invest it with the ability to look back at us’ (Benjamin 
2003, 338). This move, to link visual closeness and distance with the animated gaze, 
prepares how technology, here a camera as the focus of actor, camera-man and 
viewer can suspend and transform the aura’s previous work of guarding the 
numinous
7 distance from ‘cult-object’ to viewer into the new relationship of the 
‘close-up’, which is tactile, an appropriation of the aesthetic object by the viewer 
through the senses. Benjamin’s use of ‘distant’ and ‘near’ for the historic stages of 
ritual- or cult-object and liberated, accessible exhibition object is a further 
development of Alois Riegl’s influential distinction in Late Roman Art Industry (1901) 
between ‘optical’ (distant, disembodied) and ‘haptic’ (or ‘tactile’, close), which Riegl 
put in context to historical changes of visual perception, thus arguing for an 
appreciation of ‘minor’ periods of art history, that in Riegl’s time were 
underappreciated. Giles Peaker shows how Riegl’s notion of Kunstwollen [‘artistic 
volition], which underlies collectively the changes in art history, suits Benjamin’s 
interest in the demise of subjectivity with its unbridgeable distance (as will become 
                                                 
657). Miriam Bratu Hansen shows that Benjamin’s introduction of the aura (with its theosophical flavours 
into a Marxist framework ‘was not least a tactical move designed to isolate and distance the concept from 
the at once more popular and more esoteric notions of aura that flourished in contemporary occultist 
discourse (and do to this day)’ (Hansen 2008, 337). Nevertheless, ‘deployment […] of the term aura is 
informed by the very field of discourse from which he sought to dissociate the term’ (Hansen 2008, 338).  
7 The term ‘numinous’ is understood here as introduced by Walter Otto in Das Heilige: Über das 
Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältnis zum Rationalen (1917), Engl. The Idea of the 
Holy An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and its Relation to the Rational (Otto 
1936). Within the limits of a Protestant interest not to abandon the rational limits of theology, Otto 
attempted to deal with the human encounter with what he calls ‘the holy’, that goes beyond the morally 
‘good’. Thus, he focuses on the emotional urgency that an encounter with the numinous holds. He uses 
the term mysterium tremendum refering to ‘tremor’, the emotion of fear, the ‘fascination’ of the ‘wholly 
other’, ‘overpoweringness’ and ‘energy’ typical for what is contained in numinous experience (Otto 1936, 
12-41). The term originates in ‘numen’ (Lat.), ‘a nodding with the head, a nod. As an expression of will, 
command, consent. Of a deity, the divine will, divine command. Hence the might of a deity, majesty, 
divinity. Cassell’s New Latin Dictionary’ (Stein 2006, 50). Also Plate (2005) makes the connection between 
Benjamin’s aura and Otto’s term: ‘Regardless of whether Benjamin had Otto’s work in mind, the relation 
between the aura and the holy is central to Benjamin’s designs for his essay, and he continues to see the 
relation of the aura to its ritualized, sacred setting’ (Plate 2005, 89). I am indebted here also to Stein 
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clearer in the next paragraphs) from an original language of ‘Truth’; the shift from 
optical perception to the appropriative ‘close-up’ of traditional ritualistic ‘distance’ is 
then also collective artistic volition: it meant for Benjamin ‘that artworks could be a 
means of access to collective experience without attention to the individual 
producer’ (Peaker 2000, 306). Applied to the potential of technology of 
reproducibility, which allows to absorb and transform the cult-object-related aura, 
closeness (the haptic approach) thus suits ‘the desire of the present-day masses to 
“get closer” to things spatially and humanly, and their equally passionate concern for 
overcoming each thing’s uniqueness by assimilating it as reproduction’, as Benjamin 
writes (Benjamin 2003, 255, emphasis orig.). This quote extends to the editing 
process in the medium of film producing montaged multiple perspectives that allow 
a translation of collective dream work (for example, collage-like editing for 
displacement).  
But a problematic constellation for a project, setting out to propose new 
materialist aesthetics, arises when Benjamin insists that not only art (which can be 
exposed to technological reproducibility) but also ‘nature’ or natural objects contain 
auratic ‘distance’; the ‘unapproachable’ extends here into and infuses matter: ‘[t]he 
essentially distant is the unapproachable’ (Benjamin 2003, 338)
8. Yet, this problem 
does not contradict Benjamin’s previous or later work. On the contrary, it seems to 
mark a transition between such early theological papers such as On Language as 
Such and the Language of Man from 1916 (in: Benjamin 1996)
  and the theses On the 
Concept of History from 1940 (in: Benjamin 2003), written shortly before his death 
and proposing a merging of historical materialism and theology. 
Bram Mertens shows the inherent influence of Jewish ‘tradition’ on Benjamin
9, 
‘tradition’ naming here the multi-layered, archive-like Torah studies (Talmud, 
Midrashim), which are collated over centuries as weavings documenting a permanent 
‘process of interpretation’ (Mertens 2007: 45) on the assumption that language is 
divine (though concealed) communication that has to be reinterpreted and aligned 
for contemporary needs.  
Such processual reinterpretation and ‘contemporaneity of the past’ equals the 
actuality of past commentaries and puts value on the minutest detail, however odd it 
might seem. Benjamin’s ‘figure of the collector, who examines the so-called refuse 
                                                 
8 The latter quote comes from On Some Motifs in Baudelaire, written in the same time as but 
contrasting with the third version of Work of Art in the Age of Reproducibility, which according to Miriam 
Bratu Hansen might have supported a reductive reading of aura as Benjamin’s supposed ‘call for its 
demolition’ (Hansen 2008, 237) 
9 Benjamin’s friend Gershom Scholem, the most important researcher on Jewish mysticism, had 
recommended a 4 volume work by Molitor, Philosophie der Geschichte oder über die Tradition (Philosophy 
of History or On Tradition), and this ‘had been one of the first works about Judaism he [Benjamin] 
acquired, it gained a place of honour in his library’ (Scholem, quoted in Mertens 2007: 17, my trans.). Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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of history (“Abfall der Geschichte”), the immense diversity of bits and bobs discarded 
in the process or progress, to which fragments of the utopian hopes and 
expectations held by the past still adhere’ (Mertens 2007: 44) is an embodiment of 
this Talmudic position. 
Benjamin’s aura critique targets a generation of Jews assimilating to protestant 
values after the foundation of the German state in 1871. It was the protestant 
affirmation of interiority via conscience and calling that underlay, according to Max 
Weber, the stability and success of capitalism at this time.
10 It could be argued that 
Benjamin’s aura appears in connection to its own death mask, as an ambiguous ruin 
of itself. It carries thus the melancholy of a mistaken or lost identity, devoid of its 
promise. But it does so, much more fundamentally for Benjamin, because of the 
(collective) loss of the human being’s ability to reconnect to the blueprint of God’s 
original language. On Language as Such and the Language of Man, a text he refers 
to as a foundation of his main thoughts, states this loss and puts history into the 
context of origin as mediated by the Torah (the first five parts of the bible) and the 
layers of its interpretation/mediation as tradition. 
God breathing language creates the world
11; the human is created then of what 
has been created already (earth) and thus is not participating directly in the first 
language. Language is given to the human as a tool to name things, to 
communicate, and this reification of the creative force leads to the inherent 
openness or confusion that, according to Benjamin, caused the Fall and further 
widening of the distance. The main point here is that the first language does not 
signify but creates, whereas the tool language has already left its original force and 
unambiguity behind. It opens up the search for traces of the first language and 
redemption within the structure of the world, including language, objects and 
historical events. Stéphane Mosès writes in the fascinating study The Angel of 
History: ‘The meaning of history is not revealed, for Benjamin, in the process of its 
evolution but in the breaks in its apparent continuity, in its flaws and accidents, 
where the sudden emergence of the unpredictable interrupts its course and thus 
reveals in a flash, a fragment of original truth’ (Mosès 2009: 80). 
Every moment in the flow of time can hold the ‘flash’ as revolutionary 
potential, but without any guarantee of a justice premeditated by historic 
materialism. Rather, the messianic rupture means the shutdown of a contorted 
history, to be expected against the abundance of images or better: simulacra, every 
                                                 
10 ‘It is obvious how powerfully the exclusive search for the Kingdom of God only through the 
fulfilment of duty in the calling, and the strict asceticism which Church discipline naturally imposed, 
especially on the propertyless classes, was bound to affect the productivity of labour in the capitalistic 
sense of the word’ (Weber 2003: 178). 
11 This is a direct reference to one of the most common translations of ‘aura’ = ‘breath’. 22 




moment. In Benjamin’s own words: ‘… for the Jews the future [did not become] 
homogenous,  empty time. For every second was the small gateway in time through 
which the Messiah might enter. (On the Concept of History, B, in: Benjamin 2003: 
397). 
 
Thus, ‘the aura’, as Stéphane Mosès clarifies, ‘is given to us as a beam of the 
original, just as the light of a star reveals to us the glow of a star that has long ago 
disappeared’;  deeply entwined in a theological matrix, the aura speaks as a 
metaphor of a simultaneous  closeness and distance of ‘the incommensurability  of 
the original’  (Mosès 2009: 78). 
Now it becomes quite obvious that the technologically  achieved reproduction 
 
embodies a further distance from the original, a decay that is desirable exactly 
because of its potential to undermine the ‘false’, contemplative  approaches ‘back’ 
(historicism)  or ‘forward’ (teleological  ideology of progress); these cover up the 
‘events’ that could prepare, initialize or be a restoration towards the first language, 
identified in the distance of the past by remembrance  and projected into the closest 
future as messianic intervention. 
Along this axis Benjamin’s archive evolves, displaying Benjamin’s insistence on 
making the theological heart of his model inseparable  from the analysis of historical 
(political) reality and taking its traces and fragments back to the encapsulated  and 
betrayed dreams of humanity
12;  his approach, so Michael Löwy says in his Fire Alarm, 
‘consists precisely in standing this view of history [the Hegelian justification  of 
 
human suffering for the sake of historical progress] on its head, in demystifying 
progress and riveting a gaze imbued with a deep, inconsolable  sadness – but also 




12  The closeness of Historical Materialism and Jewish Messianism lies in the latter’s focus on 
external reflections of inwardness in contrast to Christian mysticism that supports a hermetic retreat into 
inwardness: ‘According to the dialectics of Jewish mysticism, the drive to the essence was at the same 
time the drive outward. The re-establishment of all things in their proper place, which constitutes the 
redemption, produces a totality that knows nothing of […] a division between inwardness and 
outwardness. The utopian element in Messianism refers to this totality and to it alone’ (Scholem 1971: 
17). 
 
13  This is most poignantly formulated in Benjamin’s interpretation (Thesis IX of On the Concept of 
History, 1940) of Paul Klee’s Angelus Novus (1920): ‘There is a picture by Klee called Angelus Novus. It 
shows an angel who seems about to move away from something he stares at. His eyes are wide, his 
mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how the angel of history must look. His face is turned 
towards the past. Where a chain of events appears before us, he sees one single catastrophe, which keeps 
piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it at his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, 
and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise and has got caught in his 
wings; it is so strong that the angel can no longer close them. This storm drives him irresistibly into the 
future, to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows toward the sky. What we call 
progress is this storm’ (Benjamin 2003: 392). The picture hangs in the Israel Museum in Jerusalem and 
can be seen here   http://www.imj.org.il/Imagine/collections/item.asp?itemNum=199799 . Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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inconsolable sadness concerns also the failure of reason that in Hegel’s work 
operates for the perfection of dialectically demonstrating the teleological unfolding 
of God as absolute reason into history
14. This endeavour proves, face to face with the 
undercurrent ‘other’ of reason toward the 1930s for Benjamin to collapse; progress 
reveals itself as a ruin of its conception, as the ‘storm’ that drives Benjamin’s angel 
of history ‘irresistibly into the future, to which his back is turned, while the pile of 
debris before him grows toward the sky’ (Benjamin 2003, 392). Contrary to Hegel’s 
model of dialectical progress, Benjamin’s proves to be, so writes Scholem, ‘really 
cyclical’: ‘Paradise is at once the origin and the primal past of as well as the utopian 
image of the future of his redemption’ (Scholem 1976, 232). Aura’s gaze – between 
human eyes, from a branch but also stars (‘Are the stars [Benjamin’s archaic choice 
of the German ‘Gestirn’ alludes to ‘forehead’ or ‘brow’] with their gaze from the 
distance the Ur[First]phenomenon of the aura?’ (Benjamin 1991, vol.II, 958) – one 
could say, is perceived with an ambiguity of hope and sadness: on the one hand its 
all-pervading shine promises being ‘index’ of original life/truth/language, on the 
other hand its presence in a culture built upon ideas of the reliability of reason and 
its grasp of God’s unfolding appears philosophically administered, receding 
reciprocally with the growth of the ‘pile of debris’. But there is more: the sadness 
attached is also one about creative language that more and more digresses from any 
possibility of translation. Looking back at Adorno’s objection that aura would, in a 
Marxist framework, stand better as a metaphor for the ‘forgotten human factor in 
the object’, Benjamin’s answer, so writes Willem van Reijn, ‘is clearly alluding to 
language, or more precisely, to that creative language for which the Adamite 
language of naming, itself a sign for lost salvation, is responsible, even after the Fall’ 
(Reijn 2001, 47). ‘Profane illumination’ sums up this interweaving of Marxist and 
Messianic tracing of fragments on a non-linear line of betrayed history, as ‘the true, 
creative overcoming of religious illumination […], a materialistic, anthropological 
                                                 
In this scenario, the fragment becomes a powerful index of historic failure, distance from the 
source and remembrance of hope; Benjamin’s method of reading the fragment is thus based on the way 
he ‘reversed the direction of [lending history legitimacy through religion and its powerful semantic force] 
from a vindication of the forward course of history to a radical critique of history when viewed with a 
backward gaze’ (Buck-Morss 1989: 93).  
14 In Hegel, the ‘absolute Idea’, so explains Terry Pinkard, can be developed methodically only from 
what is already established, from ‘that which is already implicit in the commitments that modern rational 
agents necessarily undertake in order to shore up and sustain the other types of judgments that they 
must make’. He quotes Hegel from Science of Logic: ‘”out of all that, the method has emerged as the self-
knowing concept that, to itself, is absolute … that is subjective as well as objective, consequently as the 
pure correspondence of the concept and its reality, as an existence (Existenz) that is the concept itself”’ 
(Pinkard 2002, 263). Pinkard points out that there is no logic ‘compulsion’ for a equation of absolute Idea 
and God; however, Hegel historicises the use of reason in its form of the absolute Idea as teleological 
stages of unfolding. It would go beyond the scope of this thesis around aura to expand on this subject. Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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inspiration’ (Benjamin 1999, 209). Aura is then, for Benjamin, finally to be derived as 
a psychoanalytic-materialist ‘projection of a human social experience onto nature: 
the gaze is returned’ (Benjamin 2003, 173), leaving ‘a world without aura, or magic’, 
as Rodolphe Gasché writes, a ‘stupendous transformation of the world […], in which 
all forms of transcendence bastardized by myth have been evacuated from the realm 
of the present. It is a world so free that it has become empty’, emptied of the 
narratives and images that for Benjamin have culminate in the aestheticizing of 
catastrophes, leaving, besides new aesthetics of utter proximity promising a 
revolutionary shift between the collective body and technology, a ‘silence’, a 
‘blankness’ pointing to ‘what it cannot name, yet from which the very meaning of 
“profane” remains suspended’ (Benjamin and Osborne 2002, 201). What remains is a 
silence only interrupted by the ticking of ‘an alarm clock that in each minute rings 
for sixty seconds’ (Benjamin 1999, 218), announcing that ‘every second was the 
small gateway through which the Messiah might enter’ (Benjamin 2003, 397).  
From the angle of ‘Tradition’, the price of eradicating aura and its associations 
to ‘divine light’ from the world is high as it concerns also a ‘sacrifice’ of the 
Shekinah, in Talmudic literature ‘presence’ or ‘indwelling’ of God (Scholem and 
Werblowsky 1987, 163), more often though, from the angle of Kabbalah, the 
feminine aspect of God as divine presence/light in the material world, Malkhut 
(‘Kingdom’, the tenth Kabbalistic ‘sefirah’ or emanation of divine power). When the 
Talmud states ‘In every exile into which the children of Israel went, the Shekinah was 
with them’, it shows the exile of the Shekinah as a result of the ‘Fall’ that created a 
cleavage between the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge, or as Scholem writes, 
‘between the upper and lower, the masculine and feminine’ (Scholem 1996, 108)
 15.
 
This promised presence in exile must have seemed – at the latest with the reality of 
fascism and concentration camps - betrayed for Benjamin; from this angle, his 
                                                 
15 Scholem explains: ‘God was revealed in His potencies and His various attribute (justice, mercy, 
etc., etc. [the ten sefirot or emanations]). By these powers through which He willed to effect Creation He 
formed “vessels” destined to serve the manifestation of His own being. […] The divine light entered these 
vessels in order to take forms appropriate to their function in creation, but the vessels could not contain 
the light and thus were broken. […] The light was dispersed. Much of it returned to the source; some 
portions, or “sparks”, fell downward and were scattered, some rose upward. […] There was nothing that 
was not damaged by the breaking. Nothing is in the place appointed for it; everything is either below or 
above, but not where it should be. In other words, all being is in Galut [Diaspora]. […] Hence there is a 
Galut of the divine itself, of the “sparks of the Shekinah”: “These sparks of holiness are bound in fetters of 
steels in the depths of the shells, and yearningly aspire to rise to their source but cannot avail to do so 
until they have support” – so says Rabbi Hayyim Vital, a disciple of Luria [Isaac Luria, lived from 1534-
1572]’ (Scholem 1971, 45). The sparks are, what constitutes also a connection between Shekinah and 
‘soul’. As divine light contained ‘broken’ with the ‘vessels’ (creations) in the world, the Shekinah suggests 
a link to what Benjamin’s aura contains. He corresponded with Scholem about the Shekinah already 
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strategy is a desperate move to intensify the heterogeneous Jewish concept of time 
by emptying the ‘small gateway’ from all the debris that could delay or obstruct the 
force of its violent impact he hoped for. The eradication of aura serves thus the 
restoration of the first language. Scholem explains:  
 
The process of decay has turned into the one great catastrophe which brings 
the past before the angel’s eyes only as a pile of debris. At the same time, however, 
Benjamin’s meaning includes the kabbalistic concept of tikkun, the messianic 
restoration and repair which mends and restores the original being of things, and of 
history as well, after they have been smashed and corrupted by the “breaking of the 
vessels [see footnote 15]”’ (Scholem 1976, 233). 
 
For art practice, dealing with intuitive elements and imagination, the hopeless 
constellation around the abolished aura holds creatively stifling obstacles, and only 
one of them concerns an inherent tendency to religious righteousness or vengeance 
as a result of knowing and exhorting ‘Law’, which in some of Benjamin’s texts 
despite their complex and overwhelming prescience can lead to irritating 
didacticism. Only the work of ‘mourning’, as Benjamin knows (Krell 2000: 136), 
provides, in a changed historical situation, a way out of this danger, a potential (and 
integral part of creativity) that might, in connection to an alternative view on aura, 
also balance out an explicitly (at times perhaps overtly) affirmative framework like 
Gilles Deleuze’s, which will be introduced in chapter 1.3. 
Back to the initial questions: what are the reasons for the reservation about 
aura in a contemporary context? What ontology is Benjamin’s aura based on? Can 
Benjamin’s notion be used as a springboard for this research?  
The reasons for the simultaneity of attraction and reservation toward aura in 
criticism might be found in Benjamin’s strategy of introducing this esoteric term that 
seems ambivalent yet consistent when one takes into account his goal to argue 
simultaneously from a materialist and Messianic point of view. His argument is 
based on theological ‘origin’ or ‘ground’ with a core of true transcendent justice 
while aura’s (alleged) decline, consistent with Benjamin’s understanding of the 
irretrievable loss of a capitalized truth in modernity, rescues exactly this theological 
ground into the framework of Marxism. Brecht (with whom Benjamin stayed at the 
time of engaging with the essay) assessed the strategy in his diary as follows: 
‘mysticism in spite of an antimystical attitude’ (quoted in: Scholem 2001, 223)
16.  
Benjamin’s move, as Miriam Bratu Hansen shows in Benjamin’s Aura, is 
motivated also by countering those contemporary esoteric strands that shared some 
                                                 
16 What Scholem told Benjamin about his impressions on the  ‘essay in the work of art’ in a meeting 
in 1937, he recounts as follows: ‘In my view, his new definition of this phenomenon [aura] constituted, 
logically speaking, a subreption that permitted him to sneak metaphysical insights into a framework 
unsuited to them’ (Scholem 2001, 260).  Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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of his views but served, even unwittingly, fascism with a spiritual superstructure. 
Projecting the hope for a decaying aura onto technology follows thus a strategy of 
denial of the ‘false’ aura in order to rescue some of its buried potential, both as 
remembrance and index for a utopian messianic rupture.  
But even from this perspective, the rescue remains essentially based on a quite 
orthodox model of ontological separation between man and the Law (redemption).  
Time, although non-linear and non-teleological, is eminently charged with 
possible cuts of a vertical intensity that will annihilate its stream into a restored unity 
with the ground (Law/Truth). 
What remains as a ‘springboard’ for this research, when the theological 
implications and ontology of a definite ‘ground’ (God), which contradict the 
objectives of this research, are stripped away?  
It is the interweaving of time and space belonging according to Benjamin to 
aura, an inherent potential of the moment
17 as the rupture of an inherent 
appearance to unfold, of Becoming. This observation has inspired me to look further 
into aura as ‘event’. However, applying the ‘catastrophic and the utopian’, 
unmistakably integral to Benjamin’s vision and apocalyptic Messianism (Scholem 
1971: 17), to the conceptual exploration of the ‘event’ as an open, creative and 
immanent unfolding, would certainly mean disrespecting his vision. This concerns 
also the model of history: a broken time line with its abundance of (historical) 
fragments and their logic of deviations and disjunctions in Benjamin’s archive that 
stores them as proofs of a lost language. This aspect points already at what is 
known as media archaeology, tracing the indices of betrayed collective dreams, of 
torn apart historical masks; however, the layer of Messianic redemption gives this 
endeavour its particular theological and melancholic dimension. 
Part of Benjamin’s estate contains several notes for his study On Some Motifs 
in Baudelaire, facsimiled in the German Gesammelte Schriften, but unfortunately not 
in the Selected Writings. One of these notes (Fig. 1) relates directly to aura. The text 
in the bottom left box on Fig. 1 reads: ‘Perhaps it is necessary to try it with a 
concept of an aura that is purged from cultic enzymes? Perhaps the decay of the 
aura is only a transitional stage of elimination of these cultic enzymes in order to 
approach others, not yet recognizable ones. ‘(Last sentence literally: ‘Perhaps the 
decay of the aura is only a transitional stage where it eliminates its cultic ferments 
                                                 
17 Krell points out: ‘To be sure, in Benjamin’s view each instant of future time is given not as a 
stolid, homogenous, and empty now point but as what Heidegger calls the kairotic moment, Benjamin 
“the little portal through which the Messiah could step”’ (Krell 2000: 136). Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
    27 
(enzymes) in order for it to approach with others, not yet recognized ones.’] 
(Benjamin 1991, Vol. 7: 752, my trans.)
18  
At the end of this note Benjamin refers to ‘play’ as maybe the ‘enzyme’ that 




Fig. 1 - Sheet from Benjamin’s notes for Charles Baudelaire. Ein Lyriker im Zeitalter des 
Hochkapitalismus (about 1939). Courtesy of Suhrkamp Verlag Berlin 
                                                 
18 The German text reads: ‘vielleicht ist es notwendig, es mit dem Begriff einer von kultischen 
Fermenten gereinigten Aura zu versuchen? Vielleicht ist der Verfall der Aura nur ein Durchgangsstadium, 
in dem sie ihre kultischen Fermente ausscheidet um sich mit noch nicht erkennbaren anzunähern. Die auf 
das Spiel bezüglichen Stel[l]e der Reproduktionsarbeit heranziehen’ (Benjamin 1991: 753). I have 
translated the German verb ‘reinigen’ as ‘to purge’ (instead of ‘to cleanse’ for instance) and follow here 
the quite physical associations the text builds and the also the putrification image that ‘decay’ holds.  Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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already in the Artwork essay. But has the envisaged liberation via ‘exhibition-value’ 
(as collective play enabled by technology), built upon the replaceable faciality and 
presence of the human, happened in Western contemporary entertainment culture? 
Already Benjamin sees that technology’s potential depends entirely on how it is 
realized; it is neutral with regard to its ideological charge: ‘The direction of this 
change [to exhibition-value …] tends toward the exhibition of controllable, 
transferable skills under certain social conditions. This results in a new form of 
selection […] from which the star and the dictator emerge as victors’ (Benjamin 
2003, 277, my emphasis). 
Benjamin’s note projects a conceptual purging of aura and affirms its 
relevance, even if ambivalent and fragmented, imbued with life (it acts: ‘eliminates’, 
‘approaches’) which leads back to its esoteric and theological dimensions, which 
resist purely phenomenological or psychological approaches i.e. approaches rooted 
in frameworks of subjectivity. Hansen thinks that Benjamin appropriates aura by 
exposing it to a ‘conceptual apokatastasis’, a “resurrection, as it were, through 
[mortification and] dismemberment”’ (Irving Wohlfarth, quoted in: Hansen 2008, 
375). The vocabulary of ‘purging’ would confirm that.  
It could be further asked whether apokatastasis can be understood as inherent 
not only to aura’s conceptualisation but also to how it works. This would presuppose 
a temporal aspect, an unfolding or cycle of ‘dismemberment and resurrection’. The 
visual associations opening up with such dynamics would lead away from the realm 
of ‘purity’ and ‘light’ that aura might carry along; it would be contaminated by death 
as much as birth, light as much as darkness, involved into a movement of vital 
change.  
Aura’s possible double aspect of temporal becoming and interweaving of dark 
and light, thought outside a determinate spiritual source (of ‘judgment’), will be of 
specific interest to this research. Technology though, which Benjamin links to aura, 
has made a radical transition from technological reproducibility to digital processing. 
The questions evolving from here will concern thus less the appropriation of an 
original than how involving the digital into the production/creation of visuals 
suggests an always already disseminated ‘original’, associated with the ontological 
status of the ‘simulacrum’ and its history of (theological, philosophical) rejection and 
(rarer) affirmation. 
The following sub-chapter, introducing the practice element and source images 
contextualized, shows how a series of alchemical Renaissance book illuminations 
with their remarkable model of aura as unfolding process of the involvement of light 
and dark could become relevant for the exploration of aura in an immanent 
framework, without denying its call for ‘otherness’. 
 Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
    29 
1.2 The Practice Element of this Research 
 
Choosing the notion of aura as a subject for the practice-aspect of this 
research originates from a long-standing interest in understanding a particular 
sensation that seems the driving force, as it initializes and accompanies the 
emergence of visuals, of the practice presented here. The sensation appears as 
highly subjective and instinctual, as ‘feeling drawn to’ or even compelled to start a 
process of painting, mark making or editing footage. Simultaneously however, 
during the process of making this sensation seems to indicate how to ‘co-create’ 
with something anonymous, an ‘other’, seems a force that puts the clarity of 
‘inwardness’ as the place of ideas, of ‘I am doing this’ in doubt. It opens a dynamic 
area of tension by remaining continuously present during the process of making, 
alternating between distance and closeness, concealed yet present, invisible yet co-
producing potentially unexpected and meaningful visuals. The emerging visual 
seems thus to have an own life: ‘Experience of the aura’, writes Benjamin (2003, 
338), ‘[…] arises from the fact that a response characteristic of human relationships 
is transposed to the relationship between humans and inanimate or natural objects. 
[…] To experience the aura of an object we look at means to invest it with the ability 
to look back at us’, adding in a footnote, that relates this observation to the aura of 
words and poetry: ‘The gaze of nature, when thus awakened, dreams and pulls the 
poet after its dream’ (Benjamin 2003, 354).  
This sensation could be described as another mode encountering a piece of art 
that has the power to affect, touch at a certain time, often unexpectedly. Without a 
doubt it seems possible to associate this frequently two-folded sensation (in this art 
practice) with layers of the numinous
19. 
The specific art practice presented here focuses, as a longstanding project, on 
the impact of the sudden and emotionally powerful encounter that mark-making, 
starting a drawing or painting (and, via software, film footage) with aleatoric marks, 
can mean. There seems to be a dynamic yet intangible presence attached to the 
process, developing an outcome as a relationship between an unfolding ‘new’ 
perspective with its intuitive, intensive qualities and the decisions concerning 
questions about how to realize this unfolding, appropriating it but not ‘owning’ it. 
Exploring this peculiar fascination with the ‘intense’ mark led to working in 
sequential fashion, which allows for each project to extend from image to image 
(instead of ‘crowding’ it into one), into what becomes a series at some point; a 
project thus ‘reveals’ itself more often than not after it has been started. The 
evolving constellations of the paintings would suggest a subject that was either on 
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my mind or on a deeper level present but not conscious. The moment of recognizing 
such a subject would coincide with an affective response and mark the point of 
departure into further exploration of the given subject. The evolving series of 
paintings proposed visual aspects like stills of a flow that built alternative 
perspectives of an ‘issue’, comparable with the sometimes absurd but lucid logic of 
dreams
20. The underlying and unplanned development within the series, that would 
reveal itself only in hindsight, would build a ‘proposal’ of complementary, 
overlooked, minor aspects, which as a completed work would trace and actually be 
the segmented line of a transformation. Following this intuitive process, so the 
hypothesis, would lead to a meaningfully embodied perspective. 
Some ground rules concern consistency of materials i.e. for each series one 
medium, one type and size of image support, a particular range of colours, brushes 
etc.; one series can consist of several subseries. These ground rules grant an 
equality of each image within one series and provide the base for working closer on 
different perspectives that the dynamic process might hold.  
This process provides ‘experience’, despite the difficulties of putting the latter 
into language due to its associations to multiple and well-known clichés, in an 
emphatic sense as discerned by Hansen in her essay on Benjamin’s Aura: as a 
translation of the German Erfahrung with ‘its etymological connotations of Fahrt 
(“journey”) and Gefahr (“peril,” related to the Latin periri, also the root of experience)’ 
it differs from the related Erlebnis as ‘“momentary, immediate experience”’ (Hansen 
2008, 338), and the challenge consists in identifying clichés of ‘experience’. The 
‘perils’ of an approach like the one introduced here wait mostly in the intensities 
(emotionally, but also intellectually) that come with an opening toward what will be 
developed here hypothetically as a relationship between aura and ‘Becoming’ in a 
                                                 
20 Similarities of the practice involved here to surrealist techniques e.g. automatic drawing etc. 
seem obvious but as a model of understanding or contextualizing they pose problems. The close liaison 
of Surrealism and psychoanalysis ties an act of automatic drawing conceptually into the psychoanalytic 
model of the unconscious and its restrictions to a reservoir of personal and repressed issues. Operating 
with this model – although accepting the connections between ‘libido’ and the drive experienced - means 
to accept mark making, which is what my drawings and paintings begin with, as manifestations of 
energetically charged projections, of a contorted essence onto a canvas. Due to the closeness of such 
works to dream-work, the outcome of such ‘release’ then offers itself to a scrutinizing psychoanalytic 
gaze that identifies on the bottom of layers of displaced and condensed personal material the results it 
expects within its given framework. Having a background in psychotherapy, this contextualisation has 
been of great interest to me, and the last series taking a psychoanalytic approach (consisting of 46 almost 
monochromatic, red more figurative paintings) engaged critically with the somewhat limiting cultural 
theory of the ‘Oedipus Complex’. It has been published as a book 2007 as Oedipus Diving (von Brasch 
2007). A question leading to the current research has been, how a core aspect of this art practice (that 
transcends the experience of the return of the repressed and rather suggests an affirmative creative flow 
that is the dialogue with the evolving piece of work) could be contextualized and supported by 
contemporary theory without having to refer to the psychoanalytic framework Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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framework of immanence
21. ‘Experience’ in this sense doesn’t deny the fact that ‘any 
experience is caught up in relations of power’ (Deleuze 1999b), in strategies of 
power that serve socially arranged, stratified modes of interpretation i.e. defaults of 
‘how to’ experience. However, and this is a specific aspect of a Deleuzian approach 
to ‘experience’ as a process, its creative transmutations, both in artistic and 
conceptual forms, can potentially ‘resist’ and counteract the rigidities of such 
stratifications by proposing ‘new’ perspectives.  
As will become clearer in section 1.4, where Deleuzian concepts relating to 
aura and Becoming are introduced, the ‘new’ responds to collective undercurrent 
conflicts with spontaneous and unpredictable manoeuvres, destabilizing structures 
(of interpretation) by escaping as/with force through the cracks of such structures, 
which organise (and potentially trap) conflicting forces as ‘consensus’. The 
emergence of the ‘new’, the creative act is, in a Deleuzian view, initiated by 
intensities not restricted to a personal unconscious but of a pre-individual quality: 
though conceptually circumventing the alleged ‘origin’ of the art work in a confined 
subjectivity, intensities will be necessarily experienced, for example in art practice, 
as sensation of an artist’s body, granting as a temporary side effect to the 
production of art stages of subjectivation (in contrast to affirming a pre-determined 
idea of subjectivity). Focusing on a processual emergence of art that might serve 
new aspects of interpretation, the practice element of this research deals (and 
perhaps must deal) with such intensities, and also with degrees of what appears as 
emotion or rather less personal, as ‘affect’. From an artist’s perspective, the attitude 
of ‘journeying’ (Lat. ‘periri’) requires an openness for what Cy Twombly associates in 
L’Esperienza moderna (1957) with ‘a certain crisis, or at least a crucial moment of 
sensation or release; and by crisis it should by no means be limited to a morbid 
state, but could just as well be one ecstatic impulse, or in the process of painting, 
run a gamut of states. One must desire the ultimate essence even if it is 
“contaminated”’ (in: Del Roscio 2002, 206). Although aura will not, in this research, 
provide a thread to an ‘ultimate essence’, Twombly makes a link to a ‘contamination’ 
attached to the work of intensities that will, following the hypothesis of this 
research, reflect onto aura as experience in art practice.  
                                                 
21 Hansen’s etymology supports mainly the building of experience. In contrast, Henry James 
describes (euphemistically) the other pole, gained experience that inevitably underlies (also spontaneous) 
practice as: ‘The power to guess the unseen from the seen, to trace the implication of things, to judge the 
whole piece by the pattern, the condition of feeling life, in general, so completely that you are well on 
your way to knowing any particular corner of it - this cluster of gifts may almost be said to constitute 
experience, and they occur in country and in town, and in the most differing stages of education. If 
experience consists of impressions, it may be said that impressions are experience, just as (have we not 
seen it?) they are the very air we breathe’ (James 1919, 389). The interest in the ‘unseen’ with its links to 
‘tracing/mapping’ and ‘life’ reflects an angle of this research.  Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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As a practitioner who engages in academic research and yet commits to work 
in the way described above, a challenge lies thus in avoiding to sugar-coat the 
tensions, which are part and stimulus of the practice. For the written part of this 
thesis this means to allow an occasional blurring of the lines between academic 
discourse and experiential narrative against the convention in academic texts to let 
affect and its less abstract vanguard, affections, dilute into a concealed ‘other’ below 
the writing
22. Disclosing these poles of artistic research might also cast a light onto 
Deleuze’s focus on the ‘pre-individual’: is it possible (or desirable) as an artist to 
remain ‘pre-individual’ in the process of making, and if not, does the point where it 
capsizes into ‘emotion’ possibly indicate anything relevant?  
The processual nature of the art practice here brings an involvement with time 
as duration to a ‘journey’ that, as a sequential project of painting for example, 
leaves an outcome of segments or windows behind, an unstable synthesis 
interrupted by the gaps that have occurred between the individual visuals. The 
French philosopher Henri Bergson describes this process as follows:  
 
‘[…] to the artist who creates a picture by drawing it from the depth of his 
soul, time is no longer an accessory; it is not an interval that may be lengthened or 
shortened without the content being altered. The duration of this work is part and 
parcel of his work. To contract or to dilate it would be to modify both the psychical 
evolution that fills it and the invention which is its goal. The time taken up by the 
invention is one with the invention itself.[…] the concrete solution [of painting] 
brings with it that unforeseeable nothing which is everything in a work of art. And it 
is this nothing that takes time. Nought as matter, it creates itself as form.’ (Bergson 
1954: 360/361)  
 
Problems like how this ‘nothing’ (taken her as no-thing-yet) can actualize, how 
a ‘depth of the soul’ can possibly be described, lead directly to the heart of this 
research: the difficulty of a topic that (not only for Benjamin) seems to evade any 
grasp of a purely analytic approach suggesting some clarification of Bergson’s 
description: the intuitive aspect of making art and its methodological reflection in 
writing i.e., how to re/present it as will become clearer in the course of this project. 
The basic research question, what aura could mean for painting in the 
expanded field extended to the questions firstly, in connection to Benjamin’s 
                                                 
22 Less from the angle of producing art but looking at art, art historian James Elkin made the 
specific rift that opens between the encounter with intensities and academic writing about it the thread of 
his book Pictures & Tears (Elkins 2001). It consists of a commented collection of various people’s 
encounters with art that made them cry, in contrast to their more composed academic contemporaries 
who come up tearlessly with erudite and detached analyses of the same works. He writes: ‘Crying, 
passions, confusions, echoes of religion: they belong in people’s experiences, not in books. There are 
writers, more prudent than I am, who don’t even broach theology when it comes to art. Religion seeps 
through everything that’s written about modern art, but it’s the thought [of crying] that dare not speak its 
name. I’ve risked being a bit ham-fisted by bringing it onstage’ (Elkins 2001, 214) Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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critique, how it might be possible to take aura out of its transcendent framework 
that signifies contemporary ambivalences around it and try to visualize it within a 
framework of immanence, secondly, in connection to the practice element, how as 
being part of an experience of emergence in ‘intuitive’ art practice it links to 
intensity.  
For the practice element of this research it seemed appropriate to look for 
visual sources that relate directly to and challenge Benjamin’s devalorised term of 
the ‘cult-object’. Are their qualities necessarily uniqueness, authenticity and are they 
necessarily references to static and hierarchical (political) religiosity? Such sources 
became two works, Mathis Grünewald’s famous and iconic Resurrection, a part of the 
Isenheim Altar pieces, and Splendor Solis, a series of book illuminations for treatises 
on alchemy dating back to Northern German Renaissance. Both the Resurrection and 
Splendor Solis deal very directly with the subject of aura, and engaging closely and 
creatively with how it ‘works’ in and through these pictures became the subject of 
the practice: by digitalizating and fragmenting their uniqueness and using these 
processed new image files, in connection to ‘intuitive’ responses, as the base for the 
emergence of new paintings, drawings and videos.  
Especially Splendor Solis offers an alternative model for aura that is processual 
without necessarily referring to a transcendent origin. The next section introduces 
the work and the reasons for choosing it as one main source for this research. 
Grünewald’s Resurrection will be introduced in chapter 2.2. 
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1.3 The Captive/Fugitive Aura in Splendor Solis 
1.3.1	 ﾠSplendor	 ﾠSolis’	 ﾠFrames	 ﾠ
 
Splendor Solis exists in six versions of illuminated manuscripts from the 
sixteenth century (the earliest one from 1531/32, the latest one from about 1600)
 23. 
All consist of written treatises and at a time 22 illuminations dealing with ‘royal art’: 
gaining gold by purifying lesser metals, though clearly indicating that the desired 
outcome is a symbolic transformation of the alchemist through catharsis that will 
provide him/her with the ‘philosophical stone’, which, so the first treatise discloses, 
‘is produced by means of the Greening and Growing Nature. Hali the Philosopher 
says thereof: “This stone rises in growing, greening things”’ (Trismosin and K. 1920, 
17)
24. The envisaged result is thus not an object but a metaphor of a processual, 
                                                 
23 Jörg Völlnagel, the specialist of the history of this work, lists the following: ‘The earliest witness 
is the manuscript in the Berlin Kupferstichkabinett (Cod. 78 D 3), dated 1531 and 1532. This is also the 
original manuscript which formed the basis for later copies. Closely linked are manuscripts in Nuremberg 
(Germanisches Nationalmuseum, 4° Hs. 146 766, dated 1545), Paris (Bibliothèque Nationale de France, 
Ms. allemand 113, dated 1577), London (British Library, Harl. MS. 3469, dated 1582), Kassel 
(Landesbibliothek und Murhardsche Bibliothek der Stadt Kassel, 2° Ms. chem. 21, dated 1588) and another 
in Berlin at the Staatsbibliothek (Cod. germ. f. 42, undated, around 1600). It was possible to show that the 
versions in Nuremberg and Kassel are direct copies of the early Berlin manuscript, while the manuscripts 
in Paris, London and the Berlin Staatsbibliothek can be identified as direct or indirect copies of the 
Nuremberg manuscript’ (Völlnagel 2011, 3). The texts of these versions differ but show a consistent 
usage of quotes from the much earlier Aurora Consurgens (around 1410). Völlnagel attributes the 
pictures of Splendor Solis to Jörg Breu the Elder from Augsburg and shows also the influences of Hans 
Holbein the Younger. Because the pictures and texts quote and refer to (in their time) the best known 
other alchemical manuscripts, the collection (then copied itself) tries as a ‘florilegium’ to surpass Aurora 
Consurgens, ‘not only in the title:’, as Völlnagel points out, ‘the rising dawn, in Latin ‘aurora consurgens’, 
is followed by the shining son, ‘splendor solis”’ (Völlnagel 2011, 13).  
The version used for this research is the manuscript Cod. germ. f. 42 in Berlin at the Staatsbibliothek as a 
facsimile (Höhle 1972); reproduced in this text are for copyright reasons digitalised Ektachrome 
reproductions from the Staatsbibliothek Berlin. The text quotes are from an English translation of the copy 
in the British library. As Völlnagel does not see essential textual differences between the different 
versions, I present here the miniatures and text quotes from slighty varying sources. 
24 The following bits of information around the circumstances around Splendor Solis and its 
reception in England at the beginning of the 20
th century might serve as small spot lights on the 
theosophical circles in which alchemy was studied and which Walter Benjamin (though in Germany) wished 
to attack with his introduction of aura into a critical context; they cast also some light on alchemy’s 
ambivalent reputation, which is perhaps based on its theosophical appropriation. The translation of 
Splendor Solis from the Early Modern High German of the treatises into English had been carried out by a 
‘J.K.’ - Julius Kohn. Keywords about Kohn’s life were published in a book in 1934 by ‘Messrs. Hodgson & 
Co.’: ‘A catalogue of valuable books from various sources including a library from a country manor house 
... ; the library of the late Julius Kohn, Esq. formerly of the Austro-Hungarian Consulate comprising an Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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infinitive and mutual relationship: the stone ‘rises’ with its effect on things and 
things grow, become more of ‘nature’ as much as they need to contain the stone 
that rises with their greening. The image reminds strongly of the relationship 
between rising sun and photosynthesis, but the peculiar mutuality, the interwoven 
growth of matter and an expanding (not only rising) sun takes both out of its 
context to physics into associations of life, of rejuvenation, infinite movement, 
becoming, when ‘greening’ is taken for its temporal, differentiating quality. 
However, the name for this relationship has the solidity, groundedness and density 
of a ‘stone’ and is, according to the various stages in alchemy gained through 
putrefaction of undifferentiated primary matter (prima materia) as the base for what 
will become the desired and elusive stone, through distillation of the four natural 
elements (fire, water, air, earth) serving the production of a ‘QUINTA ESSENTIA of the 
elementary FAECES’ (Trismosin and K. 1920, 70) used for the purification and 
preparation of the stone’s body and sublimation.  
The philosopher’s stone ‘is a stone and not a stone’, a symbol typically 
incorporating the presence of an equilibrium of matter and spirit, thus bridging a 
gap that traditionally exists between them. The equilibrium is based on the workings 
of the elements
25, which, according to the alchemists, always simultaneously 
                                                 
extensive collection of books on comparative religions, Oriental literature and philology, occult mss., 
books on alchemy, spiritualism, mystical theology, etc.’  
Around the 1880s, we find Kohn involved in a specialist fight about esoteric positions, staged on 
the pages of magazines like The Theosophist and The Spiritualist. At some point, the mysterious 
translator must have dared to contest the authority of founder theosophist Helena Blavatsky whose 
writing, in my view, is distinguished by an unfortunate concurrence of confusion in terms of style and 
renunciation of sound arguments. Her (written) revenge testifies to the fact that esoteric or religious 
authority has to justify itself by keeping the self-imposed elevation toward ‘higher wisdom’ literal and talk 
‘down’ to the enemy: ‘Since he did not hesitate to name Mme. Blavatsky [she writes here about herself] 
and tried to show her so inferior to himself, we do not see why we should feel the slightest scruple to lift 
up the “brazen mask” which shrouds the face of the Kabalistic beau domino. We declare then in our turn, 
proofs in hand, that Mr. Julius Kohn is a very conceited, vain, young gentleman, who, hardly weaned from 
the A.B.C. of Occultism, puts on the airs of a mysterious grand adept––dextro tempore, writes pretentious 
articles under the safe cover of two initials, and so obtains a public hearing under false pretences. There 
is no Kabalistic organ, and even the third-class London Weeklies, but would throw his articles in the waste 
basket, had he offered them. What better opportunity, then, taking advantage of the ill-feeling of the 
Spiritualists toward the Theosophists to get room in a journal wherein to ventilate his vagaries? Hence his 
articles in The Spiritualist, and the declarations that there are no spirits in nature other than human 
spirits; and the magisterial, ridiculous verdict “if the Theosophists study the elementals, they study only 
undeveloped human spirits”’(Blavatsky 1881). Despite the venom sprayed, J.K.’s translation of Splendor 
Solis remains the only one available in English, recommended by the British Library where the manuscript 
version from 1582 is held. 
25 This particular point is based, as also quoted in the treatise, on Aristotle’s theorization ‘that the 
four elements were formed by combinations of basic properties or qualities of matter (hot-cold, wet-dry), Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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penetrate each other. The ‘stone’ is ‘like a man, … composed of body, soul and 
spirit. The body has the power to fix or coagulate the spirit. The spirit has the power 
to dissolve and penetrate the body.’ It is thus the paradoxical ‘supreme 
crystallization in form of the precious life-essence’ (Abraham 1998: 145), essentially 
the claim of a spiritualization of the earth and the body, of light being veiled in dark 
matter and nature and matter. This point is significant as it questions a division 
fundamental to Judeo-Christian beliefs. It also explains why ‘alchemists’ were 
persecuted and executed as heretics.  
The ‘Great Work’ can be summarize briefly in three stages
26: 
1. nigredo, the ‘blackening’ (Fig. 3) that prepares matter for a development by 
disintegration of its present form, comparable to the disposition of ‘melancholy’, 
referring here also to black traditionally attributed to the planet Saturn
27. The 
particularity of alchemical darkness (prima materia) according to Fig. 4 is that it is 
inherently light, a sun illuminating as darkness, or the state of being virtual of what 
becomes more and more distinct visibility, through the gradual differentiation from 
black (as the inner of the earth) to red (or gold). 
Nigredo leads matter back to a state of chaos and is associated with 
putrefaction, thus suggesting that also transformation or differentiation is inherent 
to darkness and always already an experience grounded in physical reality and the 
alchemist’s body, thus an experience, simultaneously symbolic and empiric.  
2. albedo, the ‘whitening’ signifies ‘purification’; after the blackened body or 
putrefied matter has been washed and shown the colours of the rainbow (as cuda 
pavonis, the peacock’s tail), it turns to a ‘dazzling white’, signifying its being imbued 
by spirit. Associations are: ‘they call it their Swan, their Dove, their white stone of 
Paradise [etc]’ (Abraham 1998, 5-6).  
3. rubedo as ‘redness’ (Fig. 5 and 6) symbolizes the tincture (the ‘philosopher’s 
stone’), the agent that, spread onto metals, will transmute lead (blackness, Saturn, 
the state of reinforced stagnation) to gold (the burning Sun, enlightened as made 
conscious). 
The agent supporting all alchemical operations is Mercury in a dual function: 
on the one hand as the metal mercury that overrules the properties of all other 
                                                 
and therefore … could be converted into one another.’ (Henderson and Sherwood 2003: 7) ‘Spirit’ is 
understood as ‘agent’. 
26 The often confusing details of the (sub-)operations wouldn’t elucidate the connection to aura, 
which this section leads to. 
27 The nigredo as alchemical stage suggests a realization of the denial of melancholy as 
depression. Julia Kristeva speaks about disavowal and ‘denial of negation’ as an ‘exercise of an impossible 
mourning, the setting up of a fundamental sadness’ that is based on displacement or ‘transposition’ of 
the ‘inscription of the want’ in order ‘to produce meaning in the subject for another subject’ (Kristeva 
1989, pp. 43 ).  Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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metals because it is fugitive, and on the other hand as the messenger between the 
worlds; it is Hermes/Mercury’s mythological function to trespass in heteronomous 
worlds (underworld, human realm, realm of the gods) in order to interconnect them, 
to inform, interweave the zones with each other.  
He is the agent of mutability and adaptability enabling an interweaving of 
diversity; he could be thus the bridge within heterogeneity. As the one who merges 
what is constructed as polarity but essentially in flux, Hermes is also an imaginary 
incarnated third term, destabilizing binary oppositions and exposing fixed positions 




Fig. 2 – Tommaso Laureti, Trionfo della religione cristiana, 1585. Musei Vaticani, Stanze di 
Raffaelo. Photo © Jean-Pol Grandmont 
 
In a legend to Tommaso Laureti’s Triumph of Christianity, or the Exaltation of 
the Faith
28 (Fig.2), Michel Serres (1995) elucidates that the messenger dies with the 
deliverance of the message: ‘Hermes, the messenger god of classical antiquity, lies 
shattered on the floor (in fact this floor is painted on a ceiling): we recognize him by 
his staff and his winged helmet. The Christian mediator takes his place on the 
                                                 
28 Fresco, 1582. Palazzi Vaticani Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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pedestal. […] Messengers disappear in relation to their message: this is our key to 
understanding their death agonies, their death and their disaggregation’ (ibid.:  80). 
Does not the central path of flight running through Laureti’s painting imply also that 
Christianity’s triumph will be shattered? The theatrical edifice, the ‘house’
29 or frame 
for this mediation, seems neutral to the erection of the cross and constructed like a 
magnified architectural detail of an infinite series of dying messengers to come.  
The book illumination from Splendor Solis on Fig. 4 shows a symbolic 
encounter of opposites: a man rises from a pool of mud, his head accentuated as if 
reddened while rising. He approaches a peacock-feather-winged woman who seems 
to wait for him and offers him a folded red cloth. The star above her head, much 
darker than her costume, might be gazing to the invisible depth of the earth that 
covers his feet and lower legs. The pool, only part of a stream, continues sluggishly 
into the distance and touches the ornate frame with all its references to nature from 
the inside. Both figures build composites of mutual references and of differences: 
they refer to earth (matter) and air (spirit), curiously coded and collaged out of joint 
references (white, red, black). The text reads: ‘Here then the body becomes spiritual 
by force of the Spirit’ (Trismosin and K. 1920, 31), but the picture hints also at a 
variant claiming that spirit becomes bodily by the force of matter and, as pointed out 
in a Tractatus aureus of the Ars Chemica from 1566, its contact with ‘what is found 
in filth’, ‘”In stercore invenitur”’ (quoted in: Jung 1983, 25). It is their being 
indissoluble that becomes visible as two singularities within one movement of 
polarities, connected by an invisible bridge yet divided by an significant instant of 
differentiation and unity, as a ‘symbol’ in the sense of Jacques Derrida’s following 
description:  
 
‘The analogy of the abyss and of the bridge over the abyss is an analogy which 
says that there must be surely an analogy between two absolutely heterogeneous 
worlds, a third term to cross the abyss, to heal over the gaping wound and think the 
gap, in a word, a symbol. The bridge is a symbol, it passes from one bank to the 
other, and the symbol is a bridge’ (Derrida 1987: 36).  
 
As the figures on Fig. 4 are personages and composites, this bridge extends or 
is diverted into the figures themselves; interweaving into each other by taking on the 
other’s colours, the ever present ‘gaping wound’ is here perhaps the fact that they, 
in the sequence of the ‘Great Work’, will die, dissolve into other constellations. 
Splendor Solis illustrates this disintegration in calm yet violent illustrations of 
dismemberment and mutilation. Fig. 5 shows a knight cutting himself up and 
discarding parts of his body. All figures, mutilated or adorned, ‘resurrect’ in 
transmutations along this invisible yet present bridge over the abyss of an instant 
                                                 
29 ‘Art begins not with flesh but with the house’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 186). Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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dividing the work of differentiation. What is the goal of alchemical work, or better 
how does the goal work? 
Fig. 6, the final picture of the first series of Splendor Solis, depicts the black 
sun transmuted after various operations into a vital red one, figuring as a distinct 
(hidden, yet concealed) level of an otherwise ordinarily illuminated landscape, 
emphasising that it is not literally the sun the alchemical adept is dealing with. Fig. 
7, the final image of the second series in Splendor Solis, expands on what remains 
concealed in Fig. 6 by presenting a king surrounded by a corona of light. He is 
positioned in the centre of the image, marking the culmination of the expanded 
process of the ‘Great Work’. Enclosed in a framed ambelic (the alchemical vessel of 
transformation), his body is enclosed by a corona of solar light; he stands on a 
waxing moon. ‘Gold’, the goal of alchemical operations, is here liquefied and 
revealed as an emanation of light, as aura, radiating life around the king. The 
precious framing (gold leaf) locates the king in a space of interiority, protected from 
the world outside as if the image pretends to ask the viewer to approach it from 
sideways, and carefully pass through the frames. The rectangular frame around the 
king motif is framed by a landscape showing people involved in everyday activities, 
but mythological references put the mundane work scene (fishing) in context to 
planetary symbolism of the moon and Luna: the central but concealed/revealed 
figure of the king, being-king is thus explicitly shown as an equilibrium of 
‘opposites’ (sun/moon) or, as the work as a whole suggests, male and female that 
can and will collapse at any time.  
Carl Jung interprets the patterns of rectangular shapes as originating from the 
square, which refers in alchemical imagery to the equal distribution of the four 
directions, elements or quarters of the earth (Jung 1980: 193). The discussed image 
shows an imbalance, a ‘predominance’ of the vertical over the horizontal; it could be 
looked at as a typical representation of a transcendent ‘position’ with its axis of ‘as 
above as below’ at the expense of the horizontal (immanent) constellation.  
The imagery or its ‘plan’ is grounded by frames that repeat its key motives and 
stretch their shape from the darkest centre of the earth to the (shadowless) corona 
of the soul into the form of an upright rectangular. But against the grounding 
element stands that which happens within the frames, the king in the glass alembic, 
the realms of sun and moon, of interior space and social environment are in reality 
interwoven; they border over the frames and always already merge kaleidoscopically, 
conjunct in a destabilization of what holds them together.  
Frames function, as Jacques Derrida writes in The Truth in Painting as parerga, 
being beside (par-) a larger work (ergon), as ‘hybrid[s] of outside and inside’, 
building ‘an outside which is called to the inside of the inside in order to constitute 
as an inside.’ (Derrida 1987: 63) The constituted ‘inside’ is here a singularised, Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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transformation in stop motion that loops, folds itself around the edges that make it 
possible for it to merge (into) heterogeneous worlds. When Derrida writes that ‘there 
can be a parergon of the beautiful … But there cannot, it seems, be a parergon for 
the sublime’ (ibid.: 127)
30, it becomes obvious that the energeia of the Splendor Solis 
series must differ from the sublime as much as from the purely aesthetic (and its 
connotations of disinterested pleasure): although ‘without-limit’, it can and desires 
to be traced, and it builds folds on various levels: from frame to frame in image to 
image in series to series; in the overlayering of this present interpretation from 
image to language; it folds itself further into the repetitions of some of its motives 
reaching out beyond the frames into my own framework as differentiation.  
Deleuze effectively comes to a similar result as Derrida when he writes, ‘the 
picture is also traversed by a deframing power that opens it onto a plane of 
composition or an infinite field of forces […] The painter’s action never stays within 
the frame; it leaves the frame and does not begin with it’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994: 188). However, what ‘deframes’ here, is understood as an ontological 
presence or field of forces that due to its energetic friction will not be contained in a 
form that it can establish only temporarily. That seems to contradict the 
understanding of a painting as a somewhat static form, but only as long as the 
creative act coming together on/in the painting is assessed as ‘final’; the force field, 
which in Deleuze encompasses not only the painter but the field of influences, the 
materials, the collective undercurrents, the multiplicity that a set-up of painting 
constitutes, is what lives on in the painting, always already deframes it. In Splendor 
Solis, this deframing power pervades the frames of the stages of the Great Work, 
which, from this point of view, are thresholds of a process, accentuated singularities 
of a certain accumulation of forces within a process of transmutation; transmutation 
highlights, from an alchemical perspective, the potential of ‘transformation’ to leap 
into ‘instantaneous change[s]’ (Abraham 1998, 204) induced by the projection of the 
Mercurial mediator over metals. Deframing, thus, opens the particular process of 
Becoming depicted in the miniatures towards constellations that are unpredictable 
and new, not logically deduced but instantaneous composites. The instantaneity 
disintegrates an organization that might be expected in favour of dream-like 
constructions: personages flow into each other and keep, fixed in a frame, signs of 
others, segments of landscapes come together over different frames.
                                                 
30 Derrida refers to Kant’s distinctions in Critique of Judgment. Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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Fig. 3 - from the first series in Splendor Solis. Manuscript Cod. Germ. Fol. 42, Staatsbibliothek, 
Preussischer Kulturbesitz Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
    42 Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
    43 
 
 
Fig. 4 - from the first series in Splendor Solis. Manuscript Cod. Germ. Fol. 42, Staatsbibliothek, 
Preussischer Kulturbesitz  Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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Fig. 5 - from the first series in Splendor Solis. Manuscript Cod. Germ. Fol. 42, Staatsbibliothek, 
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Fig. 6 - from the first series of Splendor Solis. Manuscript Cod. Germ. Fol. 42, Staatsbibliothek, 
Preussischer Kulturbesitz  Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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Fig. 7 - from the second series of Splendor Solis. Manuscript Cod. Germ. Fol. 42, 
Staatsbibliothek, Preussischer Kulturbesitz Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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 What needs to be ‘framed’, be shown evidence of its singularities in order to 
become visible, is thus the ‘Great Work’ as a temporal unfolding of a differentiation 
that also in terms of time is in reality multi-layered. A text in Splendor Solis, quoting 
‘the [nondescript] Philosopher’, betrays a remarkable characteristic concerning the 
‘Great Work’s’ professed order of successions: ‘”dissolve the thing, and sublimate it, 
and then distil it, coagulate it, make it ascend, make it descend, soak it, dry it, and 
ever up to an indefinite number of operations, all of which take place at the same 
time and in the same vessel.” ALPHIDIUS [another alchemist] confirms this and says: 
“You must know that when we dissolve we sublimate as well and calcinate without 
interruption”’ (Trismosin and K. 1920, 23; my italics).  
The successions, determining the ‘Work’ as multi-layered simultaneous and 
interacting zones of differentiation, enter in Fig. 7 a potential phase of aura as 
image. But as everything works towards this end, and the end intermingles with all 
differentiations at the same time, it seems as if this once visible aura is the inherent 
agent of differentiation: the ‘light’ at an unstable ‘end’ already contaminated by 
subcutaneous putrefaction at an unstable beginning, by layers of first dark matter 
and Mercury’s fugitive fusions of fire and water that, instead of preparing aura for 
an end, pull it back towards the prima materia, its becoming darkness’ inherent 
light. Splendor Solis’ visualization of transmutations, resulting in and simultaneously 
suspending aura, is thus perhaps also a visualization of a proximity or mutuality of 
aura and Becoming. Aura, here, has no reference to an original; thus, it does not 
constitute a distance between original and copy as in Walter Benjamin’s notion but 
always already is inherent to the Becomings of what is depicted as a ‘Great Work’ 
that culminates ultimately (though only temporarily) in a coincidence of opposites, a 
vanishing point where ‘opposites’ (dark/light, male/female, original/copy etc.) 
overlap and disprove their ‘binarity’. 
With this constellation, Splendor Solis reflects as imagery also a specific shift 
of the concept of ‘image’ in Renaissance. Paul Kugler shows how Giordano Bruno 
located imaging, which had been linked in Platonic and theological traditions to the 
representation of some pre-existing original, ‘as a creative, transformative, and 
originary power […] within the human condition’ (Kugler 1997, 75). Thus, for Bruno, 
painting is not limited to creating copies but the place to invent: ‘any painter is 
naturally an establisher of infinite images who, by means of his image forming 
power, constructs from sights and sounds by combining in a multiplicity of ways’ 
(Bruno and Higgins 1991, xv). With this shift, the ‘sun’ loses its symbolic significance 
of being the original (as in Plato’s Republic) whose light exposes the inferior copy. 
Paracelsus, another Renaissance alchemist, asks: ‘What else is imagination, if not the 
inner sun?’ (quoted in: Kugler 1997, 75) and declares thus an independence from the Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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original, an ability to partake in the creative dynamics of nature and its forces
31. 
Coming back to Splendor Solis with its explicit links to the sun as transmutation and 
aura in flux (according to the reading attempted here), it could be said that aura is 
developed here outside of models of an original truth that perverts with its filtering 
down into copies. 
The aura in Fig.7, a pictorial mask, a somewhat static and jagged cut-out 
mandorla around a crowned man works as an index of an infinite, yet immanent 
process that will ceaselessly repeat its work of differentiation or ‘being-born’ as the 
almond or vaginal shape of the mandorla affirms. The process repeats within the 
framing/protective mater(ia) of immanence, showing at this stage a dissolution (as 
coniunctio) of the binary structure ‘man/woman’. The king, simultaneously 
concealed and revealed, inhabits a stillness between two breaths, between further 
differentiations into past and future of the ‘Work’. It is the frames of Splendor Solis 
that dissolve and extend him into otherness and hold the imagery of an arrested, 
‘captive’ aura, isolated from a flux, a potentially chaotic field of immanence with its 
fugitive/forming forces. 
Thus, according to the ‘ethics’ of alchemical transformations, becoming-king or 
authenticating a process of Becoming can be achieved only as equilibrium of multiple 
polarities or syntheses, which stay open as multiplicities in movement with their 
either/or options of spontaneous, yet selective further differentiations. Then, Fig. 7 
in its context could be seen as affirming a temporary state within a ‘processual 
direction’, as Félix Guattari puts it, ‘in the existential sense of auto-affirmation’ 
(Guattari and Ettinger 2002, 244), a temporary yet definite window into 
subjectivation. 
The reading of aura as proposed here, starting from a Renaissance work on 
alchemy as an alternative to models that bind aura into the transcendent dynamics 
of original and copy, led to an intricate connection to Becoming. But what can be said 
about Becoming?  
This research aims to put aura in context to the philosophical concept of 
Becoming, a key to the ontology of immanence of Gilles Deleuze, which will be 
introduced in the chapter 1.4. Deleuze did neither engage with aura nor with a 
strand of alchemy that links it, as proposed here, to an ontology of immanence. 
However, a connection, which will be explored briefly in the next paragraphs and 
before introducing Deleuze’s Becoming, can be established with Deleuze’s tacit 
adaption and updating of important strands of the work of Carl Jung (see Kerslake 
                                                 
31 Paracelsus writes for example: ‘He who is born in imagination discovers the latent forces of 
Nature. . . . Besides the stars that are established, there is yet another - Imagination - that begets a new 
star and a new heaven’ (Hayes 2001, 13). Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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2007), one of the major proponents examining a relevance of alchemy for 
modernity.  
 
1.3.2	 ﾠJungian	 ﾠAlchemical	 ﾠ‘Individuation’	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
 
Jung questioned, while still associated with the Freudian psychoanalytic 
movement, the framework of ‘libido’ underlying Freudian psychoanalysis (Jung 
1956), departing from a revision or revaluation of the concept of schizophrenia
32. He 
observed that schizophrenic patients can be considerably helped by taking their 
encounter with paranoiac ‘voices’ seriously as split contents of a collective 
unconscious which, holding the history and symbolic representations of humanity, 
can overwhelm the individual’s conscious mind. Jung proposed that the dynamics of 
such ‘mnemic sediment[s]’ (Jung 1971: § 693) might - in contrast to the Freudian 
concept of the unconscious in its ‘topographical’ sense comprising ‘the repressed 
contents which have been denied access to the preconscious-conscious system by 
the operation of repression’ (Laplanche and Pontalis 1988, 474) - also hold 
autonomous factors challenging a person to grow beyond social construction. His 
thesis indicates thus an autonomous volition inherent in the unconscious, a theory 
he would develop further and that caused the break with Freud
33. However, exactly 
this point must have been attractive for Deleuze whose work sets out to de-
subjectivate the conceptualization of perception: ‘Was not one of the most important 
points of Jung’s theory already to be found here: the force of “questioning” in the 
unconscious, the conception of the unconscious as a unconscious of “problems” and 
“tasks”? Drawing out the consequences to this led Jung to the discovery of a process 
of differenciation [this specific Deleuzian take on differentiation distinguishes 
differential or virtual ‘differentiation’ from ‘differenciation’ into actualized, real’ 
thing] more profound than the resulting oppositions’ (Deleuze 2004b, 161). 
                                                 
32 Especially this point was of interest for Deleuze; he and his (at times) co-writer, psychoanalyst 
Felix Guattari, developed ‘schizoanalysis’ (see next section), if though with a different conceptual goal, 
from the same point. 
33 The Freudian school’s core argument against this, undertaken when Jung’s ideas were very 
fashionable (Glover 1950) was already formulated by Freud himself in the paper The Unconscious (1915), 
one year before the break with Jung: ‘The psycho-analytic assumption of unconscious mental activity 
appears to us, on the one hand, a further development of that primitive animism which caused our own 
consciousness to be reflected in all around us, and, on the other hand, it seems to be an extension of the 
corrections begun by Kant in regard to our views on external perceptions. Just as Kant warned us not to 
overlook the fact that our perception is subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical 
with the phenomena perceived but never really discerned, so psycho-analysis bids us not to set conscious 
perception in the place of the unconscious mental process which is its object’ (Freud 1926, 104).  Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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According to the imagery of Splendor Solis, Becoming encompasses at first 
sight an inner development and its symbolic representation. According to Jung in 
various studies on alchemy, such alchemical medieval imagery and symbolism 
typically witnesses how ‘the alchemist projected […] the process of individuation into 
the phenomena of chemical change’ (Jung 1980, 482), revealing with its projective 
character its inaccessible numinosity. His thesis is that alchemical imagery 
constructs an intermediary link between unconscious processes of individuation and 
the conscious mind engaging with understanding them, assessing alchemy thus as a 
possibly ‘obscure’ and underrated source of ‘knowledge’, which provides forgotten 
dynamics, a heterogeneous moment of what in modernity emerges as a ‘new’ 
technique (science): psychoanalysis.  
Individuation, a term that has its roots in alchemy - it dates back to Gerard 
Dorn, a Belgian alchemist (see Samuels et al. 1986, 76) - is understood in Jungian 
terminology as a ‘process of differentiation’ (Jung 1971, §743), ‘the centralizing 
processes in the unconscious that go to form the personality’ (Jung 1980, 482). It 
enables a social person to develop as distinct from others and collective 
expectations while focusing on the dynamics of ‘self’ as a constellation, which 
encompasses conscious and unconscious potential and conflicts of creative changes 
and does, more integrated, not lead into isolation but to stronger, because less 
adapted, connections to others (Jung 1971, §744). The ‘self’, which is augmented 
here to the unconscious, assumes a creative unconscious, which challenges a 
subject’s prevalent rational position with ‘psychoid’ and teleological dynamics ,with 
scattered contents and splits of the collective evolution of humanity that swarm on a 
vast libidinal stream. The dynamics of this stream, freed of its restriction to a purely 
personal and principally contorting mirror, will be disguised as spontaneous 
imagination with the potential and direction to become conscious. Jung’s concept of 
desire encompasses thus libido (as sexuality) as one expression among other 
passionate interests, and psyche and psychic reality are directed towards a 
development (integration and individuation): 
 he ‘opts to “enlarge the narrower 
concept of psychic energy to a broader one of life-energy, which includes “‘psychic 
energy’” as a specific part’ (Kerslake 2007, 74).  
The aim of individuation ‘is nothing less than to divest the self of the false 
wrappings of the persona [the social mask] on the one hand, and the suggestive 
power of primordial images on the other’ (Jung 1953, 172), thus an alchemical, 
‘paradoxical practice’ (Semetsky 2006, 333) along the polarities 
conscious/unconscious and collective/individual with their pictorial symbolism that 
carry cathexic ‘numinous character’ (Jung 1980, 476)
34. Aura as the numinous 
                                                 
34 Aura as the numinous character of such pictured symbols would here be ascribed to the complex 
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character of such pictured symbols would here be ascribed to the complex 
projections coming with the process of (Jungian) individuation. This is, because the 
‘numinosum’ with its aura, which in sacred art and its staging close to an altar 
‘legitimizes’ the distance to presence of otherness, would be turned into the work on 
a mutual projection emerging between a demand (in the sense of challenging 
dynamics) of an open, but directed unconscious for integration and a conscious 
persona within its social network dealing with this demand, ‘a dynamic agency or 
effect not caused by an arbitrary act of will. On the contrary, it seizes and controls 
the human subject, who is always rather its victim than its creator. The numinosum – 
whatever its cause may be – is an experience of the subject independent of his will. 
[…] The numinosum is either a quality belonging to a visible object or the influence 
of an invisible presence that causes a peculiar alteration of consciousness’ (Samuels 
et al. 1986, 100).  
From this angle, Splendor Solis presents ‘imagery’ in the sense of bridging and 
mediating the various strands of a continuously destabilized differentiation, aiming 
‘at a living co-operation of all [collective, individual, unconscious] factors’ (Jung 
1953, 172). The process directs both itself and the alchemist symbolically towards 
the declared goal of the ‘Great Work’, a conjunction of its inherent opposites 
[coniunctio oppositorum]; however, being a movement of (further) differentiation, 
this conjunction forms simultaneously its dissolution, leaving the ‘Great Work’ 
always suspended
35.  
James Hillman sums up Jung’s interest in alchemy when he writes: ‘in Jung’s 
language, psychotherapy achieves its ultimate goal in the wholeness of the 
conjunction’ (quoted in: Semetsky 2006). But despite Jung’s consistent work on 
destabilizing binary opposites and augmenting the concept of desire that opens it 
for an ontology beyond a framework of subjectivity and reflects clearly into 
Deleuze’s concept of Becoming, his model is still based (and that is its weakness 
from the perspective of this research) on ‘universals’ i.e. ‘archetypes’ (the ‘self’ 
being perhaps the central one). These, for Jung, empty and instinctual structures 
cannot be but explored/lived individually in the process of individuation. Though 
always aware of the fact that the (alchemical) processes he is dealing with ‘are 
steeped in mystery’ (Jung 1980, 482), Jung disappoints the reader with ‘fixations’ 
(denoting here the alchemical reductions of volatile spirit to permanent forms i.e. re-
presentations) like: ‘We are then confronted with the underlying human psyche 
which, unlike consciousness, hardly changes at all in the course of many centuries 
                                                 
35 Splendor Solis shows how the painter visualizes alchemical (virtual/differential) transformation, 
shows his image of ‘differentiations’; the pictures, in contrast, are the ‘differenciation’ of what he brings 
into form. When, in the further course of this thesis, ‘differentiation’ is used on its own, the relationship 
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[…] Here, too we find those fundamental psychic facts that remain unchanged for 
thousands of years and will still be unchanged thousands of years hence’ (Jung 
1980, 476)
36. Aura would here be ascribed to the complex projections signifying the 
process of individuation but anchored in ‘eternal’ forms and limited to 
intersubjective development.
  
However, Kerslake shows how Deleuze worked also Jungian ‘archetypes’ into 
the concept of problematic ‘Ideas’ in Difference and Repetition (Kerslake 2007, 92), 
which will be introduced in the next section. The reasons for Deleuze’s interest in a 
thinker, who like Heidegger represented especially for the generation of leftists in 
the 1930s
37 and the one active in the 1960s and 70s an ambivalent engagement with 
Nazi ideology, are according to Kerslake the following:  
 
‘He [Deleuze] is opposed to the view of many contemporary theorists (from the 
Frankfurt School to Hardt and Negri) that all subjective experience is always already 
                                                 
36 However, Kerslake shows how Deleuze worked also Jungian ‘archetypes’ into the concept of problematic 
‘Ideas’ in Difference and Repetition (Kerslake 2007, 92). Although explicitly arguing against universals, 
Deleuze refers also to pre-individual (dynamically charged) intensities that support a subjectivation or 
individuation, ‘to bring into being that which does not yet exist’ (Deleuze 2004b, 185) i.e. individuate by 
differentiating beyond that which has already established as a ‘norm’ that ‘judges’. The reasons for 
Deleuze’s interest in a thinker, who like Heidegger stood for the generation active in the 1960s and 70s 
for an ambivalent engagement with Nazi ideology, are according to Kerslake the following: ‘He [Deleuze] 
is opposed to the view of many contemporary theorists (from the Frankfurt School to Hardt and Negri) 
that all subjective experience is always already penetrated by either representation or the biological 
imprint of late capitalism (or, at worst, by both of these). Much of Deleuze’s most creative thought is 
focused on articulating a positive account of the autonomous processes of the unconscious. Instincts and 
intuitions, experience of love, intoxication, esoteric experiences, breakdowns, dreams and nightmares all 
involve “dramatizations” which are relatively independent of our everyday representational activity, and 
involve what Deleuze and Jung both call “individuation”. The lurking political claim here is that to act as if 
processes of individuation do not exist (as the aforementioned thinkers often do) is self-defeating, and 
robs the agent of the strength to throw the dice in other domains. To recapture for theory and practice 
the positivity common to processes of individuation might therefore require making some strange 
alliances with more ‘esoteric’ traditions of thought (which were not always associated with the right, 
especially in France). Deleuze certainly does not appear to have been afraid to make this move.’ (Kerslake 
2007: 189) 
37 Walter Benjamin writes 1937 in a letter to Scholem that he had ‘begun to delve into Jung’s 
psychology – the devil’s work through and through, which should be attacked with white magic’ (Benjamin 
1994, 544). This Manichaean assignment of ‘white wizard’ vs. ‘ur-devil’ comes with Benjamin’s need to 
delimit clearly his arcades project and the search for ur-images (what became ‘dialectical’ images) from 
Jung’s ‘archetypes’. Jung, in contrast to Benjamin, does not refer to a transcendent origin or ‘fall’ but 
stresses that he examines the dynamics of human consciousness that lead, by trying to grasp an all-
pervading and ‘numinous’ desire (‘psyche’), to the collective evolution of varying ‘god’-images; his Answer 
to Job (1952) develops this perhaps most convincingly. Thus both ‘share’ an interest in possibilities of 
thinking the influence of the ‘pre-historic’ within contemporary historical time; one significant difference 
is Jung’s focus on a description of interiority (influenced by Kant) and Benjamin’s strategies against 
subjectivity (as it leads even further away from a redemption that will be a collective one). Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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penetrated by either representation or the biological imprint of late capitalism (or, at 
worst, by both of these). Much of Deleuze’s most creative thought is focused on 
articulating a positive account of the autonomous processes of the unconscious. 
Instincts and intuitions, experience of love, intoxication, esoteric experiences, 
breakdowns, dreams and nightmares all involve “dramatizations” which are relatively 
independent of our everyday representational activity, and involve what Deleuze and 
Jung both call “individuation”. The lurking political claim here is that to act as if 
processes of individuation do not exist (as the aforementioned thinkers often do) is 
self-defeating, and robs the agent of the strength to throw the dice in other 
domains.’(Kerslake 2007: 189) 
 
The observation in this section, based on Splendor Solis, that aura with its 
connection to Becoming deframes the allegedly determinate stages (or 
‘dramatizations’ of the individuation) of the ‘Work’ suggests that to ask ‘what 
Becoming is’ will miss exactly its processual quality, would ask for an essence. By 
presenting incessant changes and differentiations, i.e. by being temporal, Splendor 
Solis, so here the hypothesis, even avoids a quest for essence.  
The next section introduces Becoming as one of the multiple conceptual keys 
for the ontology of immanence, which Deleuze developed between the 1950s up to 
his death in 1995 works and its relevance for aura in immanence.  
 
 





At the heart of Deleuze’s philosophy stands the concept of (Being/Life/Desire 
as) ‘difference in itself’ in its temporal involvement with ‘repetition for itself’, 
released from any subordinations to identity and conceptualized explicitly in 
immanence, thus led by the question of how to avoid grounding Being in an ‘origin’ 
that causes the world with its beings and regresses toward transcendent hierarchies 
and their ‘judgments’.  
There are many ways of ‘entering’ Deleuze’s network of concepts, which is 
pervaded by ‘difference’ and its intricate relationship with Becoming, supported by 
an array of creative sourcing of various philosophical strands, writers, artists, 
musician. Martin Heidegger is only one of many thresholds (names) in this network, 
                                                 
38 For this section, which cannot be more than a briefest introduction, the following secondary 
literature has been most helpful with assisting the reading of Deleuze: (Agamben 1999c ; Artaud 1976 ; 
Balke 1996,  1998 ; Bogue 2003 ; Bryden 2001 ; Gente and Weibel 2007 ; Grosz 1999,  2008 ; Hardt 1993 
; Kaiser 2009 ; Keller 2007 ; Kerslake 2007 ; Lambert 2002 ; Marenbon 2003 ; O'Sullivan 2006 ; Parr 2005 
; Pinkard 2002 ; Rancière 2009 ; Rölli 2004 ; Semetsky 2006 ; Williams 2003 ; Young 2002). Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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but especially his critique of metaphysics and questions around the ‘ontological 
difference’, which implied the shift from the question what something is to the 
affirmation that something is, seem to be highly relevant for the understanding of 
Deleuze’s steps.  
The question what something is automatically leads into models of 
representations based on a matrix of origins behind the world (‘appearances’), a 
grounding separation between the original (‘god’) and the world as a lacking or 
deceitful ‘simulacrum’ as it has been carried out in classic metaphysics. In Identity 
and Difference from 1957, Heidegger shows how metaphysical thinking revolves in a 
circle around the attempt to give ‘account of the ground’, of ‘what is called to 
account by the ground, and finally what calls the ground to account’ (Heidegger 
1969, 58) and introduces thus a split between things in their temporal ‘being’ and 
Being as such.  
This attempt is based on the subject as reliable basis of perception and 
knowledge: originally translated into the Latin word subjectum, the Greek 
hypokeimenon means ‘that which is underneath’, referring, so explains Heidegger in 
the paper The Age of the World Picture, to ‘something which lies before us from out 
of itself and which, as such, lies at the foundation of both its own permanent 
characteristics and its changing circumstances’; it signifies as an ‘unshakeable 
ground of truth, which rests in itself’ (Heidegger 2002,81) the basis of knowledge. 
With Descartes and the rise of modern philosophy, so argues Heidegger, the weight 
of this certainty of truth was shifted with the liberation from theological orthodoxies 
towards the human mind constituting truth. The subject reflects itself like the object 
world as representation: ‘The subiectum, the fundamental certainty, is that always 
secured entity which representing man always co-presents along with human or non-
human being, along, that is, with the objectified’ (Heidegger 2002, 82). This shift in 
modern philosophy concerns the new and opened ways of positing what is 
‘obligatory’ according to the subject as source of knowledge: reason, an ordered and 
classified nature and social space or what has not yet been objectified: chaos. The 
shift thus reflects a potentially (and practically) destructive mastery over nature and, 
simultaneously, the oblivion of the primary relationship of world as beings and 
Being, establishing their mutual ‘disclosure’ and ‘concealment’ as truth.  
What has been forgotten, is ‘that when we deal with the Being of beings with 
the beings of Being, we deal in each case with a difference’ (Heidegger 1969, 62); 
here, difference becomes a hinge previously not thought independently, which, 
outside of any ground, relates beings and Being in their mutual and simultaneous 
folding of concealment/disclosure. To abstract a ‘ground’ from the realm of beings 
is the consequence of forgetting the limiting perspective or horizon applied to it, 
which inevitably ‘degrades’ beings, ‘as they are the fullness of Being: they are what Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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is most of all’ (Heidegger 1969, 69). Metaphysic’s simultaneous attempts to 
determine the universal essence of beings (‘indifferently valid everywhere’) and unity 
in the ‘All-Highest’ (Heidegger 1969, 58) sublate difference in the identity of Being 
(as God).  
Re-presentation, which is at the heart of such limiting pictures of the 
differential twofold of beings/Being, Heidegger describes as ‘to set something 
before one’ and secure it as ‘what has been set in place [das Gestellte]’, to frame it in 
order to make it usable. Heidegger calls this characteristic human trait (that comes 
with language) - ‘to set something in place’, to frame it in order to master, change, 
administer it - enframing (Gestell) (Heidegger 2002, 82). In its practice, as 
ceaselessly developing technologies in a world of the forgotten fold of being-here as 
‘fullness of Being’, the process of enframing (Gestell) becomes highly ambivalent and 
dangerous. Heidegger proposes to ‘step back’ and to think difference as difference: 
‘Being thought in terms of difference’ opens the ‘twofold’ of Being and beings as a 
‘circling […] around each other’ (Heidegger 1969, 65).  
Creating his own radicalised concept of difference, Deleuze refers to 
Heidegger’s ‘”turning” beyond metaphysics”’, which supports his move of freeing 
difference from its subordination to opposition, resemblance, identity and analogy. 
When Heidegger writes: ‘Being itself can open out in its truth the difference of Being 
and beings preserved in itself only when the difference explicitly takes place’ 
(quoted in: Deleuze 2004b, 78), he moves in this direction, but keeps, by leaving it 
in the middle of the ‘twofold’ with its apparent given/giving coherence, difference 
hinged. Deleuze expounds where his concept differs from Heidegger:  
 
‘Because we think without origin, and without destination, difference becomes 
the highest thought, but we cannot think it between two things, between a point of 
departure and a point of arrival, not even between Being [l’Étre] and being [l’étant]. 
Difference cannot be affirmed as such without devouring the two terms that cease to 
contain it, though it does not itself cease from passing through assignable terms. 
Difference is the true logos, but logos is the errancy that does away with fixed 
points; indifference is its pathos. Difference emerges from and re-enters a fissure 
that swallows up all things and beings’ (Deleuze 2004a, 159) 
 
Here, difference has been released from any subordination that could 
guarantee identities derived from relationships between things (opposition, 
resemblance, identity, analogy). Unhinged, difference also questions (and devours) a 
coherent axis between Being and beings. It destroys its temporal suffering (as fixed 
conception of ‘Being’=indifference) by ceaselessly passing through the cracks and 
fissures of ‘strata’, the nameable historical formations, positivities and empiricities’ 
(Deleuze 1999b, 41) of knowledge, but not remaining as their assignation. Following 
the fissure ‘in order to reach an interior of the world’ (Deleuze 1999b, 99) equals 
following difference in its involvement with repetition as processual differentiation. Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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Taken out of their analogical relationship or their categorised differences, 
Being and beings fall together as ‘univocity’, a concept that had already been 
developed by the medieval theologian John Duns Scotus: ‘All masters and 
theologians seem to use a concept common to God and creature, although they deny 
this verbally when they apply it’ (quoted in: Marenbon 2003, 312). Aware of the 
dangers to uphold a community of beings with God as reality against a first being as 
source, Duns Scotus restricted this concept to logic, thus ‘neutralised being itself in 
an abstract concept’ (Deleuze 2004b, 49). For Deleuze, Baruch Spinoza is the first 
who affirms in his Ethics univocity as one single universal and infinite substance, as 
‘Deus sive Natura’ that possesses all attributes as expressive modes (thoughts, 
beings) and avoids the separation between Being and beings:  
 
‘If substance possesses equally all attributes, there is no hierarchy among the 
attributes, one is not worth more than another. In other words, if thought is an 
attribute of God and if extension is an attribute of God or of substance, between 
thought and extension there won't be any hierarchy. All the attributes will have the 
same value from the moment that they are attributes of substance. We are still in the 
abstract. This is the speculative figure of immanence’ (Deleuze 2004b). 
 
Deleuze, as can be seen at this point, prepares from multiple sources a 
network of predecessors for a philosophy of difference kept consequently within 
univocity of being and immanence. Immanence is ‘not immanence to substance; 
rather, substance and modes are in immanence’ (Deleuze 2001, 26). None of the 
concepts, which rise from this network of non-hierarchical involvement, will be ones 
‘beyond’. The problematic division between the one and the multiple, which affects 
also the one between subject and object, makes way for multiplicities populating 
planes of immanence, traversed by difference. What had in (Kantian) critical 
philosophy been an analysis and determination of the limits of human recognition 
and knowledge as ‘transcendental subject’, opens up in Deleuze to the positivity of 
‘life’, is turned, beyond the borders of interiority, to the outside, reaching into the 
pre-individual and indefinite as ‘A LIFE’, the plane of immanence that defines 
subsequently the ‘transcendental field’. ‘[A] singular essence’ (Deleuze 2001, 29), it 
builds, consisting of all planes (‘interleaved’, ‘holed’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 
50/1)), a crossover of cosmos and chaos, of order and disorder, spatialized time and 
temporalized space: ‘chaosmos’ as first visualized in James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake: 
‘[…] every person, place and thing in the chaosmos of Alle anyway connected [...] 
was moving and changing every part of the time [...] the continually more and less 
intermisunderstanding minds […] as time went on as it will variously inflected, 
differently pronounced, changeably meaning vocable scriptsigns’ (118.21-28). In Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
    61 
contrast (but not opposed
39) to Kant’s conception, the plane of immanence holds 
forces of ‘chaotic variability’, which provide the potential for the differentiation and 
actualization of the real as world and its experience (‘transcendental field’). It is art’s 
task to transform this ‘chaotic variability’ into ‘chaoid variety’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994, 205) and to provide audio/visual/readable links to ‘singularities’, to those 
remarkable, inimitable points or transformative thresholds of Becoming on the plane 
of immanence, which delimit the concept of the subject and its organization of the 
world. A singularity is ‘any element that can be extended to the proximity of another 
such that it may obtain a connection’ (Deleuze 2006c, 354), indicating that 
knowledge becomes an ‘assemblage’ of such extending proximities, and this 
includes as well the place of such knowledge, the concept of the subject. 
Individuation encompasses thus the transcendental field, not only the subject (as in 
Jung), which becomes a cluster of ‘pre-individual singularities and non-personal 
individuation’ (Deleuze 2006c, 355). For an artist (as for the philosopher), that 
means: ‘I am no longer myself, but an aptitude of thought for finding itself and 
spreading across a plane that passes though me at several places’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994, 64); however, a philosopher, according to Deleuze/Guattari, needs to 
create concepts that are able to describe the constellations of events, whereas an 
artists includes ‘the novelties, goes beyond the perceptual states and affective 
transitions of the lived’, is a ‘seer, a becomer’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 171).  
Brian Massumi’s aphorism: ‘It is every being’s exemplary fate to be born a 
singularity, for more to come’ (Massumi 2002b, xxxiv) alludes to the overall-
conception of the plane of immanence as univocity of all being that, with its affirmed 
infinite chain of ‘birth’ and metamorphosis, absorbs ‘origin’ and ‘otherness’ (both 
pointers to the traditional notion of aura and transcendence) ‘within the immanent’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 47). In order to prevent transcendence from re-entering 
into the imagined (the thought of) still-stand (via contemplation, reflection, 
communication), the immanent needs to be conceptualized as continuously 
differentiating movement of the infinite
40: Deleuze uses for this resistance the verb 
‘to immanate’, a ‘device’, as Catherine Keller writes, ‘that will let immanence resist 
its own petrification’ (2007, 155). 
When Deleuze writes: ‘What differentiates itself is first that which differs from 
itself, in other word, the virtual’ (2004a, 43), it becomes clear that what actualizes 
through/on the planes in time must be intricately involved with and triggered by an 
                                                 
39 The main aspects of Deleuze’s critique of Kant is explained in chapter 3.1. 
40 In how far this is possible in art practice, is one of the main underlying questions of this 
research. It links directly to the problematic of flux and framing flux in visuals (chapter 2.3) and the 
question of how the ethical aspects of aura (response/ability to/wards the ‘other’) might transform in an 
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intensity that exceeds  what otherwise would stagnate as a fixed form. Ronald Bogue 
explains:  
 
‘The virtual is actualized in bodies, states of things, perceptions, and 
affections, and these actual entities are the subject of scientific investigation. But 
immanent within the actual is the virtual, something extra that exceeds the 
actualizations of every occurrence, both something left over, perpetually in reserve, 
and something still about to occur, an “infinite awaiting that is already infinitely past, 
awaiting and reserve”’ (Bogue 2003, 176).  
 
Deleuze reworks here Henri Bergson’s objection to the application of scientific 
methods onto lived experience. As scientific methods apply to the observation of 
objects in space, separated from each other and in a ‘stop’-state, they cannot do 
justice to the characteristics of the immediate, the sensation of internal non-linear 
flow of time, ‘duration’ and will lose ‘the difference of the thing, that which makes 
its being, that which makes it this rather than that, this rather than something else’ 
(Deleuze 2004a, 24)
41. Metaphysical systems built on such analytical methods will, 
according to Bergson, fail as they disregard that duration is not only the internal 
experience as flux but also its quantitative condensation; when he writes ‘fixed 
concepts can be extracted by our thought from the mobile reality; but there is no 
means whatever of reconstituting with the fixity of concepts the mobility of the real’ 
(Bergson 1946, 189), he foreshadows what Deleuze conceives in his philosophy as 
an overdue critique of ‘images of thought’, judgments derived from spatial analysis 
of duration, which is temporal, yet non-linar. Duration appears as two tendencies of 
one movement, as spirit (duration as internal experience, ‘mobility’) and 
simultaneously as matter and with it as two modes of time: past and present as 
coexisting movements, ‘the one beneath the other, and not the one after the other [, 
…] different times, the present and the past, as contemporary with one another, and 
forming the same world’ (Deleuze 2004a, 24). The virtual then, as accumulation of 
‘an infinitely dilated’ past, an excess with its problematic complexes that (even if 
never having been present), triggers actualization by differentiation, a contraction 
‘as an extremely narrow, tensed present’ (Deleuze 2004a, 31).  
From this angle, Becoming is exactly the process of actualization of the 
coexisting and real ‘beneath’, the virtual, before it has become the actual itself. 
Instead of functioning as a hinge between the virtual and the actual, Becoming 
names difference in movement, differentiation within duration; it traverses, passes 
across and through duration’s ‘ability to englobe itself, even while it splits itself up 
                                                 
41 Bergson writes: ‘[…] it appeared to us that the utilitarian work of the mind, in what concerns the 
perception of our inner life, consisted in a sort of refracting of pure duration into space a refracting which 
permits us to separate our psychical states, to reduce them to a more and more impersonal form and to 
impose names upon them, - in short, to make them enter the current of social life’ (Bergson 1919, 242). Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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into fluxes and concentrates itself in a single current, according to the nature of 
attention we pay to it’ (Deleuze 2004a, 39). With Becoming, duration ‘differs from 
itself’ (Deleuze 2004a, 37), differentiates multiplicities, both continuous 
(quantitative) and discontinuous (qualitative) ones as production of real difference
42. 
As englobing heterogeneity, Bergson’s discredited élan gains with Deleuze’s take on 
‘Bergsonism’ new relevance: for it is not a clearly framed subject that Bergson’s 
conception of ‘difference’ (according to Deleuze) invites to dissolve in a stream of 
dreamy consciousness, but a multiplicity or destabilized composite or ‘subjectile’
43 
of heterogeneous and differentiating tendencies that must live with an awareness for 
how to respond creatively (actively) to ‘a force that duration carries in itself: 
dichotomy is the law of life’ (Deleuze 2004a, 28). The dichotomy, could be argued, 
consists perhaps merely between Deleuze’s claim and actual regress into new 
hierarchies between ‘pure’ forces and historical/social reality he aims to overcome; 
then, the traditional genesis of Becoming from Being would have been just reversed. 
But Deleuze clearly states the reality and simultaneity (univocity) of the interaction of 
both perspectives: ‘The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. The 
                                                 
42 Multiplicities as temporalized ‘compositions’ appear in two types: on the one hand as actual 
numerical objects of observation, represented by space, differentiating quantitatively in measured time; 
on the other hand as virtual, heterogeneous and internal aspects of duration. Multiplicities are ‘composed 
of particular elements, empty places for those who temporarily function as subjects, and cumulable, 
repeatable and self-preserving regularities [, …] topological’ (Deleuze 1999b, 13). As spatial relations of 
lived experiences and their fissured strata, of concepts as much as expressive intensities and their 
dramatization, multiplicities encompass a network that interweaves and dissolves structures of exteriority 
(as countable things) and interiority (as psychic states). Deleuze writes: ‘The important thing … is that the 
decomposition of the composite reveals to us two types of multiplicity. One is represented by space (or 
rather, if all the nuances are taken into account, by the impure combination of homogenous time): It is a 
multiplicity of exteriority, of simultaneity, of juxtaposition, of order, of quantitative differentiation, of 
difference in degree; it is a numerical multiplicity, discontinuous and actual. The other type of multiplicity 
appears in pure duration: It is an internal multiplicity of succession, of fusion, of organization, of 
heterogeneity, of qualitative discrimination, or of difference in kind; it is a virtual and continuous 
multiplicity that cannot be reduced to numbers.’ (Deleuze 1988a: 38) 
43 Deleuze, in The Fold, refers to architect/philosopher Bernard Cache’s term of the ‘objectile’ as: ‘a 
very modern conception of the technological object: it refers neither to the beginnings of the industrial 
era nor to the idea of the standard that still upheld a semblance of essence and imposed a law of 
constancy … but to our current state of things, where fluctuation of the norm replaces the permanence of 
a law; where the object assumes a place in a continuum by variation … The new status of the object no 
longer refers its condition to a spatial mold – in other words, to a relation of form-matter – but to a 
temporal modulation that implies as much the beginnings of a continuous variation of matter as a 
continuous development of form’ (Deleuze 2006b, 20). From this perspective, which implies a 
temporalization/vecorialization of the relationship between subject and object and the latter’s becoming 
an ‘event’, Cache speaks of the subject – put as ‘event’ or ‘surface’ (subjectile in French means literally 
‘the layer as basis for applying paint’ (Interview in: Balkema and Slager 1999, 27)) - as ‘subjectile’. Cache 
writes: ‘The subjectile […] subdivides into “subject” zones of which it will be said that they have this body 
or that soul’ (Cache 1995, 124). Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual. […] Indeed, the virtual must be defined as 
strictly a part of the real object – as though the object had one part of itself in the 
virtual into which it plunged as though into an objective dimension’ (Deleuze 2004b, 
260). Differentiation refers thus to differentials as ‘portions of the difference’, a 
‘reciprocal determination’ or relations between differences in contrast to quasi-
Neoplatonical theories of emanation. ‘A life’ or the plane of immanence, containing 
‘only virtuals’, coexists with its actualization in ‘an object and a subject to which it 
attributes itself’ (Deleuze 2001, 31) as one constellation within a much broader 
transcendental field. 
Becoming as the gradual, intense differentiation (not the virtual, not the actual 
but in between) is here the productive and infinite return of differences, the vitality 
of pure differences and repetitions leading to temporarily stable forms. The forming 
of these stable forms projects no finality but functions as masks or costumes: 
‘Repetition is truly that which disguises itself in constituting itself, that which 
constitutes itself only by disguising itself. It is not underneath the masks, but is 
formed from one mask to another, as though from one distinctive point to another' 
(Deleuze 2004b: 19). The subject, as multiplicity opened in and for the forces of 
Becoming, the personal and the personal experience (per sonare (lat.): to sound 
through a mask) becomes thus a locus solus, a unique place of transmutation within 
‘A LIFE’ (Deleuze 2001: 31). Deleuze binds Nietzsche’s ‘eternal return’
44, the 
affirmation of a ‘thought in its most terrible form: existence as it is, without meaning 
or aim, yet recurring inevitably without any finale of nothingness; “the eternal 
recurrence”’ (Nietzsche 1968, 35), into his philosophy by linking it to difference. 
Repetition is the counter-part to difference, linking it not to repetition of the same 
but to transmutation. As Nietzsche argues ‘to welcome every moment of universal 
existence with a sense of triumph [..] in oneself as good, valuable – with pleasure’ 
(Nietzsche 1968, 36), he positions the affirmation of recurrence against the 
consequence of the transcendent structures of religion, slavery of ‘resentment’ that 
coerces the individual into subordination of life, passion, vitality and positivity as 
‘misery’ to transcendent ideals
 45. What Nietzsche achieves, according to Deleuze, is 
to affirm the ‘death of God’ in a new way, not as affirming man’s usurpation of 
                                                 
44 Developed particularly in Nietzsche’s fragments from the years 1883-1888, which were ordered 
into thematic section by Nietzsche’s sister and first published posthumously as The Will to Power in 1901. 
This edition (and especially Alfred Bäumler’s editorial involvement) gained notorious fame in the 1930s as 
the sum of Nietzsche’s thinking and its closeness to the aims of the ‘Third Reich’.  
45 In terms of Becoming, this freedom of transcendence makes the plane of perspectives - that had 
to be subordinated to the judgment of transcendent authority - explode: ‘If becoming is a great ring, then 
everything is equally valuable, eternal, necessary. – In all correlations of Yes and No, of preference and 
rejection, love and hate, all that is expressed is a perspective, an interest of certain types of life: in itself, 
everything that is says Yes’ (Aphorism 293, 1888, in: Nietzsche 1968: 165). Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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God’s place but by ‘trying to give voice to […] impersonal individuations and […] pre-
individual singularities … that’s what he calls Dionysos, or also the super-man’ 
(Deleuze 2004a, 139). Deleuze reads Nietzsche’s ‘eternal return’ not as the return of 
the same, but as that which ‘one also will the eternal return’, a condition, which, 
enlarged onto the concept of ‘being’ excludes the inverted resentment of 
superiority: ‘only that which becomes in the fullest sense of the word can return, is 
fit to return. Only action and affirmation return: becoming has being and only 
becoming has being’ (Deleuze 2010, x): linked to (the re-turn of) further 
differentiation, Becoming implies decisions, ‘disjunctions’ or selections. This reading 
installs the notorious terms ‘selection’ and ‘being fit’ - perhaps the most alarming 
aspects of certain forms of vitalism - in univocity, where they indicate the ability and 
responsibility of transmuting with the potential of ‘zoë’ as ‘life’ against its 
administration as ‘bios’ in strategies of politics.   
‘Life’ as the plane of immanence (the virtual and thus being real) carries 
complex questions, which trigger actualizations and their reflection in thought (as 
counter-actualizations). Deleuze calls these problematic questions or problems 
‘Ideas’, thereby inverting Platonic Ideas, which are positioned as pure abstractions 
outside of real forms, into differentiated complexes within univocity=immanence. 
Thus, ‘[p]roblematic Ideas are not simple essences, but multiplicities or complexes 
of relations and corresponding singularities’ (Deleuze 2004b, 203), they ‘pre-
embody’ tests and selections asking for solutions, which ‘ground in the conditions of 
the problems’ (Deleuze 2004b, 201)
46. Emerging from and encompassing the 
tendencies of problematic Ideas, Becoming suggests, from the point of view of this 
research, artistically and politically an unfolding of a community of dissensus, not an 
empty homogeneous search for the supra-sensible or for power
47. Subjectivation 
(also in the sense of making art) encompasses not the development of a 
homogeneous or indifferent ‘style’ (Deleuze 1995, 141) but asks for decisions of 
how to subjectivate, to be a differentiating multiplicity and respond to the world as 
‘matrix of problems’ (Kerslake 2007) after the loss of ‘belief’ in transcendent ideals 
and with it, loss of coherence between thought and world:  
                                                 
46 Deleuze’s composite or conjunction of ‘different/ciation’ refers, according to Constantin V. 
Boundas, ‘to the complex relations between problems and solutions, questions and answers, virtual Ideas-
structures and their actualizations. Deleuze calls 'differentiation' the totality of the diacritic relations 
which occur `inside' an Idea-structure, and 'differenciation,' the process of actualization of such a 
structure. `Differenciation', therefore, designates the actualization of a virtuality, and it is only one half of 
the notion of difference. It is the half which cannot account for itself without prior appeal to the process 
of differentiation’ (in: Patton 1996, 91). 
47 Deleuze puts differentiation and thus the problematic of a complex act in the centre, not 
foremost the ‘Other’, He avoids thus what Jacques Ranciére points out in Dissensus: ‘Obedience to the 
rights of the Other sweep aside the heterogeneity of political dissensus in the name of a more radical 
heterogeneity’ (Rancière 2009, 74). Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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‘What we most lack is a belief in the world, we've quite lost the world, it's been 
taken from us. If you believe in the world you precipitate events, however 
inconspicuous, that elude control, you engender new space-times, however small 
their surface or volume. It's what you call pietas.  Our ability to resist control, or our 
submission to it, has to be assessed at the level of our every move. We need both 
creativity and a people’ (Deleuze 1995, 176).  
 
Here it is lived, continuous and active openness for ‘selective’ differentiation in 
discontinuity (‘creativity’, ‘people’) that is anchored in immanence (the world) from 
where  ‘a breach [as transcendent ‘event’ or rupture within the immanent] is 
expected’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 47), the trigger from virtual problematic that 
stimulates the ‘new’.  
Selections as responses to the intensities of virtual problems result from the 
particular way in which, in terms of time, actualizations (and consciousness) build, 
according to Deleuze, upon three syntheses of time: the first being a passive 
synthesis of habit, defining an organism as ‘contraction’, as ‘living present in time’; 
the second a synthesis of memory as a priori or ‘pure’ (thus not yet actualized) past, 
a virtual co-existence of past and present, which constitutes memory as an 
‘embedding of presents themselves’ (Deleuze 2004b, 102) from ‘the point of view of 
a ground which causes the passing of one present and the arrival of another’ 
(Deleuze 2004b, 117). Against the purely cyclical models of predictable repetitions 
of the present into futurity, Deleuze introduces with the third synthesis of future an 
effacement of the present as agent: the ‘eternal return’ of repetition confronts the 
subject-agent with ‘empty time’, a ‘time out of joint […] outside the curve which gave 
it a god [or, teleology], liberated from its overly simple circular figure’. This involves 
a continuous questioning of what “I” is, a fracture demanding decisions about how to 
act futurity in a scenario where: ‘[t]ime itself unfolds (that is, apparently ceases to be 
a circle) instead of things unfolding within it (following the overly simple circular 
figure’ (Deleuze 2004b, 111)
48. 
Deleuze’s conceptualization of the ‘eternal return’ with its reference to the 
complexity and Becoming of individuation (individuation always precedes the 
individual, Becoming the actual) inherently subverts a state of established power as it 
tends to that which is still ‘to come’, the ‘new’ and the ‘minor’ which is not yet 
established as majority or narrative/mythology to be followed; in this context – 
strictly speaking, Becoming excludes ‘what is’ - his concept has its political/ethical 
strength and installs Nietzsche’s affirmation of life in an unambiguous way
49.  
                                                 
48 This subject is central to chapter 2.5 of this thesis. 
49 John Caputo shows in Against Ethics that Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche suppresses Nietzsche’s 
rejection of differentiating univocity or, how Caputo puts it, difference as ‘gay play of egalitarian forces’. 
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This extension of individuation affects the limitations of the ‘unconscious’ to a 
realm of human condition as held up by psychoanalysis. When the virtual, the past 
(memory) with its problematic Ideas ‘coexists with itself as present’ (Deleuze 2004a, 
29), then it is also the virtual as ‘unconscious’ that actualizes its other movement, 
‘consciousness’, with its quantitative reflective mode. The polarity of 
conscious/unconscious seems reflected in the relationship between the reality of 
virtual/actual but destabilized by the minute instants of differentiations. Already 
Bergson’s perspective of the unconscious is that  
 
‘[…] memory does not consist in a regression from the present to the past, 
but, on the contrary, in a progress from the past to the present. It is in the past that 
we place ourselves at a stroke. We start from a “virtual state” which we lead onwards, 
step by step, through a series of different planes of consciousness, up to the goal 
where it is materialized in an actual perception; that is to say, up to the point where 
it becomes a present, active state; in fine, up to that extreme plane of our 
consciousness against which our body stands out. In this virtual state pure memory 
consists’ (Bergson 1919).  
 
Like an inverted cone, the ‘unconscious’ dilates here downward towards the 
pre-individual singularities and complexes of the plane of immanence, which escape 
transcendent concepts.  
The ‘unconscious’ in its relationship to Becoming and the plane of immanence 
with its singularities, as conceptualized by Deleuze and psychoanalyst Félix Guattari, 
his at times co-writer - the ‘two of us […] each of us several, […] already a crowd’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 3) -, differs radically from traditional psychoanalytic 
frameworks and their focus on an individual’s equilibrium in between societal 
demands and unconscious drives. 
 Desire, far from being the drive behind a theatrical self-illumination via 
mythology, does not exist as such in Deleuze/Guattari’s materialist ‘Schizoanalysis’ 
but as a network of productive ‘desiring-machines’, making the unconscious a 
factory of production (thus not first a question of representation that needs 
decoding). Their first cooperation for their project Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
Anti-Oedipus, presents ‘the univocity of the real, a sort of Spinozism of the 
unconscious’ (Deleuze 1995, 144), dealing here with the concept of the Real as 
proposed by Jacques Lacan when he updated Freud’s topology.  
In Lacan’s The Mirror Stage as Formative of The I Function (2006, 75-81), the 
first identification and image of the self (at the age of 18 months, before entering 
                                                 
to vanish in Deleuze’s reworking for a new post-war reception of his work. Caputo stresses that Deleuze 
stays silent about Nietzsche’s extremes, denies Nietzsche’s affirmation of opposition and quotes Deleuze: 
‘”One cannot overemphasize the extent to which the notions of struggle, war rivalry or even comparison 
are foreign to Nietzsche and to his conception of the will of power”’ (Caputo 1993, 50). When Caputo 
claims that ‘[Deleuze’s] will of the free spirit guards against all “responsibility”’ (Caputo 1993, 44), he 
obviously denies Deleuze’s implicit ethics which will hopefully become clearer in the course of this thesis. Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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speech) is composed like a mirror image as it is the result of reflections: either of a 
direct visual glimpse of the inverted parts of the own body on a speculum, or of 
others who themselves imitate the infant’s movements. Others and the self-as-other 
function thus as foundation for a subject forming in-between the desire of others, 
the discourse of signifiers (Symbolic Order) enabling the communication of desire on 
the one hand, and the realm of partial drives on the other hand, located in the Real 
that will remain according to Lacan, after the subject’s entry into the symbolic order 
(as it is unsymbolizable), inaccessible. The gap or, perhaps better, the wound of lack 
resulting from this structure will shape all subsequent forming of relations exactly 
because of the separation and somewhat final seclusion that builds the nucleus of 
inter-subjectivity as a fundamentally barred one in this model. In connection to the 
external, inassimilable and radical otherness that inhabits inevitably an unconscious 
understood as linguistically structured, ‘[m]an’s desire is the desire of the Other’ 
(Lacan 1998b, 235)
50.  
By conceptualizing the Real as univocity, Deleuze/Guattari make it accessible 
and dissolve this dialectical, yet also constitutional gap (the wound of lack) that 
marks the barrier to the inaccessible. Then, the Real appears in all its productivity, 
as immanent chaos of partial drives and objects and transforms the conception of 
the unconscious (and thus desire) that emerged with the enlightenment and the 
simultaneous liberation of the ‘night’, the slumber of reason. Freud’s model, built 
upon hydraulic imagery of sexual cathexis in its conflict with the cultural demands of 
sublimation on the one hand and ordained capitalist strategies in the upcoming 
industrial age on the other transforms to an affirmative, challenging and creative 
stream of desire-connectivity and transcends the individual as a blindly locked unit 
by equipping it conceptually (and practically) with a potential to link into this 
connectivity. 
Deleuze/Guattari re-evaluate the symptoms of schizophrenia by listening to 
schizophrenics like Jung, but from another angle. Once the ‘lack of being’ as hiatus 
between Symbolic Order and the Real has been de-installed, the typical disruption of 
a functioning integration into the symbolic order opens to the chaosmos of a 
(problematic) potential of pre-individual fluidity and its inherent formations of desire 
                                                 
50 Lacan’s thus dialectic conception of desire – which Deleuze from his perspective of univocal 
differentiation will try to dismantle - is strongly influenced by Kojeve’s reading of Hegel’s chapter on the 
relationship of master and slave in (Phenomenology of Spirit) forming the subject’s self-consciousness: 
‘Man’s humanity “comes to light” only in risking his life to satisfy his human Desire – that is, his Desire 
directed toward another Desire. Now, to desire a Desire is to want to substitute oneself for the value 
desired by this Desire. For without this substitution, one would desire the value, the desired object, and 
not the Desire itself. Therefore, to desire the Desire of another is in the final analysis to desire that the 
value that I am or that I “represent” be the value desired by the other: I want him to “recognize” my value 
as his value. I want him to “recognize” me as an autonomous value’ (Kojève 1980, 7).
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to break through or liquefy capitalist structures that are liaised with a particular 
controlling mythical structure, the familial triad of the psychoanalytic oedipal model. 
The delirium of and split-offs from the schizophrenic body, the non-organic 
fragments or singularities connected in a ‘machinic assemblage’ they name Body of 
Organs (further on BwO) after texts by Antonin Artaud who developed a theatre of 
intensity (‘theatre of cruelty’) that incorporates, not represents, the transgression of 
the body thwarted by order language. In fact, words (or their order as ‘language’) 
tormented Artaud’s body, and in one of his last works, the radio play To Have Done 
with the Judgment of God (1947), it reads: 
 
‘Man is sick because he is badly constructed. / We must make up our minds to 
strip him bare in order to scrape / off that animalcule that itches him mortally, /  / 
god, / and with god / his organs. / For you can tie me up if you wish, / but there is 
nothing more useless than an organ. / When you will have made him a body without 
organs, / then you will have delivered him from all his automatic reactions / and 
restored him to his true freedom. / Then you will teach him again to dance wrong 
side out / as in the frenzy of dance halls / and this wrong side out be his real place.’ 
(Artaud 1976: 570) 
 
Here, the body’s fragmentation into partial objects and non-organic forces 
liberates the body from its organs as judgments of God, from ‘the doctrine of infinite 
debt [that] determines the relationships of the immortal soul with judgments 
(Deleuze 1998, 128): the ‘organ-ized’ body is barred from ‘true freedom’ i.e. from 
thought beyond its order as language maintaining a consciousness that never 
recognizes and affirms its entrapment by God’s judgements. The BwO stands thus, 
as Joshua Ramey puts it, for ‘a subtle body accessible at the extremes of experience 
– in suffering, delirium, synesthesia, and ecstatic states’, for Deleuze marking the 
intense conditions for stepping out of images of thought and conceiving the real in 
thought ‘paradoxically beyond its representational capacities’ (Ramey 2012, 2). 
God’s judgement thus marks ‘lack’ as it ‘implies a veritable organization of the 
bodies [and is} nothing other than the power to organize to infinity’ (Deleuze 1998, 
130), the ground for a will for power, not the will to power that would affirm 
transformational Becoming. The BwO connects desiring-machines from one to the 
other, but also (against traditional logic) by simultaneously charging all chains as 
‘disjunctive syntheses’, ‘an immanent use that would no longer be exclusive or 
restrictive, but fully affirmative, nonrestrictive, inclusive’. Such rebuff to reason and 
structure supports Deleuze/Guattari’s project applying schizophrenic Becoming to a 
critique of capitalist structures and societies: the disjunction shows both aspect of a 
delirium that capitalism produces, the catatonic, dead and the vital, anarchic; the 
disjunction proposes an avoidance of that identity, which obeys the structure of 
judgment, opening both at once ‘without restricting one by the other or excluding Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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the other from the one, is perhaps the greatest paradox […,belonging] precisely to 
both sides’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 76). 
Clearly, Deleuze/Guattari free Artaud’s Body without Organs from the clinically 
schizophrenic aspect of a deep, almost gnostic disgust of the body
51 to its potential 
as ‘affective, intensive, anarchist body that consists solely of poles, zones, 
thresholds and gradients. It is traversed by a powerful, nonorganic vitality’ (Deleuze 
1998, 131)
52. In this description, elements encountered earlier in this section, play 
together: the intensity of affects in problematic virtual multiplicities urging into 
actualization, the poles and thresholds built by singularities during differentiation in 
the virtual, the free flowing chaotic stream of forces that are not yet organically 
bound. 
Deleuze/Guattari achieve, by introducing the BwO, to radicalize a line of 
Freudo-Marxism of the end 60s, which in their view, paralyses due to its narrow 
framework. Guattari writes: 
  
‘To sever desire from work: such is the primary imperative of capitalism. To 
separate political economy from libidinal economy: such is the mission of those 
theoreticians who serve capitalism. Work and desire are in contradiction only in the 
framework of relations of production, of well-defined social and familial relations: 
those of capitalism and bureaucratic socialism.’ (Guattari 1977, 74).  
 
Capitalism (and bureaucratic socialism) as delirium suggests a becoming-
Capitalism of desire as an all-pervading and intangible plane, not in the sense of a 
teleology of desire but its being ‘world-historical’ (Deleuze 2006c, 314), a 
consequence of the representation of its forces as ‘surplus-value’; as such a delirium 
                                                 
51 Susan Sontag points out that the BwO carries with it a Gnostic refusal of the body itself and a 
very specific refusal of language to create a meaningful discourse. ‘Artaud’s commitment’, she writes in 
her excellent introduction to Artaud’s Selected Writings, ‘to the magical value of words explains his 
refusal of metaphor as the principal mode of conveying meaning in his late poems. He demands that 
language directly express the physical human being, The person of the poet appears in a state beyond 
nakedness: flayed’ (Susan Sontag, Artaud. An Essay, in: Artaud 1976: lii). This point is turned affirmatively 
by Deleuze.  
52 From an orthodox Lacanian point of view, Deleuze’s and Guattari’s affirmation of the Body 
without Organs (and especially their recommendation to make one for oneself) implies a trespassing of 
one of the fundamental Lacanian concepts, the patriarchal subjection to the symbolic order (of 
coordinated/-ing language and laws); Ellie Ragland-Sullivan gives Deleuze/Guattari a slap on the wrist: 
‘These authors, indeed, advocate what Lacan has shown to be an impossibility: to live in sanity in an 
archaic, preverbal state of psychic symbiosis. The schizophrenic hero of Desire, whom they extol, is a kind 
of Marcusian or Laing-like caricature of the Lacanian desiring subject’ (Ragland-Sullivan 1986: 272). 
However, Smith (2012, 313-324) can prove that Deleuze/Guattari in fact continue as ‘Lacan’s most 
profound, but also most independent, disciples’ his work by consequently conceptualizing along an 
inherent criticism of psychoanalysis in Lacan’s own work: ‘In Lacan, the symbolic organization of the 
structure, with its exclusions that come from the function of the signifier, has as its reverse side the real 
inorganization of desire’ (Deleuze/Guattari, quoted in: Smith 2012, 322).  Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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it proves able to absorb the challenges of its consistency (class struggles) and relates 
to what Robert Kurz calls the ‘esoteric’ aspect of Marxism, the ‘independent’ 
productivity of capital
53: ‘Capital is’, Marx states, ‘productive: […] as the 
personification and representative, the reified shape of the “social productive powers 
of labour” or the productive powers of social labour. The way in which the law of 
capitalist production — the creation of surplus value, etc. — enforces […] appears as 
inflicted by the capitalists upon each other and upon the workers — hence it in fact 
appears as a law of capital operating against both capital and labour’ (Marx 1975, 
491); thus, ‘value’ transforms into (or ‘mystifies’ as) an ‘automatic subject’. 
Deleuze/Guattari’s strategy of coupling Becoming to chaosmos and its ‘desiring 
machines’ allows following up this ‘surplus/beyond’. Desiring-machines become the 
interconnectivity that is desire as concrete production (the ‘striated’), as flow (the 
‘smooth’), interrupted, transformed, overlapped, coupled with fragmented, cathexic 
partial objects, ‘machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other 
machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1983, 1).  
Looking at the complex network (desiring-machineries) of contextualization 
that plugs into Becoming, Deleuze achieves, by reworking multiple planes of 
previous philosophers’ concepts, to counter-act and destabilize Law and Judgment, 
which are deduced from a ‘First’ and based on the broken link (the ‘Fall’) that marks 
re-presentation. Against the hiatus gaping between Being and beings, his concept of 
univocity of being affirms, beyond its conceptual argument, multiplicities as 
actualizations of its potential forces, of an always already connective and productive 
stream of life/desire, turning God’s judgment into the readiness for decision, for 
living the intensity of an ‘incalculable soul’ (Deleuze 1998, 135)
54. Thus, uprooting 
the dialectics between the one and the multiple, multiplicities remained for Deleuze 
a key concept of his philosophy (Interview, in: Villani 2007, 43): they ‘cannot be 
                                                 
53 Kurz, in his introductory comments for his anthology of Marx texts for the 21. century (in Marx 
and Kurz 2008), juxtaposes the ‘exoteric’ and failed Marxism of class struggles with the ‘esoteric’ one 
that detects the surplus of commodities (value as ‘fetish’) as independently functioning ‘automatic 
subject’. Affecting equally capitalist and working class, it proves a merely ‘exoteric’ Marxism in form of 
organized struggle to be inoperative. In Mystification of Capital Marx writes: ‘the value of commodities 
[…] is constantly changing from one form to the other without thereby becoming lost, and thus assumes 
an automatically active character [automatisches Subjekt, Engl. literally ‘automatic subject’] If now we take 
in turn each of the two different forms which self-expanding value successively assumes in the course of 
its life, we then arrive at these two propositions: Capital is money: Capital is commodities. In truth, 
however, value is here the active factor in a process, in which, while constantly assuming the form in turn 
of money and commodities, it at the same time changes in magnitude, differentiates itself by throwing off 
surplus-value from itself; the original value, in other words, expands spontaneously’ (Marx 2000, 487).  
54 Deleuze quotes here Spinoza and continues: ‘This is no subjectivism, since to pose the problem 
in terms of force, and not in other terms, already surpasses all subjectivity’. Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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reduced to the distinction between the conscious and the unconscious, nature and 
history, body and soul [… as they] are reality itself’ (Deleuze 2006c, 315). Composed 
of singularities, their relations are Becomings, their events (see chapter 2.4) 
individuations without subject in ‘smooth’ space/times (heterogeneous, amorphous, 
not striated, thus conceptually relating to Bergson’s duration)
55. This conceptual un-
grounding affirms powerfully the autonomy of difference within Becoming, revealing 
‘the freedom of the non-mediated ground, the discovery of a ground behind every 
other ground’ (Deleuze 2004b: 80). Deleuze’s philosophy itself, one could say, 
actualizes by weaving multiplicities like ‘a rhizome, not [like] a classificatory or 
genealogical tree’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 263), spreading as the construction 
of maps still imbued with desire, with an excess or surplus value of couplings of 
multiplicities and their dimensions marked by transformative ‘lines of flight’. Within 
the sedimented structure that a rhizome builds as soon as it is represented, these 
lines of flight, far from any connections to ‘flying’, are the perpetual movement of 
points as lines (thus never arresting as single ‘point’
56) that allow the forming 
assemblage to transform further, to reterritorialize in other assemblages while 
already destabilizing them. The dynamics of the virtual and the real appear here as 
‘lines of sedimentation and reterritorialization’ (forming/strata/discontinuity) and 
‘supple lines of creativity and deterritorialization’ (transforming/smooth/continuity), 
and one is unthinkable without the other; yet, their relationship is non-dialectical 
because of the differentiator, Becoming that always already escapes/flights an 
opposition and transforms the virtual during its actualization i.e., what actualizes 
differs from the virtual and does not emerge as a synthesis between virtual and real. 
The ‘rhizome’ as emerging/represented complex of productive multiplicities and 
constructed planes contains thus both ‘knots of arborescence in rhizomes, and 
rhizomatic offshoots in roots’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 22). The focus of the 
rhizome, though, remains on ‘difference’ (with its dependence on differenc/tiation) 
and Becoming, and the coordinates of a rhizome are determined not by ‘universals 
but by a pragmatics composing multiplicities or aggregates of intensities’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004, 16). Lines of flight, traversing multiplicities and carrying 
intensity, work as a-signifiers against the closure of a secured relation between 
signifier and what is signified. Simultaneously, they mark a vibration; an echo of 
Becoming that oscillates as differentiation between/with virtual intensity and 
something real actualizing.  
                                                 
55 In fact, multiplicities and Becoming are the same thing: ‘[…] it amounts to the same thing to say 
that each multiplicity is already composed of heterogeneous terms in symbiosis, and that a multiplicity is 
continually transforming itself into a string of other multiplicities, according to its thresholds and doors’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 275). 
56 ‘There are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree, or root. 
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In the later Deleuze, this oscillation or ‘in between’ is accentuated in his work 
around the concept of the ‘fold’. Deleuze constructs the ‘fold’ from the composition 
of Leibniz’ ‘monads’, an infinite number of unsubstantial but individual and dynamic 
substances, which each contain the whole world, yet from another perspective. 
Between their two architecturally conceived floors, a window- and doorless upper 
floor (soul) and a lower floor, ‘pierced with windows’ (senses), communication 
unfolds as movements and resonances. Prehending what is sensed is thus a 
translation of ‘the visible movements below into sounds up above’ (Deleuze 2006b, 
4), a resonance between a ‘dark ground’ and its translation. Deleuze writes: 
‘Essential to the monad is its dark background: everything is drawn out of it, and 
nothing goes out or comes in from outside […] the architectural ideal is a room on 
blackmarble, in which light enters only through orifices so well bent that nothing on 
the outside can be seen through them, yet they illuminate or color the décor of a 
pure inside’ (Deleuze 2006b, 30/1). This ground, as it is one side of the fold that 
links it to prehension, does not suggest an underlying ‘Self’ or an essential ‘first’, 
but ‘rather constitutes its enfolding, its inside, coextensive with the outside’ (Kaiser 
2009, 209); thus, clarity gained will always fall back into obscurity and vice versa, 
leaving the monad in a state of differentiating ‘chiaroscuro’ (Deleuze 2006b, 36). 
Deleuze offers here, as Birgit M. Kaiser (2009) shows, an alternative reading of 
‘analogy’; freed from Leibniz’ central monad (God)
57 and its pre-established faculty of 
harmony, the ‘chiaroscuro’ enables a model of ‘ground’ that becomes enfolded in 
differentiation by the fold as differentiator. As Daniel W. Smith writes, the fold is 
 
 ‘a singularity, because folds vary, and every fold is different; all folding 
proceeds by differentiation. No two things are folded in the same way – no two 
rocks,no two pieces of paper – nor is there a general rule saying that the same thing 
will always fold in the same way. In this sense, there are folds everywhere, but the 
fold is not a universal; rather, it is a “differentiator”, a “differential”’ (Smith 2012, 
129).  
 
The two non-essential sides of the fold (crypt/bright room, obscurity/lightness, 
soul/matter, prehension/senses, virtual/real) are constituted by the fold as 
differentiator; by its ‘echo’ that is also the oscillation, the echo of Becoming. The 
continuous, never static fold then ‘echoes itself, arching from the two sides 
according to a different order. It expresses […] the transformation of the cosmos 
into a “mundus”’ (Deleuze 2006b, 33), into endless pleats of matter and immanent 
Becoming.  
                                                 
57 Deleuze writes: ‘Even God desists from being a Being who compares worlds and chooses the 
richest compossible. He becomes Process, a process that at once affirms incompossibilities and passes 
through them. The play of the world has changed in a unique way, because now it has become the play 
that diverges’ (Deleuze 2006b, 92). Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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As differential oscillation, Becoming or ‘echo’ emphasises its materiality and 
the involvement of senses, which connects it to perceptions/prehensions, although 
the source of such perceptions is not anymore a phenomenological subject
58 but 
processual subjectivation in a framework of multiplicities. Looking back to the 
intensities that are linked to problematic ideas in the virtual, Becoming oscillates 
(differentiates) between the latter and an actualization and provides (or challenges) a 
person with a choice how to respond, how to select or allow a deterritorialization. 
This response to the oscillation of Becoming as differentiation suggests, from the 
angle of this research, a possible link to aura.  
 
 
1.4.2	 ﾠPotential	 ﾠof	 ﾠDeleuze’s	 ﾠBecoming	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠAura	 ﾠ
 
Deleuze’s concept of Becoming can do justice to those aspects of aura that are 
associated with the ‘sacred’ (the ‘numinous’) and that cause contemporary 
reservations due to their stratified vectors back to ‘mist-enveloped regions of the 
religious world’ (Marx 2000, 473) and God’s judgment (or Law). That is, because 
Deleuze asks for ways of creating concepts outside of significations i.e., from the 
inside of univocity, which dissolves the transcendental Idea of God - without having 
to foreclose its problematic as ‘illusion’ - into the immanent processuality of creative 
desire: what becomes along differentiating repetition, ‘produces nothing other than 
itself’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 262), ‘nothing by filiation’. In the same time, 
Deleuzian philosophical concepts are always already touching the domain of art and 
the production of affects and percepts, are, as Smith writes, ‘necessarily inseparable 
from affects and percepts; they make us perceive things differently (percept) and 
they inspire new modes of feeling in us (affects), thereby modifying, as Spinoza 
would say, our power of existing’ (Smith 2012, 127). 
Looking back at Splendor Solis, we can find that it is indeed the concept of 
differentiation at the centre that pushes the visual series ceaselessly ahead via multi-
layered assemblages, their dissolution and new Becomings towards a fragile and 
unstable equilibrium at the ’end’: Mercury is here the name of differentiation, of 
becoming-other - ‘neither one nor two […but] the in-between, the border or line of 
flight’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 3232) - that provides the illuminated framed 
                                                 
58 The problem phenomenology encounters Deleuze/Guattari formulate as follows: ‘Husserl 
conceives of immanence as that of the flux lived by subjectivity. But since all this pure and even untamed 
lived does not belong completely to the self that represents it to itself, something transcendent is re-
established on the horizon, in the regions of nonbelonging’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 46). 
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pictures, the temporary stratified masks of a philosophical stone, which, taking into 
account that it actualizes itself only as Becoming and not as a stable outcome, 
traverses and coincides with Mercury, the hidden agent: the hardest and the most 
elusive, rock and fugitive mercury as two simultaneous layers of the alchemical fold. 
The agent rearranges the continuously dis-organising elements of multiplicities (the 
white arm, the red head, the brown torso of the man on a virtual flight to the woman 
and vice versa, his birth out of the mud on Fig. 4; the man and his cut-up double, the 
variation of his face: value or waste), oscillates at their edges and transforms them 
as the fold in-between. 
The corona in Fig. 7, the sensitive or ‘minor’ triumph at the point of a 
supposed completion of the alchemical operations appears in this process as a 
deceptive ‘stop’, actualizing the representation of the ‘agent’ while hinting at its 
deterritorializing potential (its being ‘event’) while simultaneously castrating its real 
force. Thus, the image of the aura carries always a tacit surplus of virtuality. It 
functions as a frame, ‘constitutes it and ruins it, makes it both hold (as that which 
causes to hold together, that which constitutes, mounts, inlays, sets, borders, 
gathers, trims – so many operations gathered together by the Einfassung) and 
collapse’ (Derrida 1987, 73). For Derrida, it is the lacuna ‘of the very unity of the 
ergon’ (ibid., 59) that necessitates this frame as one of lack; in a Deleuzian reading, 
the corona would hold its lines of flight, traversing it and actualizing other 
transformations, potentially the ‘new’. Both views, complimentary as they are, 
support the reading proposed here: that the philosopher’s stone and aura is not an 
end-product but a dynamic, congruent with continuous individuation and co-existing 
with the complex of mediator, transformation and selection that assembles a framed 
picture. 
 But is this dynamic of a ‘folded’ aura consistently applicable to Splendor Solis? 
After all, amongst protective hulls and frames, Fig. 7 isolates carefully an aura that 
is explicit (golden, undisturbed) light. It should not be forgotten that light emerges 
here with the idea of the lumen naturae
59, and this always concealed/concealing light 
cannot be disentangled from its fusion with darkness. Both ‘completion’ and ‘purity’ 
are only possibilities, and the painter of the illuminations knows this. It is the 
introversion and over-protection of such completion that betrays the dependence of 
such temporary isolation on a space devoid of any contamination by other zones. 
The king’s aura emphasizes the brilliance of the agent’s work, Mercury’s as much as 
Becoming’s, which needs to be seen alongside the lines that already traverse the 
                                                 
59 A central term in alchemy: ‘… in the very darkness of nature a light is hidden, a little spark 
without which the darkness would not be darkness … lumen naturae, the divine spark buried in the 
darkness … it is the light of the darkness itself, which illuminates its own darkness, and this light the 
darkness comprehends. Therefore it turns blackness into brightness’ (Jung 1980: § 197, 160). Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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series as a multiplicity and link/fold it in/to the darkness of prima materia. The 
latter holds virtual dynamics and becomings with new ‘echoes’ or aura and equals 
the almost blind ‘ground’ (the complex problem, the sensate) of the fold as 
differentiator, the ‘chiaroscuro’ as in-complete involvement of light and dark
60. Then, 
as Michael Goddard writes, ‘the spiritual and the material are simply two distinct yet 
indiscernible sides of the same fold’ that alchemy maps, suggesting, in relation to 
the process of individuation that Becoming always affects ‘a complete immersion in 
life and in love as a process of metamorphic subjectivation and the elaboration of a 
crystalline [new] regime of signs’ (in: Bryden 2001: 62).  
There is another aspect that justifies reading Splendor Solis and its clandestine 
doorways to processual aura from a Deleuzian angle of ‘Becoming as 
differentiation’
61. Deleuze understood himself as ‘a pure metaphysician’ (Interview 
with Villani, in: Villani 2007, 42) who engages with ‘first realities’, an exception in 
contemporary philosophy and, of course, unambiguously overstepping Heidegger’s 
cautious posing the question of ‘ontological difference’ in his attempt to overcome 
metaphysics, with which this section began. But in contrast to metaphysics as a 
conceptual ‘proof’ of transcendence, Deleuze’s work around ‘first’ realities concerns 
mainly, as Arnaud Villani writes it, the ‘isolation of the conditions of possibility for a 
complex act’ (Villani 2007, 57) on the plane of immanence, and as such it is 
understood in this research. This focus on the ‘complex act’ is a direct consequence 
of the pragmatics of ‘difference in movement’
62,
 which extend tacitly to art practice 
                                                 
60 Gershom Scholem, in Alchemy and Kabbalah, supports a connection, already earlier suggested, 
between Shekinah and aura: ‘It is undeniable that the symbolism of the Shekinah, the female aspect of 
the divine world of the sefirot – which represents the last of the ten steps of emanation within the 
Godhead, as it is richly developed in the Zohar – exhibits close parallels to the alchemical symbolism of 
the prima materia. […] there is a structural relation between the ascension from the lowest to the highest 
sefirah and the alchemical steps involved in the refining of the philosophical gold according to a mystical 
view of the ars magna {Great Work]’ (Scholem and Ottmann 2006, 42). This would suggest a reading of 
the lumen naturae as Shekinah (divine presence), though in a ‘vertical’ i.e., transcendent context or 
interpretation. 
61 Joshua Ramey, in a comprehensive study just published (Oct. 2012), undertakes to show in how 
far the ‘dark precursors’ of Deleuzian philosophy reach into the hermetic and Gnostic tradition of an 
indissoluble involvement of nature and spirit/mind that in its briefest formula is well-known as ‘as above, 
so below’ and also part of what Splendor Solis is about. Ramey finds it in ‘Deleuze’s insistence upon the 
nature of thought as spiritual ordeal, as a transformative encounter with nature’ (Ramey 2012, 3). He 
supports the perspective of this research when he writes with regard to alchemy: ‘The alchemical dream 
of hermetic science is to complete the task of the redemption of the soul without the sacrifice of the body, 
and without the sacrificial reduction of matter to form. In the modern, secularized thought of Deleuze, 
hermeticism takes on the guise of a “deterritorializing” of both spirit and organic matter, envisioning both 
as expressions of an “anorganic” and “machinic” play of forces’  (Ramey 2012, 29). 
62 Marty Slaughter, in a paper on Deleuze and art, refers to this implicit ethical aspects as: ‘By 
understanding the body’s intensities, its becomings, and its will to power, one affirms one’s forces and 
wrestles with antagonistic forces. The ethical is therefore a process, of resisting, of loosening up rigid Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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and, in the reading proposed here, affect directly the sensation of aura outside of a 
transformation of its intensity into superordinate signifiers or derivates of a ‘first’ 
truth. In context to the tension between continuity and discontinuity, between 
Becoming and its re-presentation, the task of the ‘complex act’ - as decisions that 
concern the pragmatics of living differentiation - marks the problem of inevitably 
downsizing potential complexity from a line of flight to a manageable ‘point’. Villani 
elucidates the specifics of Deleuzian metaphysics:  
 
‘If rite, myth and religion can translate the overflowing feeling which results 
from the first fact of the infinity of the ‘real’ (a sort of “I believe”, an adhesion to a 
type of “faith”, an unreflective “natural attitude”), metaphysics might be the decision 
in thought to reflect upon the possibility of giving a full and just account of this 
hyper-physical infinity. But then, could one imagine any problem which better 
articulates what is at stake here, than that of thinking the loss that accompanies 
certain modes of thinking, and all action in general? To pose this question in all 
consciousness, is to be a metaphysician. And I wager that Deleuze, in calling 
himself, and in feeling himself to be, a pure metaphysician, wanted first of all to 
bring this idea, this problem to the fore’ (Villani 2007, 52). 
 
The loss of complexity addressed here might not only concern religious 
signifiers, which are gained from applying representation onto what continuously 
differentiates, but also a surrender or reserve in the face of ambivalent notions like 
the aura, which undoubtedly do occupy strata in religious territories and add to their 
image production. But such notions (and images) might transform when looked at as 
multiplicities with their inherent lines of flight, their ‘shooting points of 
deterritorialization in assemblages of desire’ (Deleuze 2006c); because it is these 
that pervade the immanent couplings of changing social fields and open them for 
deterritorialization, not for a return to ‘nature’, but for a ‘new’ productivity, and with 
it a conceptual revaluation within a philosophical framework of metaphysics, when it 
creates concepts outside of transcendent splitting.  
From the perspective of this research, the reprimand of aura (understood here 
as a sensation of what Villani calls ‘hyper-physical infinity’ or intensity of virtual 
excess) as ‘illusion’ or as lost in an ‘age’ threatening ‘uniqueness’ seems thus to be 
purchased too easily with a foreclosure of desire, which, left trapped in a notion like 
aura, supports its substitutes in form of commodity/celebrity-aura in a society 
where life (here as the potential of Deleuzian Becoming that can resist/subvert 
                                                 
molar structures so that they become more molecular and permeable, of creating situations for de-
territorialization and of pusuing ‘lines of flight’. […] Thus, the ethical is what is creative – creating new 
forms to be individual, social or political – in order to bring forth the difference that has until now only 
been possible’ (Slaughter 2004, 255). Marius von Brasch    1. Departure Points 
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power
63) is in danger to ‘become the ideology of its own absence’ (Adorno 2005, 
190).  
Deleuzian Philosophy, in its involvement with conceptualizing what emerges by 
differentiation, filters beyond its traditional limitation as epistemology into creativity 
and builds thus indissolubly a fold with non-philosophy; therefore, Deleuze’s 
insistence that philosophy creates and abstracts concepts from fields of Becoming 
and involves art as a complimentary discipline dealing with the creation of affects 
and percepts, invites a simultaneously conceptual and practice-based approach for 
aura that pervades, so the proposal here, both. 
The following chapter 2 documents how practice and philosophical elements of 









                                                 
63 ‘Life’, as ‘desire’s variable field of immanence’, so writes Deleuze, ‘becomes resistance to power 
when power takes life as its object’. It affects/is affected by the plane of immanence, which Deleuze 
conceptualizes as ‘the matrix of indefinite desubjectification’ and ‘virtual indetermination’. Thus ‘life’ 
encompasses here less an individual’s life than pontentiality and lines to ‘pure contemplation without 
knowledge’, as ‘A LIFE’ it ‘marks the radical impossibility of establishing hierarchies and separations’ 
(Agamben 1999a, 232/3(Agamben 1999a, 232/3), a concept an individual might integrate and choose to 
act upon. Deleuze never suggests that individuals can free themselves from power structures; they remain 
always multiplicities within in a social field and its desiring-machines of forces and power.  Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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Chapter 2 documents the practice-based element of the research. It is based on 
notes taken during the practice and follows chronologically the project’s gradual 
development.  
2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura  
 
2.1. ‘Mapping/Tracing’ on the Axis between Painting and 
Digital Technology 
 
Before documenting the practice-based research, one question needs to be 
considered first: what does the ‘axis between painting and digital technologies’ 
encompass, which delineates its scope?  
In general, the axis indicates a relationship between the media, an overlapping 
of what still is devised into such brackets as ‘old’ (painting) and ‘new’ (digital 
media). In connection to aura and especially Walter Benjamin’s critique, the axis 
responds to a specific contemporary shift: the age of reproducibility has been 
followed by one of cybernetics, dealing with a progressive ‘man-machine symbiosis’ 
(Paul 2008, 9) and based on communication and control systems, which in the 
beginning related to military purposes and transformed into the present worldwide 
accessibility of the internet. Computers and tailored software have become tool as 
well as medium for many contemporary artists, often to comment on or counteract 
the ever expanding ambivalence of the rhizome of the internet as platform of 
communication. In an essay from 1988, where he applies Benjamin’s inquiries to ‘the 
Age of Cybernetic Systems’, Bill Nichols juxtaposes the appropriative gesture typical 
for ‘reproduction’ with ‘digital simulation’ and its temporal flow, which ‘becomes 
embedded within a system ready to restore, alter, modify or transform any given 
moment to us at any time’ (Nichols 2003, 631), leaving us, in contrast to the 
appropriated object as fetish, with a fetishized process, the somewhat concealed 
operation of simulation as output of the engagement with computational systems: 
‘[t]he consequence of systems without aura, systems that replace direct encounter 
and realize otherwise inconceivable projections and possibilities, is a fetishism of 
such systems and process of control themselves’ (Nichols 2003 632). 
Departing here from Benjamin’s critique as well, it seemed important not to 
answer the question whether digital media are alien to aura too quickly, especially 
when used, as in this research, with an awareness of its capacity as tool. Christiane 
Paul (Paul 2008) distinguishes artists integrating digital or ‘new’ media as tool into 
other practices/media from those disseminating digitally produced and stored, Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
    80 
mostly interactive work as medium on the internet. This definition looses its grip 
when Paul states that ‘paint is a medium and the brush is a tool’ (quoted in: Graham 
2007, 100) as also the brush is involved in ‘forming’ paint, shapes its materiality and 
becomes a medium of the visual outcome. Talking here about digital media as a tool 
refers to its capacity ‘to allow for multiple kinds of manipulation and a seamless 
combination of art forms, which can lead to a blurring of the distinctions between 
different media’ (Paul 2008, 28), ‘to hybridize and stray across media boundaries’  
(Graham 2007, 101). One of the reasons not to produce overtly interactive outcomes 
for this research (which would put a stronger accent on the medium aspect) have 
been the obvious restrictions of given choices suggested by ‘interactivity’, which, so 
also Paul states, has ‘become almost meaningless due to its inflationary use for 
numerous levels of exchange’ (Paul 2008, 67); another reason has been a planned 
and limiting focus on producing outcomes that, although produced or involved with 
an apparently ‘smooth’ medium of dissemination, somehow could be attributed 
‘uniqueness’. Following Benjamin’s criteria for aura, outcomes on the axis or line 
that differentiates the ‘handmade’ (painting) and the simulation of the hand (digital) 
will necessarily be ‘contaminated’, to various degrees, either by uniqueness (with its 
connections to aura) or simulation. To assure that Benjamin’s condition of 
reproducibility (for aura’s decay) has been given enough weight, the practice of both 
painting and digital input (with outcomes in form of paintings, drawings, films, all 
involving the axis by using projections of digitized sources onto canvas/paper, 
digital photographs of paintings as footage for films etc.) is based throughout on 
reproductions of the main sources, in one case scanned from a book facsimile 
(Splendor Solis), in the other retrieved from a license-free online archive (Grünewald’s 
Resurrection). 
Thus, blends of obviously heterogeneous media would emerge, hybrids picking 
up the differences between the materiality of paint and the seeming immateriality of 
the digital as much as an ambivalence with regard to ‘representation’ specific to this 
axis. When Paul writes that pixels do not ‘require a physical object to “represent” and 
are not based on a principle of continuity with a real world’ (Paul 2008, 48), it 
follows that also painting, when involved with the digitized, simulated alterations of 
sources, might be affected by this loss of an ‘object’.  
The objective of the practice element has been to find ways of ‘tracing’ aura – 
questioning Benjamin’s concept of uniqueness and transcendent(al) ‘origin’ - in the 
(digitized) sources (pieces chosen for their literal iconic dealing with aura) where it is 
not visible but intensely present as ‘lines of flight’, which destabilize the iconic 
status, deframe, deterritorialize the pictures/image of aura into potential new 
assemblages (the outcomes of this research). This, of course, assumes that a 
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timeline of such an endeavour. The test of this ‘set-up’ would be to see how far the 
inherent dissolution of borders between subject (artist) and object (source/outcome) 
in favour of pre-individual intensities, which are criteria for the creativity of 
Deleuzian Becoming, could be supported.  
Deleuze/Guattari discern ‘mapping’ from ‘tracing’ when they discuss the 
construction of rhizomes, especially with concern to their construction of a rhizome 
of non-genealogical plateaus, which grow into each other like their authors as A 
Thousand Plateaus. This discernment is conceptually important as it supports 
Deleuze’s revaluation of concepts: they are not derived but created; the plane of 
immanence for a concept or a work of art is not derived but constructed, a turn 
following Deleuze’s insight in the closure of images of thought, which cripple the 
chaotic fecundity and absurdity that thought with its ‘outside’ provides. 
The ‘mapping’ of a rhizome or growing multiplicity is thus not the 
reproduction of lines, inflections or landscapes with their hollows and hills, but their 
construction, the ‘the removal of blockages on bodies without organs, the maximum 
opening of bodies without organs onto a plane of consistency [maintaining a 
consistence of some kind]’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 13). Nevertheless, it is the 
tracing that ‘has already translated the map into an image’ and plays its pivotal role 
in recognizing/prehending/refolding the emerging construction.  
Thus, speaking here of ‘tracing’ links to this pair of construction and 
reproduction, with a stronger weight on the ‘complex act’ as ‘construction’. 
However, there is also a line pointing to Walter Benjamin’s distinction between aura 
and ‘trace’ in The Arcades Project: ‘The trace is appearance of a nearness, however 
far removed the thing that left it behind may be. The aura is appearance of a 
distance, however close the think that calls it forth. In the trace, we gain possession 
of the thing; in the aura, it takes possession of us’ (M16a,4 in: Benjamin 2002a, 
447). ‘Tracing’ in this sense describes the ‘in between’ of mapping/tracing, 
mediating the sensation of distance and closeness; ‘the thing that calls it [aura] 
close’ would then perhaps be a real yet virtual ‘pre-individual’ intensity pushing into 
actualization and becoming trace as part of the visual outcome
64. This Benjaminian 
aspect, though, differs as it connects to an unadulterated ‘first’ – a ‘distance’ 
Deleuze explicitly dissolves in the dynamics of mapping/tracing as univocal fold. 
With regard to the axis between painting and the digital, the outcomes of this 
research depend on a mediator that, like in the alchemy of Splendor Solis, traverses 
the heterogeneous worlds of paint and pixellation and is attached to the creative 
‘map’ of virtual intensities. These touch (in a painting or drawing) where the 
                                                 
64 The German ‘Spur’ (‘trace’), which Benjamin uses in the fragment, has a link to ‘footprint’ as 
index of an absence but also to ‘spüren’ (‘to sense’), which suggests stronger the mentioned ‘appearance 
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projections of digitally altered fragments of sources provide a force field for 
mapping and meet or reach into another multiplicity (paper/canvas-brush-paint-‘a 
day’-pencil-hand-eye-affect-percept, to name only a few); in the case of film where 
layers of footage, including digitized fragments of analogue work, are mapped, 
stencilled, stretched, scaled etc. by smooth transformations
65. Becoming, in a 
Deleuzian sense, the ‘differenciator’ of difference (which allow difference to be 
identified) is such a mediator, the ‘middle’ as it involves the virtual (not in the sense 
of computer related ‘virtual reality’) and the real i.e., extends to an involvement of 
desire into technology. If aura (as proposed here) ‘echoes’ Becoming, ‘provokes’ a 
response (as being involved with virtual problems and questions) and Becoming 
passes through technology, aura would also ‘work’ through/with technology. This 
contradicts positions like Dieter Mersch’s where aura depends on existential 
experience and works, if, despite technological input
66; it supports Josephine Berry’s
67 
who locates (with regard to net art dealing with the instable and fluent worlds of the 
Internet) ‘preservation of […] aura within the unpredictable mutations and instability 
of digital information’ (Berry 2001, 4). 
A ‘co-operation’ of aura and technology seems, from a Benjaminian angle, at 
least problematic, especially as the digital alterations in this research are based on 
scanned reproductions, which would preclude aura  (there is even the possibility to 
claim that it have been exactly those reproductions as sources that, with their aura, 
have stimulated to start a research about them). From a Deleuzian angle, Becoming 
refers always to something ‘living’, and Martin Stingelin, considering if the Internet 
can be called a ‘rhizome’ or a BwO, makes a point about the two sides of the term 
                                                 
65 Here, the hard disc provides a container and platform for transformation as well as for the 
outcome. Transformations of footage as long as being altered via software translations of commands are 
smooth; as a written file on DVD the film loses its smooth state, it striates. 
66 Aura, for Mersch, is destroyed with the loss of alterity and responsivity. Mediality belongs to the 
code, significant chains, formation, not to materialities, experience, encounter, to the uniqueness of a 
moment, which is given in the trace left by a performative act (Mersch 2002). Aura escapes the machine, 
which ‘degrades the living body [Leib] to an element of its functiong. Thus, virtual experience contrasts in 
peculiar ways with bodily passivity, which eliminates all other stimuli in order to immerse oneself deeper 
into the cave, the “cave of simulacra”’ (Mersch 2002, 102; my transl.). At this point, concerning the 
ontological valuation of the simulacrum, Mersch’s position differs from the one of this research, which is 
inspired by Deleuze and his affirmation of the simulacrum as will become clearer at the end of (this) 
chapter 2. The ‘simulacrum’, which ontologically avoids a recurring to the set of original and copy, does 
not avoid, so the thesis here, a response/ability to alterity; in contrary, the ethical dimensions implied in 
the ‘complex act’, as introduced in chapter 1.4.1, strongly suggest it. 
67 Berry argues from a Benjaminian definition of aura when she writes: ‘[…] the automatic functions 
of software and the chaotic world which information technologies help to reveal work both to confound 
the subject and produce a non-instrumental second nature in which art participates. The evasiveness and 
potentiality of this second nature into which the relations between the social and the technical harden, 
surfaces in art as a new form of auratic distance’ (Berry 2001, 293).  Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
    83 
‘virtual’: ‘While the virtual has its reality in its own concept, which abides its 
actualisation in a real creation, computer virtuality is limited to the realisation of a 
computational possibility, which equals a mere repetition’ (Stingelin 2000, 28). 
Nevertheless, if aura connects to Becoming and its virtual surplus, a participation of 
technology cannot be precluded. A definite statement about this point would frame 
aura as a universal and be forgetful about the highly speculative aspect of this 
research’s scope. What can be affirmed from a Deleuzian angle, though, is the vital 
role of a decision for deploying (in the sense of dis-plicare, ‘to unfold’) technological 
potential (the digital) for/in ‘actualizations’ i.e., a creative/complex act involving ‘a 
displacement of the framing function of medial interfaces back onto the body from 
which they themselves originally sprang’ (Hansen 2004, 22); in brief, an ambivalent 
potential of the relationship between artist/viewer and technology. Will the 
complexes artist/viewer, when addressed by Deleuze potentially as temporal, 
interconnecting and interfolding networks of multiplicities, be in danger to 
disappear in ‘"a system of information" […, loosing] all freedom as they are "sucked 
up as standing reserve [resource]"’ (Dreyfus 2004); producing/consuming art 
complicit with communication models of advertising and ‘a globalisation of the 
image in the service of capital’ (Rosalind Krauss, quoted in: Hansen 2004, 23)? 
Concerning the work or pragmatics of transformation of the self (approaching the 
BwO with its transgressions of thought images and order-language), that seems to 
be unlikely, as these pragmatics will affect a technological ‘awareness’; however, it is 
a concern of this research, as mentioned earlier, to observe thresholds from which 
‘subjectivity’ might take over the practice and become more delimitable.  
Technology - and this has been pointed at already by determining the role of 
digital media in this research mainly as ‘tool’
68 - is appropriated in this research 
where it touches a classic medium (painting/mark making) with an uncertainty about 
an all-changing ‘newness’ of ‘new media’. Considering that ‘to mediate’, as 
Alexander Galloway sums up Lev Manovich’s core argument, ‘is really to reframe, 
that mediation in general is just repetition in particular, and thus that the “new” 
media are really all the artifacts and traces of the past coming to appear in an ever-
expanding present’ (Galloway 2011, 384)
69, the ‘new’ points back to ‘old’ media and, 
                                                 
68 In terms of tool or medium, the digital functions as medium where finished films, digital 
documentation of other outcomes are stored on my website and accessible. The focus of the research, 
however, remains on production, which deals, from the angle of producing art, with being affected and 
perhaps affecting aura.  
69 Mark B.N. Hansen objects that this position ‘constantly threatens to reduce new media to a mere 
amplification of what came before’ (Hansen 2004, 32). However, in a conversation with Michel Serres, 
Bruno Latour states: ‘This problem of time is the greatest soucce of incomprehension, in my opinion. 
What makes other people’s “past” empty, frozen, nontemporal, is the supposition that the past is out-of-
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leaving genealogies behind in favour to more heterogeneous maps, also to the non-
linear strands of forgotten media. An uncertainty about the ‘new’, which might 
overcome the problems of other, less ‘immaterial’ technologies, comes clearly with 
the mountains of toxic waste, which the ever growing industry around digital culture 
and its ‘planned obsolescence’ (Parikka 2012, 166) leaves behind; a situation 
reminding of Benjamin’s angel of history, driven by a transcendent ‘storm irresistibly 
into the future, to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows 
toward the sky’ (Benjamin 2003: 392) (see footnote 13).  
What seems at the core of dealing with new technology in art is (from the angle 
of this research and aura’s alliance with Becoming as vitality) an astute awareness 
for what Heidegger calls the danger of regarding technology as ‘neutral’ ('The 
Question Concerning Technology', in: Heidegger 2008, 312), of remaining blind for 
technicity as ‘technological understanding of beings’ (Dreyfus 2004).  As poiesis, 
technicity or the ability to order everything everywhere, to ‘enframe’ world 
[stellen/Ge-stell – to set/enframing] lets, according to Heidegger, ‘what presences 
come forth into unconcealment’ (Heidegger 2008, 326). On the one hand, it reveals 
‘man as the one who is needed and used [in the twofold of Being/being] for the 
safekeeping’ (Heidegger 2008, 338) of what has been forgotten in representational 
thinking (the fold of unconcealment/concealment); on the other hand, it reveals ‘the 
actual as standing-reserve [Bestand]’ (Heidegger 2008, 326), as mere resource to be 
managed from a position of discrete representation. The danger lies in forgetting 
the potential of technology as a frame-work, a constellation that potentially can 
serve the creativity within the twofold: ‘the essential unfolding of technology 
threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be 
consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the 
unconcealment of standing-reserve’ (Heidegger 2008, 339). Translated into a model 
of folding multiplicities (dispersing the ‘twofold’), the danger could be 
forgetting/denying the alignment with actualizations of virtual problem-
constellations, ‘letting oneself act’, as Villani writes, ‘to let the virtual infuse, without 
forcing it’, referring here to ‘to become’ as the transitive verb that ‘”lets itself be 
traversed by”’ (Villani 2010, 77).  
From this angle, digital technology, which certainly enhances the mapping of 
creative acts and thus serves poiesis [bringing forth], cannot simply be reduced to 
binary coding as a mode of representation
70. Challenging Deleuze’s preference of the 
                                                 
70 Also the above-mentioned ‘danger’ should not deflect from the positive potential of digital 
networks; as Andrew Feinberg writes in 1999: ‘From the standpoint of the ordinary human being – and 
even system managers and philosophers are ordinary human beings in their spare time – networks are 
lived worlds in which humans and things participate though disclosive practices. This lifeworld of 
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analogue on grounds of its lines to intensity, also those between body and BwO 
(Deleuze 2005, 79/80), Jussi Parikka, in his paper Ethologies of Software Art, 
suggests ‘we bracket the question of binary codes as secondary to the more specific 
and important role software plays as part of cultural assemblages’. As ‘executable’ 
code (in connection to this research software that allows to transform a file in the 
mode of ‘smoothness’, stretchable, extendable, shrinkable etc.), the digital code 
moves away from functioning as representation; it carries ‘a surplus value that is not 
reducible to [its] function of coding and recoding’. Parikka quotes Deleuze/Guattari: 
’Every code is affected by a margin of decoding due to these supplements and 
surplus values – supplements in the order of the rhizome. […] codes fundamentally 
include all phenomena of relative decoding that are all the more usable, composable, 
and addable by virtue of being relative, always “beside”’ (Parikka 2010, 122). 
It could be said that on the one hand the potential of digital software to 
transform in a state of ‘smooth’ provides its materiality, visible pixellation, 
contortion, keying etc. in the transformed picture/footage/projection; it ‘simulates’ 
or actually performs the actualization of a virtual intensity. On the other hand, it is 
certainly true for this research, which throughout involves experientially analog 
reproductions, that, as Brian Massumi emphasizes, ‘[t’he processing may be digital – 
but the analog is the process. The virtuality involves, and any new possibility that 
may arise, is entirely bound up with the potentializing relay [as the experiential 
relays the reception of digital outcomes sets in motion]’. For Massumi, the ‘new’ is 
‘not contained in the code’ (Massumi 2002a, 142). Which of both is more accurate, 
cannot be decided here. 
Mapping along the axis between painting and digital input concerns here 
foremost mapping and finding those lines of flight, which destabilize the 
metaphysics of representation developed in (thought) images of aura. ‘First’, so 
writes Deleuze about the untimeliness of the line of flight as rupture of the ‘new’, 
‘one must trace it out, know where and how to trace it out’, being well aware of the 
risk of destruction coming with it (Deleuze 2006a, 105). This quote confirms that a 
supposed ‘either/or’ distinction of ‘mapping’ and ‘tracing’ is difficult; both coincide 
in the act of making and the emergence of a piece of art. 
‘Knowing where and how’ (from Deleuze’s quote above) concerns also a 
reflection of the media axis onto another axis, the rapport between Renaissance and 
contemporary art practice, which, especially in connection to Splendor Solis and its 
alchemical transformations, can reveal forgotten dynamics of ‘old’ media that 
relativise the distinction of newness of ‘new’ media. The elusive alchemical mediator 
that actualizes and, simultaneously, sabotages the striation of the ‘philosophical 
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stone’ (the immediacy of Becoming) can be followed in what ‘he’ leaves behind, a 
series of framed temporality not so distant from a series of image file 
transformations induced by working with a software and framed by a screen. The 
Renaissance Mercury/Hermes leaves messages behind that touch and embody 
heterogeneous strands, messages like in the digital world that ‘might have several 
embodiments automatically derivable from the same data’ (Nicolas Negroponte, 
quoted in: Braudy and Cohen 2009). The juxtaposition of ancient and contemporary 
art practice might add a heterogeneous moment to the ‘media-archaeological record’ 
of what Siegfried Zielinski (2006) calls ‘deep time of the media’: as tracking trails, 
‘impregnations of events and movements’. For even Renaissance alchemists, like 
contemporary media archaeologists and artist researchers, ‘needed to learn much in 
order to decode, read, and classify the signs’ (Zielinski 2006, 27) in a fold between 
calculation and imagination, a ‘tension between reality that is filed away in concepts 
and a reality that is experienced’ (Zielinski 2006, 34)
71. 
 
2.2 Language and Haptic Visuality 
Video – Pages I & II (2010) - http://vimeo.com/mvonbrasch/videos 
 
The first pieces in the course of this research respond to an underlying aspect 
of Benjamin’s critique of the aura, the conception of an ‘original’ language (as 
introduced in Chapter 1.1) that formed the world, uncoils as a multi-layered book. 
This book writes itself. How would the ‘book’ continue writing itself in a digital film, 
a medium that in a framework of original truth might hold all the significance of 
                                                 
71 In a conversation with Catherine Perret, digital video artist Joseph Nechvatal who experiments 
especially with substituting subjective input in art practice with viral transformations of images online, 
makes a connection between early Renaissance and digital art: ‘[…] connectivist non-separateness is part 
and parcel with a noology of inter-subjectivity, which on one hand, gives art the license to appropriate 
scientific tropes, and on the other, lends science art’s powers of non-utility, freedom, and even excess. It 
is this border-crossing between Janusian mirror states that leads me to believe that we are entering a 
state of a new kind of natural magic – in some ways reminiscent of the Florentine 15th Century Neo-
Platonists. Take Marsilio Ficino and/or Giovanni Pico as examples. Their thinking typically placed the reign 
of significance in-between the vast remoteness of spiritual infinity and the baseness of present 
materialism - therefore concentrating on the zone of transformational actions of humans that lead to a 
natural magical alchemy. This noology is about knowledge that can transform things and states of the 
system. In that sense I am maintaining that we are leaving the age of sterile reductive analysis and 
entering into one of fecund synthesis; much like the poetic-mythic-scientific age of the early Renaissance. 
The binding force of this synthesis is certainly inter-subjective pleasure (art) and a lust for yeasty 
comprehensions out of which new possibilities grow. These comprehensions are obtained by 
experiment/chance/inner-risk […]’ (Nechvatal and Perret 2006). 
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depletion of ‘truth’? How would aura - as a distinct and intense sensation of an 
unfolding emergence, which in the process of making is followed i.e. 
‘mapped/traced’ - be affected by a digital recording, an always already reproduced, 
disseminated unfolding of language  
Thinking about the traditional conception of ‘artistic’ subjectivity (holding a 
position somewhere between the outcome of a film and the realm of language) and 
its links to uniqueness, it felt appropriate to include connections to a (disembodies) 
body uttering language: writing by hand and speaking, thus making a body part of 
the ‘book’ writing itself without making it visible and simultaneously exposing the 
most intimate (writing by hand/audible voice) to the least intimate. Benjamin, who 
knew a lot about graphology, decided quite early to adopt a neutral handwriting that 
would defy personal revelations (however, his handwriting betrays his intention). 
Pages I unfolds the recording of normal, (visually) isolated handwriting on footage of 
an environment impossible to be written on literally; it unfolds itself in a timeline, 
writes itself on or against a continuous movement of water, spray produced by the 
movement of a ship. Layering these components could resemble an inscription onto 
a primordial image of world. The writing is not signed with a name; it makes itself 
visible, becomes language as writing/reading that lets itself be shown what is said, 
both personal and impersonal. At this point, Heidegger’s questioning meditation on 
language comes to mind, where language ‘needs human speech and is nonetheless 
not the mere contrivance of our speech activities’, where speech ‘as listening to 
language lets itself be told the saying’. However, ‘the saying’ [die Sage], conjoined 
with the reiterations of speech by a ‘stream of stillness’, does not refer here to a 
cause or ground but to ‘propriation’ as the event of the ability to reflect and speak 
about being and its ‘There is/It gives”, which being needs ‘if, as presencing, it is to 
come into its own’ (Heidegger 2008, 411/12). This position stands like a mere 
observation between Benjamin’s model of language as filtered and contorted 
translation of divine Law and Deleuze’s understanding of language. In 
Deleuze/Guattari, language and especially writing challenges to break through the 
cycles of conventions of meaning toward ‘the moment when language is no longer 
defined by what it says, even less by what makes it a signifying thing, but by what 
causes it to move, to flow […]: a process and not a goal, a production and not an 
expression’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 133). Such a poetic production depends on 
the openness for or actualisations of events that coincide with new inventions of 
sense. These emerge along an arch built by the verb with its two-folded temporality: 
the present as succession of instants and the pure infinitive, ‘empty form [..,] 
distance [that] does not implicate a time internal to language without expressing the 
sense or the event, that is to say, the set of problems raised by language’ (Deleuze 
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The text written for this temporal unfolding of the infinitive ‘to write’
72 would 
write itself, as duration (‘distance’) and succession (‘present’), handwritten by 
someone, using language to fill the gaps between the words it consists of, between 
things it tries to signify, between one and an other, perhaps a viewer following the 
unfolding words and the spray on the still dark water, a visual depth that equals the 
unknown territory of the ‘other’ in the sense of a person, a face or the own voice 
reading the unfolding text to itself. The process mediated by the video reconstructs 
and presents the unfolding of language or, quoting here (despite Benjamin’s disdain 
for him
73) Martin Heidegger who speaks in The Way to Language (in: 2008: 412) of 
the ‘saying’ that discloses itself in the reiteration of speech, the ‘stream of stillness’. 
Both share the idea of an originary language, even if Heidegger thinks the latter as 
the unconceals its concealment language as a specific . The notion of shares an 
essential moment with Benjamin’s ideas about language, an impossibility of 
appropriating it.  
 
                                                 
 
72 It writes / I couldn’t find you, couldn’t / hear, couldn’t read / your skinscripts / serpents of 
letters / sung spoken / folds over plates full / of fruit and hair and  / scents, blindfolded / / couldn’t sing 
/ the keys out of range / / distant, however / closer and / couldn’t voice the gaps / the delays the / 
bracketed narrowed image of / you it / writes that is / something, stars, rubber / shoeprints, rusty / 
waterthreads, buds / a fleeting warmth and ashes / and stained pullovers / in between / folded unfolded / 
enveloped unenveloped / digitized undigitized 
73 In a letter (20.1.1930) to Gershom Scholem, Benjamin considers the importance of a discussion 
of historical knowledge for an introduction to Paris Arcades, now The Arcades Project (Benjamin 2002a): 
‘This is where I will find Heidegger, and I expect sparks will fly from the shock of the confrontation 
between our two different ways of looking at history’ (Benjamin 1994, 359-360). Section N3, 1 of The 
Arcades Project (Benjamin 2002a, 462) juxtaposes ‘images’ and their ‘historical index’ to Heidegger’s 
‘historicity’. Most probably (Benjamin’s criticism remains fragmentary), he refers to his own method of 
interpreting images (’dialectics at a standstill’) and retrieving what the constellations reveal about 
betrayed collective dreams in concrete historical moments – a hermeneutic archaeology. In contrast, 
‘historicity’ is a condition resulting from Heidegger’s attempt (in Being and Time) to release the 
limitations of the phenomenological subject into ‘Dasein’ (being) where history appears as less specific 
’dispensation’, ‘sent’: ‘The analysis of the historicity of Da-sein attempted to show that this being is not 
“temporal”, because it “is in history”, but because, on the contrary, it exists and can exist historically only 
because it is temporal in the ground of its being’ (Heidegger and Stambaugh 1996, 345) Peter Garloff 
observes that Benjamin’s and Heidegger’s positions overlap in their universalistic foundation (‘dreaming 
collective’ vs. ‘Da-sein’): both share a ‘trans-historical, primal-historical accent’ (2003, 310/311) and a 
critique of ‘inauthenticity’. Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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Fig. 8 - Still from Pages I (16:9; 4’ 15”) 
 
Handwriting as an temporal visual unfolding keeps as a time-based record an 
indexical allusion to someone writing just now or having written sometime ago and 
yet disperses a concrete idea of who made the film, of who signed the record; if 
handwriting unfolds as a kind of signature then also Louis, a figure in Virginia 
Woolf’s The Waves, could have made the film when he says: ‘I have signed my name, 
[…] already twenty times. I, and again I, and again I. Clear, firm, unequivocal, there it 
stands, my name. Clear-cut and unequivocal am I too. Yet a vast inheritance of 
experience is packed in me. I have lived thousands of years’ (Woolf 2000: 127). ‘I 
have lived thousands of years’ can here also indicate, beyond the allusion to his 
reaching into the depths of collective history or consciousness, a loss of a clearly 
formed identity, even a dissipating body, a looking-back to opaque blocks of 
memories and oscillating strands of Becoming. 
Technically, the handwriting had to be isolated as a layer on top of other 
footage in After Effects. The aim was not to produce aura but to play with some of 
the conditions typical for the experience of aura: a space of contemplation, 
disjunction that creates synthesis, suddenness, the gaze of personal signs, the index 
of someone unfolding a delayed process of thought. 
By adding words onto images and associations, I touch on something that 
seems an integral of Becoming in this film: the impossibility of bridging the 
‘distance, however near it may be’ that opens between the words and what they 
intend to mark. The set-up shows that however natural the unfolding and the 
actualization might manifest, here as words or signatures-becoming-flux, the 
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work towards the fragment. This would have been predictable for a discursive text; 
but it seems the same for poetic language used to support the consciously 
developed haptic character of this film.  
The notion ‘haptic’ is used here in the sense Laura Marks develops it in The 
Skin of the Film, as a visuality less concerned with representation or narrative than 
the evocation of associations and memories: ‘While optical perception privileges the 
representational power of the image, haptic perception privileges the material 
presence of the image’ (Marks 1999: 163).  
However, language, in the case of Pages I unfolding as haptic visual 
movement, seems also to actualize the problem of ‘translation’ which Benjamin talks 
about, problematizing against the blurring of the haptic the ‘gap’ or the fragment; 
although visually and semantically blurred and thus ‘open’, the film manifests both, 
a haptic ‘deviation’ from semantics and a fragmentation of language that might 
reflect §what Derrida describes in Des Tours de Babel (where he refers to Benjamin’s 
essay on language) as ‘the inadequation of one tongue to another, of one place in 
the encyclopedia to another, of language to itself and to meaning’ (Derrida and 
Kamuf 1991: 244).  
This aspect points to and reflects a general problem of this project: the 
interweaving movements that lead from an image (painting) to language, from art 
practice to its contextualization and vice versa; there are equally specific differences 
between working visually around the aura and working around it in the form of a 
discourse, and both are envisaged by engaging with this research.  
At this point it might become clear why aura is a subject that seems to evade a 
discourse: it works and is ‘placed’ along the axis of closeness/distance, and these 
are the keywords referring to a haptic experience: in between the medium and the 
artist, in connection to the screen and viewing a work ‘the dynamic activity of 
viewing that is engaged in both the film and the spectator, each as viewing subjects’ 
(Vivian Sobchack, quoted in: Hansen 2004: 274).  
While it seems possible to engage a haptic flux within a frame (the canvas, 
paper, the screen) that denotes the différance
74 as well as the potential of ‘lines of 
flight that pass through the territory only in order to open it onto the universe’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 187), this haptic flux is broken up in any written body 
of work about it.  
 
                                                 
74 ‘Différance’ is here understood as lack – not as a negative but as a heterogeneous 
presence/absence - in its relationship to the set of work (ergon) and frame (parergon): the work (the 
‘energeia’) protects itself from what is lacking: ‘Although apparently opposed – or because opposed – 
these two bordering determinations of what the parergon is working against (the operation of free energy 
and of pure productivity or the operation of the essential lack) are the same (metaphysical/metaphysics)’ 
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The second film followed a similar line of an unfolding of ‘writing’ but the 
significant difference is that it looks at the problem from the angle of an abstraction 
of handwriting as illegible mark making, thus not providing clear language, but 
perhaps allusions. The film shows a hand forming lines and signs on paper, tracing 
its moving along its shadow and naturally never arriving.  
The film – more than the first one – focuses on layering, reveals underneath, 
through keying and thus isolating the mark making, multiple layers, which are 
stencilled, used only partially and arranged in the 3D workspace of After Effects. 
Although the first version of this software was released just in 1993, its workspace is 
not much different from a typical baroque opera set with its ‘painted backdrops, side 
panels that slid back and forth into the wings and borders that were raised or 
lowered from the ceiling’ (operaatelier.com 2010).  But there is another curious 
parallel to the Baroque opera stage. Joanna Norman notes in Performance and 
Performativity. Baroque Art and Design for the Theatre (in Snodin and Llewellyn 
2009, 145) that a court theatre like that at Český Krumlov (Czech Republic) with its 
‘several pairs of wings receding towards a backdrop, … the illusion of infinite stage 
depth … favoured a privileged viewer seated in the optimum location’; the central-
point perspective thus created mirrored the ruler’s power who ‘should be the only 
one able to appreciate the spectacle in its entirety, and it also served to direct the 
audience’s attention towards the ruler as the real focus of the event’. From this 
perspective, the presentation of a digital film on flat screen mirrors a similar set-up: 
the isolated viewer, perhaps wishing to merge with the haptic visuals and their 
backdrop layers, thus augmenting his/her own ‘field’ of presence, occupies a 
somewhat deceptive central position as a ruler (of this establishing field); a row of 
flatscreens with viewers in the same order would emphasize this strange connection 
between power and isolation. 
The visible film might potentially flow over the frame of the screen, i.e. it is 
less designed to support the window effect than to blur the experience of it and ‘to 
touch the eye’ or be touched by the eye
75; it shows tarnished forms, dark matter, 
moving star constellations derived from the pixellation of colour layers, creating 
what typically would be called haptic visuality. ‘The tactile quality of the video image 
is most apparent in the work of videomakers’, writes Laura Marks, ‘who experiment 
with the disappearance and transformation of the image due to analog and digital 
effects. Electronic effects such as pixellation can render the object indistinct while 
drawing attention to the perception of textures’ (Marks 1999, 176). But it is 
remarkable how haptic film and the illusion of a digital ‘flow’ and continuity are 
technically organized.  Following Edmond Couchet, the ‘numerical image is an image 
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composed of small “discrete” fragments or elementary points, to each of which can 
be attributed whole numerical values … These numerical values render each 
fragment an entirely discontinuous and quantified element’ (quoted in: Hansen 
2004: 9): the digital image appears to be a problematic hybrid of ‘analog surface and 
a digital infrastructure’, a ‘disjunction between surface appearance and materiality’ 
as Mark Hansen formulates in his New Philosophy for New Media (Hansen 2004, 9). 
The subcutaneous stars in Pages II (built as flickering digits left visible for the 
viewer below continuously shifting and keyed top layers) refer to the already quoted 
note by Benjamin asking whether ‘the stars and their gaze from the distance [are] 
the original phenomenon of aura’ (Ms 931, Benjamin Archive, in:Benjamin 1991, Vol. 
2.3.: 958) as much as to the alchemical lumen naturae as sparks of light inherent to 
darkness, to what is concealed or covered by earth or skin. The stars are juxtaposed 
to close-up footage of earth that has been altered (darkened brown) in order to 
emphasize the character of fermentation and an alchemical memory of the insistence 
on interweaving both. 
Breaking digitally, with ‘empty’ pixellation through the footage layers and 
bringing the remaining fragments into motion equals perhaps the spreading of 
stencils and pin-hole stars on an otherwise petrified mask. They set free some of the 
masks (layers) inherent in the energy to differentiate itself (again, but anew) towards 
other forms, a random flow produced in between the intensity of intention, keyboard 
commands, the medium of the framing screen and the software as agent and 
messenger of this transformation.  
Transformation is thus a doubly encountered subject, as much on a ‘semantic’ 
level as on a technological one, confirming Laura Marks when she writes: ‘In utter 
contrast to McLuhan and the many critics who followed him in asserting that video is 
a cool and distancing medium, I argue that video’s tactile qualities make it a warm 
medium. It is the crisp resolution into optical visuality that makes an image cool and 
distant’ (Marks 1999: 176). 
Transformation, questioning the rigidity of established states, carries 
inherently an aspect of mourning and melancholy related to the loss that is a 
necessity on a way to healing and integration. Music seemed important as a support 
of this aspect, and as part of the practice a piece was produced that creates an 
atmosphere contrasting with the moving abstractions; the music starts very suddenly 
after a longer period of silence and the film ends with a longer period of silence. 
Using the digital image as a layered stream means also to deal with what 
Deleuze describes as their ‘power to turn back on themselves [… as] object[s] of a 
perpetual reorganization, in which a new image can arise from any point whatever of 
the preceding image’. The space they are generating and that Pages II intends to 
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horizontal’ (Deleuze 2008a: 254). This kind of space resembles a labyrinth, 
alternating haptic and optic qualities, perhaps similar to the one Benjamin 
encountered in a dream: climbing up and down a labyrinth of partially covered 
staircases (close vision), a labyrinth that extends into all directions, he finds himself 
suddenly on a peak (distant vision), discovering other people on other peaks, but 
soon one by one falls back in a vertigo that suddenly had started to spread out 
(Dream 28th June 1938, in:Benjamin 2008: 59).  
The conflict between the haptic, ‘smooth’ effect and the stencilled flow of 
words and illegible marks suggests that aura with its pull can be made a subject for 
the digital medium. According to Deleuze, with the new image the screen loses its 
connection to the human ‘posture’ and becomes a ‘table of information, an opaque 
surface on which are inscribed “data”, information replacing nature, and the brain-
city, the third eye, replacing the eyes of nature’, an automatism ‘worthless in itself if 
it is not put to the service of a powerful, obscure, condensed will to art’ (Deleuze 
2008a: 255). This position asks to realize that technology and its possibilities need 
to be used in unpredictable and creative ways, as a conscious extension of 
Becoming, the actualization of the virtual, into the appropriation of technologies for 
art, in ways that undermine the will for power that seems, alongside a more and 
more confusing projection of community, the biggest danger of the digital economic 
regime.  
The films presented here followed an auratic ‘trace’ in Benjamin’s work, the 
idea of language as unfolding creativity. The question whether such films, which deal 
with the subject of aura in the ways described produce aura for a viewer will be left 
open in this research as it depends entirely on the unique constellation of a viewer’s 
encounter with them. Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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2.3 Working with a ‘Cult-Object’ 
Drawing - Studies after Grünewald (2010) - 
http://www.mariusvonbrasch.co.uk/aura_research/drawings.html 
 
Gershom Scholem recalls in Walter Benjamin. The Story of a Friendship that 
Benjamin owned ‘a print of Mathis Grünewald’s Isenheim Altarpiece [that] hung on 
the wall of his study, where it would remain for many years to come. In 1913 as a 
student he had made a special trip to Colmar to see the original. His notes from 
those years often refer to the Isenheim panels; he was overwhelmed by what he 
called das Ausdruckslose, their quality of expressionlessness.’ (Scholem 2001: 47)  
For Benjamin, the ‘expressionless’ is the ‘objection’ to harmony and semblance 
provided by form that enchants ‘chaos momentarily into world’ (Goethe's Elective 
Affinities, in: Benjamin 1996: 340), the witness that art does not originate from 
‘nothingness’ but chaos that ultimately it cannot sublimate; the expressionless 
‘interrupts the harmony … grounds the mystery; this petrification grounds the 
content in the work’, it ‘compels the trembling harmony to stop and through its 
objection immortalizes its quivering’ (Benjamin 1996: 340), thus opening the 
‘beautiful appearance to the dimension of the ethical’ (Werner Hamacher, 
Afformative, Strike, in: Benjamin and Osborne 1994: 124)
76.  
When he finds the ‘expressionless’ in an early paper on Socrates in 
Grünewald’s ‘halos emerg[ing] from the greenest black’ (Benjamin 1996, 52), it can 
be assumed (Weigel 2008) that Benjamin refers also to the Resurrection. The halting 
moment of the ‘expressionless’ will be introduced at a later point (chapter 3.1).  
Following Benjamin, the ‘expressionless’ belongs to the circle that assigns 
meaningfulness to the aura by giving it an ontological status as an index of 
redemption within a teleological and theological concept of history. The Isenheim 
altar and especially Grünewald’s Resurrection (Fig. 12) have made a long lasting and 
deep impression on me as they did on Benjamin. An old postcard from Colmar had 
been unfortunately lost for this research. The reproduction has been imported from 
a copyright online archive.  
 
                                                 
76  Hamacher connects the ‘expressionless’ to Benjamin’s Critique of Violence. Benjamin makes 
here a far-reaching distinction between lawmaking or –preserving and divine violence: ‘… all mythic, 
lawmaking violence, which we may call “executive,” is pernicious. Pernicious, too, is the law-preserving, 
“administrative” violence that serves it. Divine violence, which is the sign and seal but never the means of 
sacred dispatch, may be called “sovereign” violence’. (Benjamin 1996, p. 252) Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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Fig. 12 - Mathis Grünewald, Resurrection from Isenheim Altarpiece (completed 1515), Musée 
d’Unterlinden, Colmar  Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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More than the ‘face’ with its gentle gaze of other victories (not the big ones) 
and the direct and luminous dispersion of the halo, the lines and flows leading to the 
guardian shoved into the bottom left corner became the trigger for drawing/mark 
making as ‘map’, following the deviations of a dialogue between, the inseparable 
equality of the halo and the blinding helmet covering the guardian’s face: the release 
of separation between those figures, denouncing hierarchies between transcendence 
and immanence; proposing immanence and painted by Grünewald, a man whose 
traces of life vanish toward a blank screen, become ‘a life’. Objective of working with 
this picture has to be a foregoing of the gaze for the reason that it would limit the 
project to a phenomenological or psychoanalytic register of ‘relating’ between one 
face and another face (‘those glum face-to-face- encounters between signifying 
subjectivities’), which finally would reduce aura to Benjamin’s impoverished (later) 
version as ‘projection of a human social experience onto nature: the gaze is 
returned’ (Benjamin 2003, 173)
77. In contrast, the objective is ‘rather to escape the 
face [thus the gaze], to dismantle the face and facializations, to become 
imperceptible, to become clandestine […] true becomings that […] make faciality 
traits themselves finally elude the organization of the face’. In brief, to move ‘[o]n 
the road to the asignifying and asubjective’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 189/90). 
Such a move is by no means intended as defilement; it is a practical consequence of 
experimenting with the virtual questions attached to a ‘sacred’ idea (its problems) in 
immanence i.e., to test its potential for ‘profane illumination’ in a framework of the 
differentiations of immanent Becoming. When Deleuze writes, ‘Christ invented the 
face’, he alludes to the image production of incarnated subjectivity and the need of 
‘our societies […] to produce the face’. Liberating the image of aura as a ‘second’ 
face, that of Becoming of subjectivity (as subjectivation) follows then the question: 
‘how to unmake the face, by liberating ourselves the questing heads which trace the 
lines of becoming?’ (Deleuze 2006a, 34). 
The traditional approach to this painting departs from a separation between 
matter and spirit. Jeffrey Chipps Smith in his The Northern Renaissance comfortably 
reassures us that ‘Christ is transcendent. His body and his five principal wounds 
radiate with divine light, and are set against the starry heavens, a cosmic backdrop 
far different from gloomy Golgatha’ (Smith 2004: 221). The reading invites us to 
pursue a hierarchical structure down from divine light to the ‘helplessly’ stumbling 
guard. The aura around the head alludes then, extending the matter/spirit division 
to the hierarchised bodies, to ‘spirit’. Such reading is supported by the positioning 
of the Isenheim Altar in a chapel dedicated to it in Colmar, a hybrid of museum and 
devotional space, a fixed artificial environment of association and reconstruction. It 
was originally commissioned for the altar of a hospital run by monks of the Antonius 
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order and specialized in treating a fungal infection (then known because of the 
burning pain it caused as ‘holy fire’ or ‘St. Anthony fire‘); one of the central pieces of 
the altar, the Temptation of St Anthony refers to this circumstance. The altar was 
dismantled in 1793 by French troops, succeeding the power of Catholicism with that 




Fig. 13 Fête de la Raison (Festival of Reason), 1793. Etching, 12 x 20 cm. Estampes, 
coll. Hennin, t. 133, n° 11687
 78 
 
It is a curious fact though, as a contemporary etching (Fig. 13) illustrates, that 
reason, the medium of promising enlightenment of and liberation from religion, 
disappears behind the veil of numinosity to take over the vacant space left by a 
transcendent god.  
How the altar in the Musée Unter den Linden in Colmar has been reassembled 
does not necessarily mirror its original arrangement. What now looks like a chapel is 
a museum and what looks like a museum is a chapel (fig. 14).  
The staged Resurrection, arguably one of the most iconic depictions of aura, 
feeds with its imaginary re- or dislocation devoid of the immediacy of necessity 
(maintaining life, place of care for those with diseases) a taste for keeping framed 
and territorialized what as ‘expressionless’ transgresses already forcefully the 
signifying conjunction of Christ/Church, feeds, as Deleuze would say, the ‘taste for 
castration, which animates the great Signifier as proposed finality of the work’ 
(Deleuze 2006a, 37); the picture remains ‘pinned against the wall of dominant 
signification’ (Deleuze 2006a, 34).  
Freeing (by addressing its virtual problematic) the work from its position will 
allow following those lines of flights, which deterritorialize the literalness of the face-
                                                 
78 Public domain image, accessed 8.2.2012 
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gaze-aura complex, following against and with the striated, beautiful image and the 
adhered traditions of beliefs, the minor moments of Grünewald’s painting, the 
aliveness and folds of individuation, giving the picture another set of meanings. It 
would also suggest that a painting contains time as a ‘crumpling, a multiple, 
foldable diversity’, as Michel Serres says in an interview with Bruno Latour, 
‘polychronic, multitemporal, […] a time that is gathered together, with multiple 





Fig. 14 - Isenheim Altar at the Musée Unter den Linden, Colmar. Photo © Andreas Tille 
 
An auratic flow actualizes between the Christ figure and the guardian whose 
face is guarded by a helmet. His colours refer back to the pictorial aura, extending 
lines from the guardian back to the risen figure, interweaving both intrinsically into 
one movement differentiating itself. Verticality thus ‘does not merely rise up’, as 
Jean-François Lyotard writes with regard to a work by Barnett Newman, ‘it descends 
like a thunderbolt. [… ] The work rises up (se dress) in an instant, but the flash of the 
instant strikes it like a minimal command: Be’ (Lyotard 2006, 338). The flash can be 
read here as the intuitive grasp of another folding than the visually obvious one that 
leads to a supposed climax in the aura/halo; the symbolic verticality has been left in 
favour of the ‘instant’, the instantaneity of differentiation. The experiment has been 
to engage with the chosen digitized sections as intermediate folds, pointing at less 
obvious rhythms, directions, proportions and even colours, focusing on a shift from 
the iconic to the intimate. Software (Photoshop) mediates the alienation of chosen 
fragments of the scanned reproduction (and perhaps what is ideologically attached Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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to it), exposing it to manipulations it in a ‘smooth’ state, destabilizing its solidity 
and setting free another ‘dynamic system’ (Peter Weibel quoted in: Rush 2005: 181)
  
of its status as information. The drawings result from experimenting with 
projections of the resulting digital striated alterations of Grünewald’s Resurrection 
and mark making with coloured pencil onto handmade drawing paper. A new state 
of Becoming would be triggered with the spontaneous associations or intensities that 
would occur while working with the projection, switched on and off (Fig. 15, 16; see 
also Appendix Fig. 51, 52).  
Drawing in this way, as the editors of Drawing Now note, focuses ‘on 
perspectives that align drawing with thinking and ideas, rather than with 
representing the appearance of object’, and the emphasis is ‘on how the process of 
making the drawing contributes to its content, a concept which we describe as 
“performative”’ (Downs et al. 2007: ix). 
The Swiss artist Britta Huttenlocher (Fig. 17) deals with aspects constituting 
Studies after Grünewald, which concern an ambivalence of the role, as Ernst van 
Alphen remarks, writing on Huttenlocher, of the ‘directing hand of the draughtsman 
and elements which have to be accepted when they emerge [… and yet] don’t’ seem 
to be drawn by a directing subject […,] seem to have emerged in the wake of other 
lines.’ (Garner 2008: 67) Working with digital projections suggests this doubling 
process of lines in drawing, an emergence of repetition out of emergence, a 
‘conjunction’ of emergence and plan.  
The drawings emerge in between the folds of this encounter with several 
mediators (Grünewald, the digital, the projection, the colour, me) folding the 
dispersions (projection) of an altered image into something new. Although seeing, 
the projected image of the digital manipulation on the paper operates as a blindfold 
that has dissolved into a luminous intangible veil in my seeing, making it at times 
impossible to see where I am with my drawing; there is no emphasis on 
representation, but still some forms, like folded mountains, reappear again and 
again; a situation that reflects what Derrida writes in The Memoirs of the Blind: ‘It is 
as if a lidless eye had opened at the tip of the fingers, as if one eye too many had 
just grown right next to the nail, …, [it] guides the prothesis of a seer who is himself 
invisible’ (Derrida 1993: 3). The intensities that are part of a subjective experience 
leave their traces in the mark making that itself closes/opens a cycle of 
different/ciation of folds inherent, so the thesis here, in Grünewald’s Resurrection. 
The particular shift, from the iconic to the intimate and emphasizing the process of 
deterritorializing, leads to a stumbling, ‘[a] trembling, that is no longer psychological 
but linguistic [and affects as well the language of mark making and makes] language 
itself stutter […] at the deepest level of style’ (Deleuze 1998, 55); to careful 
navigating in between a manipulated source image and the evolving new, inside the Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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territory and landscape of sedimented historical interpretation and ideology. This 
process follows in a visual way Deleuze’s dealings with the figure of Christ, which, 
according to Clemens Pornschlegel appears at various places in Deleuze’s work. 
Deleuze aims to ‘obstruct any dogmatic recording of the figure of Christ, to make 
Christ ‘faceless’ and to let the figure drift away further and further. The historic 
Christ is given back by Deleuze to finity and immanence, while the endeavour of 
liberation and redemption, the movement of absolute decoding has to be repeated 
anew incessantly’ ('Notre Frère à tous in: Balke 1996, 289; my transl.). 
During such a decoding of an image of the face of the ‘other’ (irrespectively of 
how masterful it is) and its gaze, the drawing process in this set-up resembles in 
part an experience of blindness, a paradoxical and blind faith in the drawing which 
‘sacrifices sight, even if it does so with an eye to seeing at last’ (Derrida 1993, 30), 
or as Jason Powell puts it, ‘this blindness […,] constitutive of any attempt at 
knowledge at all, […] demands faith and a certain passion for the unknown, a certain 
openness to the future and to others’ (Powell 2006: 174)
79. However, this blindness 
extends to the question: who makes the drawing? There is lived experience, ‘not 
subjective, or not necessarily’ as Deleuze claims, ‘the flow and the interruption of 
flow’, and there are names (Grünewald, Deleuze, for the outcomes of this research 
my own), intensities, which can ‘be lived only in relation to its mobile inscription on 
a body, and to the moving exteriority of a proper name, and this is what it means for 
a proper name to be always a mask, the mask of an operator’ (Deleuze 2004a, 257): 
reason enough to honour the names, to make them part of the works that ‘sprang’ 
from them. 
The next (longer) section examines the fold between ‘flux and fragment’ 
closer, based on paintings and drawings engaging with Splendor Solis. 
 
 
                                                 
79 And, in Derrida’s own words: ‘A hand … feels its way, it gropes, it caresses as much as it 
inscribes, trusting in the memory of signs and supplementing sight. It is as if a lidless eye had opened at 
the tip of the fingers, as if one eye too many had just grown right next to the nail, a single eye, the eye of 
a Cyclops .… This eye guides the tracing or outline (trace); it is a miner’s lamp at the point of writing, a 
curious and vigilant substitute, the prothesis of a seer who himself is invisible.’ (Derrida 1993: 3) This 
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Fig. 15 – Marius von Brasch, Study after Grunewald, coloured pencils on paper 56 x 75 cm, 
2010 Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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Fig. 16– Marius von Brasch, Study after Grunewald, coloured pencils on paper 56 x 75 cm, 
2010 Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 









Fig. 17 Britta Huttenlocher, Untitled, 2007, pencil on canvas on wood, 76 x 82 cm. Photo: 
Peter Cox. Courtesy Galerie Paul Andriesse 
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2.4 Flux and Fragment 
2.4.1	 ﾠSplendor	 ﾠSolis’	 ﾠFrames,	 ﾠContinued	 ﾠ
 
Painting - Forgotten/Preceding Spaces (2010); Paraphrases (2010/11); Sleeper 
(2010) 
http://www.mariusvonbrasch.co.uk/aura_research/painting.html 
Drawing - Line of Flight (2011) 
http://www.mariusvonbrasch.co.uk/aura_research/drawings.html 
 
Working with Splendor Solis meant applying the process of dismantling aura, 
which had started with ‘mapping/tracing’ other strands than the visible ones in a 
single painting by Grünewald, to an ancient series of paintings that endeavours to 
trace a gradual unfolding of aura itself.  
To recapitulate: the Splendor Solis images, windows allowing the view of 
certain thresholds, of complex alchemical i.e. integrative Becoming with its 
landscapes and personages, are left behind by a fugitive agent in-between potential 
and actualisation (see Chapter 1.3), the alchemical Mercury or, as proposed here, 
Becoming itself. The difficulties involved in their ‘job’ to condense the complexity of 
elusive processes betray a general dilemma of the presence of time (as both 
durational and linear time) on a static carrier: the pictures deal with forces of 
unfolding to be depicted, perhaps even re-presented by a painter, but the 
composites and their paradoxes, which make the images, clearly subvert 
representation. They deal with forces of Becoming that they can only trace 
retrospectively by framing them. Deleuze and Guattari delineate this inside/outside 
interwovenness of forces, involved in (in the case of this research) painting: ‘… art is 
never an end in itself; it is only a tool for blazing life lines, in other words, all of 
those real becomings that are not produced only in art, and all of those active 
escapes that do not consist in fleeing into art, taking refuge in art, and all of those 
positive deterritorializations that never reterritorialize on art, but instead sweep it 
away with them toward the realms of the asignifying, asubjective, and faceless’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 208).  
What they describe is a scenario that involves the painter as part of 
transversally working forces of unfolding, not as ‘author’, which puts his/her ability 
of being in control radically in question in between the emergences or ruptures of 
such dynamics into new open constellations. From this perspective, the separation 
between an artist’s subjectivity and the outside, the materials and thoughts and 
actions that mend them, starts to crumble and open up a field of interacting Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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tendencies and differences. This point is a consequence of Deleuze’s project that is 
about how to find ways to describe how experiences ‘give’ us the agency of 
subjectivity at all, and not how to determine the conditions for a subject to gain 
experience (in the form of categories for example).  
Positing inwardness as a source against or medium of an outside world would 
suggest a static ‘self’ unable to align to a potential metamorphosis and is thus 
contrasted with questions about how to gain a fluent form of ‘self’ by building 
experiences within an immanent field of forces into assemblages or ‘styles’ that are 
open enough for the forces involved to initialize further changes.  
Painting in this multiplicity of forces is not grounded in what traditionally 
would be seen as ‘the artist’; it is taking part in an experience ‘in between’, an 
individuation or Becoming: amongst different durations, measures of experience, 
and influences of forces, affects, tools. The scenario critiques authorship and the 
emphasis of a signature on painting as much as it points at the artist’s specific role 
of assisting art’s coming forth into being
80. However there remains the ambivalent 
‘inscription’ of the name attached to the outcome of a differentiating process that 
leads away from the name, which affects, and this point has been an important 
aspect of making Studies after Grünewald, the concept of a drawing/painting as 
‘outcome’. It subverts the demand to complete a work in the sense of ‘folding it up’, 
as François Jullien calls it in his book on emptiness (as the space in between subject-
object and object-object as space of emergence) in classic Chinese painting, of 
sealing a state where the ‘work falls into a slumber upon being finished’ and 
‘luxuriates in the comfort procured by its gradual certainty about itself’ (Jullien 
2009:60). This confirms Paul Cezanne’s somewhat morose remark about finished 
painting enjoying merely ‘the admiration of imbeciles’ (quoted in Jullien 2009: 60).  
Working with images from Splendor Solis was thus initially led by questions 
about how to mirror and continue this ‘labour’ in the series, pictures and frames into 
new works. During the process of making the paintings, the following questions 
emerged: why did the practice lead repeatedly back to one specific image of 
Splendor Solis, the ‘Hermaphrodite’? 
Splendor Solis, one could say, is caught up and made possible by frames, or as 
a whole series, by one arching ‘line’ or frame. A frame acts as a first boundary and 
‘skeleton’ for the actualization of new expressions and forms, thus simultaneously 
condensing the potential further flow of forces that, in the frame, necessarily appear 
                                                 
80 Barbara Bolt, under the heading ’The Challenge of Contemporary Practice’, writes: ‘I would like to 
argue that artists in the modern age are so focussed on creating and marketing artwork that they forget 
they are co-responsible (along with other contributors) for letting art come forth into being. In their pre-
occupation with being be-ings, some artists become engaged in art business and tend to reduce their 
materials and tools to a means to an end’ (Bolt 2004, 85). Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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to be harnessed in order to build an expression. Elizabeth Grosz observes: ‘ … [T]he 
frame’s most elementary form is the partition, whether wall or screen, that, 
projected downward, generates the smoothness of a floor, that “rarefies” and 
smoothes over the surface of the earth, creating a first (human) territorialisation’ 
(Grosz 2008: 14).  
From Deleuze/Guattari’s point of view (which is effectively very similar to 
Derrida’s, see Chapter 1.3.1), the individual images and the series as a chronology 
are ‘traversed by a deframing power that opens it onto a plane of composition or an 
infinite field of forces […] The painter’s action never stays within the frame; it leaves 
the frame and does not begin with it’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 188). Becoming, 
then, needs to be ‘framed’, be shown the evidence of its singularities in order to 
become visible at all and borders over the frames, destabilizes what the frames hold 
together into moving shards of a kaleidoscope.  
Against the evidently grounding force of the frames stands thus the force of 
transformation, explicitly addressed by Splendor Solis, which inherently will enforce a 
potential destabilization of these frames. And the same is true for the territories of 
the individual images, as all the figures are composites already about to dissolve 
into new constellations. They traverse from frame to frame, at once interior space, 
interpretation, body, social environment and (non-human) nature. This ambivalence 
attached to thresholds pointing out a flux is maybe one reason why the entrance and 
disappearance of these figures and composites remain so curiously impersonal and 
unannounced.  
Exploring Splendor Solis’ frames and the inherent fragmentation resulting from 
their ambivalence in individual pictures (rather than an open series) had been the 
thread for the two paintings Preceding/Forgotten Spaces (Fig. 18 and 19). The 
interweaving of such layers and fragment composites of Splendor Solis with layers of 
contemporary associations would allow the emergence of something new. This 
process follows Splendor’s modelling of alchemical operations in the sense that the 
emerging new images would conceal and ‘frame’ the complexity of layers of 
different places, times and durations (the ancient book illumination / the duration of 
experience as time of change while working on the pictures / elements of collapsing 
contemporary houses / the association of one motif, the Hermaphrodite, with a still 
from Bertrand Bonello’s film Tiresia from 2003). 
 
An image with such properties just listed resembles what Deleuze calls a 
‘crystal image’, which holds ‘the present [as] the actual, and its contemporaneous 
past [as] the virtual image’ (Deleuze 2008a: 76), a notion that encompasses the 
visible and simultaneously present invisible layers of time and potential. 
Actualization of the virtual within this set-up does not introduce a separation 
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folded into each other, are aspects of the dynamics of emergence in a plane of 
immanence. Time, as involved in these dynamics, splits, ‘has to split the present in 
two heterogeneous directions, one of which is launched towards the future while the 
other falls into the past. Time consists of this split, and it is this, it is time, that we 
see in the crystal. The crystal-image was not time, but we see time in the crystal. We 
see in the crystal the perpetual foundation of time, non-chronological time.… ’ 
(Deleuze 2008a: 79). With its shifting, distancing and approaching layers of different 
time zones, the build-up of these pictures remains a nevertheless very material and 
haptic assemblage of zones, evoking thus what Beth Harland calls ‘haptic time’, ‘a 
time without entry or exit’ proposing ‘itself as a time which eschews narrative, one 
which privileges material presence over representational structure, a [quoting then 
Laura Marks] “direct experience of time through the body”’ (Harland 2009, 66).
81 
These properties of immanence in the crystal-image relate (although Deleuze 
never makes such connections himself) to the lumen naturae in Splendor Solis, the 
light inherent in dark matter that houses the potential dynamics to push something 
into emergence, holding thus simultaneously microscopic and cosmic forces and 
layers like a ‘crystal’ structure: ‘The little crystalline seed and the vast crystallisable 
universe: everything is included in the capacity for expansion of the collection 
constituted by the seed and the universe,’ (Deleuze 2008a: 78).  
After Preceding/Forgotten Spaces, I focused in Paraphrases (2010/11) (Fig. 23 
– 28
82) making a series of paintings that could be interpreted as depicting a time-line  
(depending on its display as one line or cluster on a wall). I followed here Splendor 
Solis’ p r o p o s e d  s t r u c t u r e  o f  a  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  w i t h  i t s  i m p l i e d  teleology  from  its 
alleged start to its end, which in the newly evolving series is broken up into a new 
but deceptive time-line consisting of frames that retell the story with jumbled up 
fragments from pictures that, in the chronology of Splendor Solis, were distances 
apart. This ‘breaking-up’ of Splendor’s chronology has been motivated mainly by the 
fact  that  metamorphoses  do  not  show  a  neat,  clearly  segmented  line  in  real 
experience,  but  are,  exactly  because  of  a  necessary  loss  of  control  during  the 
process,  experiences  of  confusion,  juxtaposition,  disorientation,  of  unexpected 
layers of regressions, progressions and dynamics. Splendor Solis highlights this, as 
already  mentioned,  by  interweaving  complexity  into  single  pictures  with  their 
symbolic composites of heterogeneous elements. 
Although  Paraphrases h a s  e m e r g e d  w i t h  t h e  i n p u t  o f  a  v a r i e t y  o f  d i g i t a l l y  
manipulated  fragments  from  Splendor  Solis,  I  came  back  again  and  again  to  one 
single picture, the motif of the ‘Hermaphrodite’. It exerted a specific fascination on 
                                                 
81 The crucial role time, especially as a qualitative instant (event, kairos) and two distinct readings 
of time, is introduced in chapter 2.5. 
82 The nucleus for this series, Paraphrases 0, is reproduced in the Appendix on p. 207 (Fig. 54). Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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Fig. 18 - Marius von Brasch, Preceding/Forgotten Spaces 1. Oil on linen. 3ft x 3ft. 2010 Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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Fig. 19 - Marius von Brasch, Preceding/Forgotten Spaces 2 (2010). Oil on linen. 92 x 92 cm 
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2.4.2	 ﾠThe	 ﾠWork	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘Hermaphrodite’	 ﾠ
 
Paraphrases emerged mainly from working with Splendor Solis, but also from 
others with more contemporary material. For Preceding/Forgotten Spaces 2 (Fig. 19) 
and already for an earlier picture (Sleeper, Fig. 22) I used stills from Bertrand 
Bonello’s film Tiresia (2003, Fig. 20, 22). This film connects to the subject of the 
Hermaphrodite and provides in my view a major contemporary contribution to the 
subject of gender polarisation. Following the Greek myth of Tiresias, the blind seer 
transgressing a consistent gender identity, the film sets out to retell the story in two 
parts. In the first part, a transsexual (played by a female, Clara Choveaux) is held 
captive by an art lover who is ambivalently obsessed with her. He blinds her as her 
identity shifts back due to the missing hormones. In the second part the blinded 
Tiresia (played now by a male, Thiago Telès) recovers, cared for by a woman in a 
small village, and begins to discover his gift of second sight. More and more 
villagers come to him because he sees what they need and wants to help. The priest 
of the village (the role of the priest and the writer from the first part are played by 
the same actor) suspects him of leading ‘his people’ away from the church and kills 
him. Both, the fascination with beauty and perfection (the aesthete) and 
institutionalisation of spiritual experience (the priest) lead to the double destruction 
of Tiresia, based on jealousy. He/she tries to escape gender, her kidnapper, her/his 
second sight
83. 
In an interview, Bonello makes an important point about the reason why he 
did not choose a transsexual for the role, but split the role:  
 
‘I refused to cast a real transsexual for ethical reasons. I think that becoming a 
woman for them is real war. A war against the world, a war against their own body.  
It’s very difficult physically and psychologically and I think that to ask a real 
transsexual to become a man again in the second part of the film would have been 
too hard psychologically. I didn’t want to take the risk. Also, I didn’t want the 
audience to look at the main character as a freak. By taking a woman and a man, you 
get the mental (and mathematical) idea of what a transsexual is and it brings us back 
to the myth, which is good. Of course, it was out of the question to take only a man 
or only a woman. A transsexual is not a transvestite. But all the other “roses” in the 
film are real transsexuals. I have to say that they all really understood my point of 
view of not taking one of them for the part of Tiresia.’ (Bonello 2005)  
                                                 
83 We will encounter Teiresia/Tiresia again at a later point (Chapter 3.2) as the blind(ed) dweller of 
the threshold between different concepts of time, announcing the incision or caesura in consciousness 
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Fig. 21 – Still from Bertrand Bonello’s Tiresia (2003) 
 
Like Bonello, this thesis refers to the virtual potential of the Hermaphrodite in 
the sense of a metaphor, but metaphors in a Deleuzian framework have become 
metamorphoses because of the expressive intensities involved (Deleuze and Guattari 
1986, 22), which, far from being signals of castration, emphasize the indivisible 
blend of sexualities (Serres 1987) and challenge the binarity of male/female and its 
extension to the one of matter/spirit: can one go so far to claim that the the 
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hermaphroditic metamorphoses? That, of course, depends entirely on a creative 
interpretation. In terms of aura as a pointer to emergence of what has not yet been, 
i.e. the ‘new’, the Hermaphrodite encompasses the potential fluency or fold between 
heterogeneous thresholds of actualizations; he could be seen as an imagined ‘stop’ 
between the folding movements. 
In  Splendor  Solis,  Fig.  22,  the  alchemical  Hermaphrodite  stands  for  the 
somewhat  stable  merging,  a  disjunctive  synthesis  of  the  two  figures  from  the 
previous picture in the series, the encounter of a male rising from the mud and a 
winged, crowned female. A temporary conjunction, robed in the colour of night and 
gestation, they fold into each other, transcend the state of being ‘individual’ and 
‘opposed’,  but  the  colours  of  their  wings,  red  and w h i t e ,  a n t i c i p a t e  f u r t h e r  
alchemical stages, unfoldings in between black (dark matter and putrefaction), white 
(purification) and red (new vitalization).
84  
Splendor Solis claims: ‘The Philosophers give to this Art two bodies, namely: 
Sun and Moon, which are Earth and Water, they also call them Man and Wife, and 
they bring forth four children, two boys, which are heat and cold, and two girls, as 
moisture and dryness. These are the four elements, constituting the QUINTESSENCE, 
that is the proper MAGNESIA, wherein there is nothing false’ (Trismosin 1920, 32). 
What we find encapsulated in the symbol of the hermaphrodite is a conjunction that 
never rests in a simple opposition but is thought and depicted as a fusion of body 
composites, as inherent differenc/tiations into new composites: the two bodies flow 
into each other and differentiate into gendered elements, dissolve the Vitruvian 
model of man with his/her five anchor points of touching the cosmic world into 
interacting virtual forces that condense back into bodies and pictures. Although this 
symbol could indicate a possible ‘beginning’ of all operations (as a anthropocentric 
‘first’, if instable conjunction), the pictured stage is only one fold among others in 
the Splendor Solis series, foreclosing the path toward an ‘origin’. 
The small cosmic egg held in the left hand of the hermaphrodite repeats the 
subject and reminds the viewer of what the alchemical, fluid operation can be about: 
working with the creative potential (the elements) that chaosmos and the fears 
associated to it hold. Splendor Solis doubles the themes but veils the elements and 
their vitality convex and protective shell of the egg, taking up the most ancient 
symbol for cosmic forces to unfold, and it is perhaps its inconspicuousness, the fact 
that the viewer needs to discover it and appreciate the preciousness of a minor 
detail, is Splendor’s very own slant on the subject.  
                                                 
84 See Abraham (1998, 98): ‘Sir George Ripley [who] spoke of the joining of ‘the Red Man and the 
Whyte Woman at the coniunctio. The resultant hermaphroditic being is thus represented in alchemical 
emblems as red and white.’ Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 





Fig. 22 - from the first series of Splendor Solis. Manuscript Cod. Germ. Fol. 42, 
Staatsbibliothek, Preussischer Kulturbesitz Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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Fig. 23 –Marius von Brasch, Sleeper (2010). Oil on linen. 90 x 120 cm Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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Fig. 24 - Marius von Brasch, Paraphrases 1 (2010/11). Oil on linen. Each 36 x 48 cm Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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Fig. 25 - Marius von Brasch, Paraphrases 2 (2010/11). Oil on linen. Each 36 x 48 cm Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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Fig. 26 - Marius von Brasch, Paraphrases 3 (2010/11). Oil on linen. Each 36 x 48 cm Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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Fig. 27 - Marius von Brasch, Paraphrases 4 (2010/11). Oil on linen. Each 36 x 48 cm Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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Fig. 28 - Marius von Brasch, Paraphrases 5 (2010/11). Oil on linen. Each 36 x 48 cm Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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Fig. 29 - Marius von Brasch, Paraphrases 6 (2010/11). Oil on linen. Each 36 x 48 cm Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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The cosmic egg appears frequently in Deleuze/Guattari’s metaphysics as the 
free flowing ‘chaotic’ desire, the all-encompassing libido that inevitably will trigger 
the assembling of ‘machinic’ intertwined connections and stratifications. The 
‘machinic’ aspect highlights Deleuze/Guattaris’s interest to conceptualize the 
unconscious as a plane of ‘production’, in contrast to a classic psychoanalytic 
theatre of mythical re-presentation by euphemistically examining the typical 
disruption of a functioning integration into the symbolic order as the potential of a 
pre-individual fluidity, which in the image of the egg is also alluded to by the fluids 
enfolded by the shell. Artists, according to Deleuze/Guattari, most possibly realize 
working with this pre-individual flow creatively. Their practice stages and demands 
the task/desire to bring forth spontaneous formations of desire which can break 
through the shell of the already-known, also in a sense of ‘form’, which a closeness 
or appropriation of strands of the ‘affective, intensive, anarchist body that consists 
solely of poles, zones, thresholds, and gradients’ (Deleuze 1998: 131), the BwO 
suggest .  
The egg folds the Body without Organs and holds as ‘the field of immanence of 
desire’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 170) also the plane on which creative processes 
as much as alchemical transformations emerge freely, chaotically. Unrestricted by 
the psychoanalytic models of lack or fulfilment, the hermaphrodite’s egg is ‘intense 
[and] defined by axes and vectors, gradients and thresholds, by dynamic tendencies 
involving energy transformation and kinematic movements involving group 
displacements, by migrations: all independent of accessory forms because the 
organs appear and function here only as intensities’(Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 
170). The freeing of the folds of the cosmic egg, its letting-itself-unfold equals the 
breakthrough of free flowing, creative psyche that differentiates itself spontaneously 
in a field of immanent life.  
But why (in Splendor Solis) does it have to be the Hermaphrodite that presents 
the egg? 
In the middle of the dynamics of desire opens another disjunctive synthesis, 
which puts the alchemists’ allusion of the conjunction of opposites (the coniunctio 
oppositorum) as the goal of the ‘work’, into another light. The picture of the 
hermaphrodite conveys a fundamental ambivalence: on the one hand, it is built upon 
the unquestioned and deeply rooted equations of man=sun and woman=moon, 
which force both genders for generations into the mimicry of fixed ‘constellations’; 
and on the other hand, by collaging and merging those constellations, the picture 
subverts such constitutive fixations and virtually liquefies them.  
It must be made clear at this point that in this research the complementariness 
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early as 1949, Erich Neumann (who engaged with alchemy in depth) introduced the 
terms masculine and feminine in his important study on The Origins and History of 
Consciousness: 
 
‘not as personal sex-linked characteristics, but as symbolic expressions. When 
we say masculine or feminine dominants obtrude themselves at certain stages, or in 
certain cultures or types of person, this is a psychological statement which must not 
be reduced to biological or sociological terms. … In reality every individual is a 
psychological hybrid. Even sexual symbolism cannot be derived from the person, 
because it is prior to the person. Conversely, it is one of the complications of 
individual psychology that in all cultures the integrity of the personality is violated 
when it is identified with either the masculine or the feminine side of the symbolic 
principle of opposite.’ (Neumann 1954, xxii) 
 
The quote with its a priori claim of sexual symbolism refers to Jungian 
archetypes; however, it can be read as well as a potential of a not-yet-lived past to be 
actualized in heterogeneous assemblages. Deleuze finds in Proust’s Remembrance 
of Things Past (written between 1909 and 1922) a model of transsexuality that is ‘no 
longer an aggregate and specific homosexuality, in which men relate to men and 
women to women in a separation of the two series, but a local and nonspecific 
homosexuality, in which a man seeks also what is masculine in a woman and a 
woman what is feminine in a man, and this in the portioned contiguity of the two 
sexes as partial objects’ (Deleuze 2008b: 88). 
As a very specific composite, the egg/hermaphrodite threshold is thus 
associated with questions about sexual identity, as the hermaphrodite emphasizes 
that ‘the separated, partitioned sexes coexist in the same individual’ (Deleuze 
2008b: 51). If the outside and inside of desire fold into each other, also the 
boundaries of gender specific expression might collapse and open the work of the 
alchemist (and the artist) towards a practice that departs quite certainly from a 
fragmented stability of ‘approved’ gender expression in art. The coniunctio 
oppositorum steps out of a binary dualism into a fluid axis of vectors and – 
extending this into the environment of an emerging piece of art – media of desire.  
Curiously enough and playing into the subject of flux and fragment, it is 
exactly the fragmentary and unsustainable character of the conjunction of opposites, 
of its reductive image of thought
85, that allows Deleuze/Guattari to extend to a 
statement like the following: ‘everywhere a microscopic transsexuality, resulting in 
the woman containing as many men as the man, and the man as many women, all 
capable of entering men with women, women with men – into relations of production 
of desire that overturn the statistical order of the sexes. Making love is not just 
becoming as one, or even two, but becoming as a hundred thousand. Desiring 
                                                 
85 Brian Massumi gives this clear definition of the Deleuzian term: ‘An image of thought is an 
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machines or the nonhuman sex: not one or even two sexes, but n sexes’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1983, 295). 
If the Hermaphrodite holds the augmentation of its symbolic (cosmic) forces in 
the miniature form of an egg
86, one could ask if there might be a connection between 
these inherent forces and the name that houses this conjunction, a mythological 
figure as much as a composite of two mythological key figures: Hermes and 
Aphrodite. 
In Ovid’s Metamorphoses
87 we are told that Hermaphroditus was the son of 
Mercury (Hermes) and Venus (Aphrodite), and that ‘in his features, it was easy to 
trace a resemblance to his father and to his mother’.  At the age of fifteen, he 
started to travel and arrived at a pool of clear water. Here lived the nymph Salmacis
88 
who ‘as soon as she had seen him, … longed to possess him’, but all attempts to 
seduce him failed. After exhausting struggles for the boy’s love she prayed: ‘“May 
the gods grant me this, may no time to come ever separate him me, or me from 
him!” … as they lay together, their bodies were united and from being two persons 
                                                 
86 Chevalier and Gheebrant write: ‘In the beginning the hermaphrodite was merely an aspect or 
anthropomorphic representation of the Cosmic EGG. It occurs at the beginning of all cosmogonies and at 
the end of all eschatologies. The fullness of fundamental Oneness stands at the alpha as well as at the 
omega of the world and of manifested being, when opposites are fused together, either because they are 
still only potentialities or else because they have achieved their final reconciliation and integration.’ 
(Chevalier and Gheerbrant 1996, 497) Such beginnings, ends or oneness are distinct human constructions 
though – interestingly, in Splendor Solis, this seems acknowledged. 
87 Ovid sourced for his account of the story older tales from Asia Minor. The excellent volume 
Classical Mythology gives a concise summary of the factual background: ‘The name “Hermaphroditus” was 
first used by the philosopher Theophrastus in about 320 B.C., describing how on the fourth and seventh 
days of the month (the fourth day was sacred to Hermes and Aphrodite) the superstitious man “spends all 
day putting wreaths on the Hermaphrodites.” By this time Hermaphroditus was worshipped as a god 
embodying the union of Hermes, with his erect phallus, and Aphrodite, as the physical expression of 
female fertility. He was, then, a minor fertility god, described by the historian Diodorus Suculus in the first 
century B.C. as “very like Priapus”, but his reputation received a boost from Polycles’ statue (which was 
said to have “made him noble”). Nevertheless, Ovid’s story, with its explicit focus on emasculation and 
physical weakness, has concealed whatever divine authority Hermaphroditus may once have held, and at 
Rome hermaphrodites were considered to be ill-omened prodigies and were drowned’ (Morford et al. 
2011, 293). 
88 Nymphs in mythology, associated with water and caverns, are often the mothers of heroes. 
Salmacis is described as isolating herself from hunting with Diana and the other nymphs (a popular topic 
of Baroque painting, for example Domenichino, 1616/17, Galleria Borghese, Rome). Their reputation of 
being seductive, elusive and violent was the reason to approach them with an ‘ambivalent feeling of fear 
and attraction [knowing that] the fascination of the nymphs brings madness, the destruction of 
personality’ (Chevalier and Gheerbrant 1996, 708), an interesting polarity to the young man, a composite 
of the trickster (Hermes) and beauty (Aphrodite). Bonello’s Tiresia takes up the Diana connection. In the 
very beginning, the man whose obsession with the Hermaphrodite will lead him to captivate Tiresia, 
inspects in the Louvre first the sculptures of the so-called Borghese Hermaphroditus (Hermaphroditus 
asleep - on a comforting mattress added by Bernini), then of Artémis à la biche [Diana with stag]. Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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they became one … a single form, possessed by a dual nature, which could not be 
called male or female, but seemed to be at once both and neither.’ But also the boy’s 
wish was granted that whoever might touch the water of the pool, ‘may … suddenly 
grow weak and effeminate.’ His parents, the gods, ‘infected the pool with this 
horrible magic power’ (Ovid 1955, 110-113). 
The alchemical Hermaphrodite is born in different stages: as a mythological 
son with great resemblance to characteristics of his parents (which gives him 
particular smooth appearance according to Ovid) and he comes into his mythological 
mask only through a quite violent struggle around desire. As Antoine-Joseph Pernety 
points out in his Dictionnaire mytho-hermétique (Pernety 1787), he does not become 
what he is before ‘the union with the nymph’ and shows a significant parallel 
between this the scene in the water of Salmacis and the becoming of the 
Hermaphrodite in alchemy. The latter cannot function as the alchemical ‘Mercury’ 
(which contains as the agent, as already discussed, both male and female seeds of 
metals and is, thus identical with the Hermaphrodite) before the coniunctio 
oppositorum of king and queen, which takes place in the form of a bath in the 
fountain of ‘the sages’ (Pernety 1787, 191).  
Hermes/Mercury is, as mentioned, the fugitive mediator between 
heterogeneous worlds and thus a messenger of communication, language and sense 
(rhetoric)
89; there is no reason not to associate him with Becoming in general and 
more specifically, to the production of pictures, the merging of disparate elements 
and media, e.g. traditional drawing/painting and digital technology: Hermes’ activity 
is restless and active, it ‘constructs itself’, as Michel Serres says about his 
‘patronymic’, ‘it creates itself, following the fluctuations of time. It could only be 
sketches out at the risk of freezing it once again into statuelike concepts, 
operations, or verbs, too simplistic and coarse’ (Serres and Latour 1995, 116/7). 
But it seems that Hermes’ work is incomplete without the input of Aphrodite, 
the goddess of love, sensation and desire, and the various and unpredictable 
                                                 
89 This makes him the first Greek mythological personage defending his breaking the law (some 
activities as the archetypal ‘trickster’) in a skilful speech (Homeric Hymns, in: Cashford 2003). The 
Sophists, especially Gorgias of Leontini, continue the tradition of juxtaposing rhetoric perspectivism to 
truth and jurisdiction in speeches. As such, they are the first ones arguing for the simulacrum vs. Idea. 
(Texts by and about Gorgias in: Dillon and Gergel 2003)  
Carl Kerényi points out also Hermes’ function as psychopomp (guide of souls, or I would like to 
add ‘individuation’), which in my view connects to Becoming and the ‘egg’ as ‘seed’. He guides ‘[t]hat 
which hovers between being and non-being, seemingly powerless, repressed in servitude, reduced to the 
life in the nocturnal darkness of the seed, finds its way upward.’ (Kerényi 1986, 85)  
Hermes is a transformation of the older Egyptian Thoth, also ‘a conciliator among the deities’, 
giving the ‘knowledge of how to write by picture symbols, hence hieroglyphs could always posses a 
magical force [hence the necessity to develop strategies of persuasion].  Scribes … were a privileged 
professional class’ (Hart 1986, 215). Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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changes and eruptions of new composites and assemblages that Mercury induces, 
the lines of flight and deterritorialization become unthinkable, in an alchemical 
sense, without the desiring machines with which new metamorphoses and stages of 
a piece of art emerge. In Ovid’s story, the besotted Salmacis asks Hermaphroditus: 
‘Fair boy, you surely deserve to be thought a god. If you are, perhaps you may be 
Cupid?’ (Ovid 1955, 111), and gives away what is encapsulated also in the somewhat 
serene Splendor Solis picture: the eruptive power of the fusion of fugitive agent and 
desire, of blind erotic transit
90 in the unfolding and emergence, in the context of this 
research, of art. Perhaps this is the reason why in its framed and fragmented form 
(as a picture condensing a threshold, a cut in the flux) the painted image of the 
Hermaphrodite has to be pacified, doubly encircled and condensed, as a figure 
presenting its own encapsulated version. Does this doubling express the volatile 
instability of the image of thought that a conjunction provides? Beyond the obvious 
reason why the story of the fusion in the water of Salmacis puts such an emphasis 
on the forceful, ‘weakening’ aspect, namely the compensatory effect on the male 
who is the protagonist of Ovid’s story, the double potential of Becoming (elusive 
agent, or medium, and erotic blind transit) expressed/condensed in the 
Hermaphrodite suggests a link to ‘eternal return’ that difference in its movement of 
repetition entails.  The fragment is stifled on the one hand, potentially 
differentiating on the other. When Deleuze refers to the Nietzschean Dionysos, it is 
the latter’s being torn apart and resurrected, in this context the de-framing power of 
the conjunction (or better disjunctive synthesis, but I like to use here the alchemical 
term with its inherent instability) of flux and fragment.  
In Robert Graves’ The Greek Myths we find proof for this thought, a curious 
connection between Hermaphroditus (‘a youth with womanish breasts and long 
hair’), androgyne (‘or bearded woman’) and ‘womanish gods like Dionysus’ (Graves 
1960, 73), another indicator and support for the significance of the Hermaphrodite 
in relation to Becoming (which, of course, is conceptually positioned in closest 
proximity to Dionysos as the masked ‘eternal return’ in the Deleuzian sense). As god 
of the theatre where his ‘effeminacy is a sign of hidden power’ (Zeitlin and Winkler 
1990, 64), he shows Becoming literally in its fragmentary, yet hermaphroditic 
(unlimited) mask. What better image could be found for Becoming’s specific 
ambivalence and state of being in between, being what traditionally has been named 
a ‘god’? 
 
                                                 
90 I use the term ‘transit’ here in adapting Perniola’s term, which builds connections with its 
associations of shifting, displacement and decentralisation to ‘simulacrum’ in movement (or Becoming): 
‘the loosening of the bond with a place of origin is no longer rewarded by a search for a promised land’ 
(Perniola 2000, 44). Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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2.4.3	 ﾠAura	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAffirmation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSimulacrum	 ﾠ
 
The practice, as might have become more and more obvious, focused on 
figuring out the paradox of the simultaneity of flux and fragment, a subject that 
might provide some substantial clues about aura, which will be introduced in the 
following paragraphs.To summarize: the initial question of this chapter concerning 
where flux and fragment touch, where painting ‘unfolds’, appears to extend to the 
framing of Becoming, to a reality of finding oneself (here as a painter) positioned 
within the emergence of a multiplicity - the painting itself - traversed by a deframing 
power of an infinite field of forces. 
As  an  outcome  of  this  project  based  on  Splendor  Solis,  a  painting  and 
subsequent  series  embodies  inevitably  a  fragment,  a  mask  in  the  performative 
unfurling of a death instinct that promises freedom
91. It holds strata of memories: of 
the processuality of Becoming, of the painters and authors of Splendor Solis, spectres 
of  others  whose  mercurial  desire  has  a  virtual  presence  despite  the  vanishing 
historical conditions and techniques. The layers of an ancient source coexist with 
traces  of  their  digital a p p r o p r i a t i o n .  T h e  l a t t e r  d o e s  n o t  r e s t r i c t  o r  d e n y  t h e  
deframing power perceived as aura but responds to the intensities the source holds 
and  involves  it  into  new  metamorphoses,  acknowledging,  as  Deleuze  might  have 
said, its being ‘larval’ beyond a division between old and ‘new’ media. Thus, the 
processuality of aura that is the pictorial subject of Splendor Solis finds (perhaps 
inadvertently) its dynamic disjunction in an art practice involving what on the surface 
might  appear  as  incompatible,  a  medium  associated  with  ‘uniqueness’  and  a 
medium of inherent instant dissemination. Then, the effect of Splendor Solis’ aura 
(from a reproduction) on the artist, which does not depend on its being the pictorial 
                                                 
91 This point elucidates a constellation between Walter Benjamin and Deleuze. In On Some Motifs in 
Baudelaire Benjamin claims, referring here to an article by Max Horkheimer, that Bergson’s durée 
(duration) - by eliminating death (Horkheimer: “Bergson the metaphysician suppresses death”) - ‘isolates it 
effectively from a historical (as well prehistorical) order’, thus also from tradition (Benjamin 2003, 336). 
The critique highlights both interests of Benjamin: the fusion of historical materialism and messianism. In 
Deleuze’s version of Bergson, which builds the moment of repetition as an instant of death into the 
actualisation i.e. the process of becoming of what the élan vital instigates as potentiality, this verdict 
seems only partially just. The foregoing of tradition is intended by Deleuze in order to liberate new 
actualisations for a time to come, which, as Daniel Smith puts it, ‘is not the future of history, but the Now 
that is distinguished from every present; it is not an instant but a becoming, the “actual” or the “untimely”, 
the conditions for the production of the new’ (Smith 2012). History as past dissolves into instants that 
mark events and their interpretation as reflected in the chapter structure of A Thousand Plateaus, where 
Deleuze and Guattari write: ‘Real history undoubtedly recounts the actions and passions of the bodies that 
develop in a social field; it communicates them in a certain fashion; but it also transmits order-words, in 
other words, pure acts intercalated into that development. History will never be rid of dates’ (Deleuze and 
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subject, has instigated its repetition by differentiation, not by guarding its traditional 
criterion  of  uniqueness  but  by  deflagrating  or  expanding  it  and  revealing  it  as  a 
multiplicity that is neither original nor copy.  
The agent of this process, the Hermaphrodite/Mercury as auratic conduit, dies 
with the deliverance of his/her/its message: following, one could add, or drawing 
other lines of flights of mediation. And with his disappearance is left a silence in-
between the joints of the new assemblage that signalizes a halt within a process that 
potentially holds no ending, is infinite. The props of Mercury have vanished and 
‘unfinishedness’ seems to depend on a sustained ambivalence of ‘empty’ and ‘full’, a 
still open field for Becoming or Mercury/Hermes to navigate with his/her fugitive 
force (for example in the drawing Line of Flight, Fig. 30). 
If the framed actualisation (painting, drawing, even film as time-based, but 
thus also time-limited outcome) holds a deframing potential of Becoming (as 
something to be uncovered, unfolded by a viewer) and functions as a ‘fragment’, 
then, in equal measure and at the same time, it holds connotations of something to 
be anticipated, yet-to-come and something indexical, historic and melancholic. It 
stresses that this open piece of art can act simultaneously as a messenger of 
something that potentially has not yet been past and will only emerge in a field that 
encloses it and a viewer, and as a fragmented witness and trace of missed 
encounters, of always already-passed or not-yet-arriving instants of unfolding.  
Looking closer at the (sometimes emotive) valuation of such connotations 
reveals how intricately they depend on different metaphysical ‘outlooks’ i.e. ethical 
positions. ‘Emptiness’ in this context for example, can refer to Lacan’s concept of 
the Real (that comes to mind with a ‘missed encounter’), which is explicitly out of 
bounds of communicability. In a Deleuzian framework though, emptiness or the 
desert provides an image of thought that allows remaining open for the input of 
virtual intensities, which might introduce with the new possible ‘solutions’ in the 
realm of the actual. The latter assumes a transformed Real (das Ding, the Thing), 
which is possible only when the question what the Ding-an-sich (the thing in itself) 
could be has become obsolete. It is based on the conceptual move towards the 
simulacrum, which arises as image of thought from difference and differenc/tiation 
as the centre of Becoming. In this sense the painting as fragment (as in this study) is 
also a simulacrum as the picture holds ‘[p]ure Becoming, the unlimited, … the matter 
of the simulacrum insofar it contests both model and copy at once’ (Deleuze 2004c, 
4)
92. How is the ‘simulacrum’ to be understood here? 
                                                 
92 ‘Pure’ shouldn’t be understood in a moral sense but (as always in Deleuze) as indicating its 
virtual state. Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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In his paper Nietzsche, Freud, Marx, Michel Foucault explains how the pre-modern 
model of resemblance was based on two distinct models of knowledge: on ‘cognitio, which 
was the transition, in some lateral fashion, from one resemblance to another; and divinatio, 
which was knowledge in depth, going from a superficial resemblance to a deeper 
resemblance’ (Foucault 2000, 271). Via interpretation and elaborate determinations of how 
resemblances interacted, the various phenomena of the world would generate a ‘consensus’ 
that in turn would ground resemblances themselves. In this generative model of original-
copy, resemblances ‘are opposed to the simulacrum, the false resemblance, which is based 
on the dissension between God and the Devil’.  
It felt a felicitous moment to discover during a museum visit Martino di Bartolomeo’s 
Exchange and Abduction of the newly born Saint Stephen (early 15
th century), one panel of 
an altar piece, which could be representative for what Walter Benjamin had in mind when he 
critiqued the passivity of contemplation adhered to the aura in Church art: it illustrates the 
story of St Stephen who as an infant had been exchanged by the devil for a changeling, 
been brought up by a hind, discovered by a bishop and finally, after a life of conversions, 
had suffered martyrdom by stoning. The first panel (Fig. 31) builds an overture that 
presents the leitmotif of the act of exchange. Interesting here is the narrative line between 
the lower right and the upper left corner: in the lower right, the simulacrum, the 
‘changeling’ - as such also always and already ‘change’ - has just been bedded carefully in 
the crib by the dark, winged and horned figure. Both infants are juxtaposed for a moment: 
Stephen’s head is already clamped by a frozen aura, while most of his body, except the 
noticeably red feet, seems mummified; the changeling, almost a perfect copy, wears black 
horns like the mounted reminiscences of Pan, the pagan god of nature.  
The winged devil or blackness - from an alchemical perspective most likely lively dark 
matter with its inherent light and mutability that has no place in the representation of ‘a life’ 
(Stephen) in ecclesiastical imagery - traverses the rectangular spatial frame of the house and 
looks back, as if to make sure the changeling is safe; perhaps he reminds us in his 
theriomorphic appearance of the possibility that the frightening ‘groundlessness’ he alludes 
to, ‘swarms’, as Deleuze writes, with differences and differentiations (quoted in: Grant 
2000, 38)
93. Nature and transcendence are clearly juxtaposed, and it will be the labour of 
the saint (with the help of the bishop’s intervention as authority) to regain transcendence by  
                                                 
93 In his paper The Chemistry of Darkness, Iain Hamilton Grant expands on this. I insert here a longer quote 
that builds a link to Splendor Solis: ‘To save the earth’s sur-face from the face behind it, what is required is a 
chemical sensibility, since chemistry has always been the science and art of the imperceptible, of what escapes the 
imprisonment of sensibility behind a face (the superficial redundancies of recognition and their maturation into 
features) to go directly to the earth, or to earths, to be dispersed and molecularised in the black. Even etymology 
serves to remind us of this: “chemistry derives from the Egyptian word for “”black””, which is itself named for the 
black earth of Egypt”’ (Grant 2000, 38). Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 




Fig. 31 - Martino di Bartolomeo (ca. 1370-1434/35), Exchange and Abduction of the newly born Saint 
Stephen. 74,3 x 58,5 cm. Mixed Media on poplar wood. Städel Museum, Frankfurt am Main. Photo © 
U. Edelmann-Städel Museum-ARTOTHEK Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
    151 
purging nature, which, as this image vividly depicts, is kept resolutely in a state of denial: 
the horns of the changeling are also the signifier of the scapegoat. None of the women has 
noticed what happened. Why? 
There is a strange cluelessness about the mother and the figure in green (most likely 
another woman); and Becoming, the birth and subsequent complications could be both a 
secret agreement and a question: the hands knowingly, inquisitively touch the red of blood 
and passion that covers the mother’s lower body. There could be a possibility that the 
picture inadvertently compensates, by telling its story, for the theological denial of nature 
and women (as ‘gateway’ for the extension of the Fall, thus the tradition to position the 
‘feminine’ closer to nature, feeling, intuition etc.), tells its reverse and subverts what it is 
supposed to mediate.  
Becoming is visualized in this panel as being torn into two fragmented and juxtaposed 
blocks: the saint and the changeling; and in its compensatory work, the image highlights 
the problematic of this state of being: the masculine remains split between logos (flying, 
surveying) and lust (Pan, the goat) while the feminine remains the secret accomplice in 
keeping the split reproduced; she is ‘protected’ by a framework, the house that cuts her off 
with its ceiling, the domain of the logos. One side of the split becomes desirable: the saint 
as role model; the other side becomes the denigrated cause of the problem, finally the 
cause of its own denigration: but thus, the devil, desire itself, becomes the accuser that 
recognizes the split
94.  
The timeline of the devil’s movement in the image shows how this split of Becoming 
into static blocks develops further and further: leaving on the one hand a creationist, fixed 
‘world’ of resemblance and on the other hand a ‘transcendent light’ that is doomed, 
reminded of its being-part-of-the-earth by stoning.  
From an angle of Becoming, aura needs to be freed from the context pictured in Fig. 
31, to be liquefied as already done in alchemy. It underlies thus conditions of interpretation 
and especially, valuation: in its traditional function and imagery (as analysed by Benjamin), 
which refers explicitly to a concealed and original source of power (transcendent reign), it 
remains of course insupportable as a critical notion and could not be used in a set-up that 
affirms the simulacrum. But even a contemplative panel like the one presented here holds a 
subversive potential that breaks it up from within and forces, one could say, the simulacrum 
affirmatively onto the contemplating viewer.  
                                                 
94 With differentiation of desire, Deleuze addresses exactly this moral split: ‘difference becomes an object of 
representation always in relation to a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an imagined opposition or a perceived 
similitude’ (Deleuze 2004b, 174). Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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A newer publication by Italian philosopher Mario Perniola keeps aura conceptually in 
its traditional framework but speaks about its ‘shadow’. Does this mean that this subversive 
side of aura has been integrated or not? 
  
2.4.4	 ﾠAura	 ﾠas	 ﾠShadow	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
 
Mario Perniola engaged with aura in his Art and its shadow (1995) and proposed to 
substitute the term ‘shadow’ for aura. The ‘shadow’ adheres immanently to the concrete 
piece of art and contains the traces of its historic folds:  
 
‘the keeper of a knowledge and a feeling which it alone can reach, only to disappear 
when the full light wants to appropriate it … it does [as it transgresses the concept of 
conflict exerted in institutions and communication] not agree with the idealization of 
conflict or victory implicit in the dialectic. For the shadow, winning is impossible and to 
think of winning is naïve’ (Perniola 1995, xix).  
 
Perniola argues here effectively for a materialized aura by affirming a ‘third system of 
art and aesthetic experience that lies beyond the traditional aura and mechanical 
disenchantment’ (Perniola 2004, 51) i.e. by turning positively what Walter  Benjamin (based 
on a Freudian and Marxist reading of the ‘tool’ i.e. the inorganic) calls the ‘sex appeal of the 
organic’.
95 Thus, Perniola tries to rescue what in the process of demystification has been 
overlooked: that instead of liberating subjects to their individual potential and political 
power, the deprivation of aura through technological reproducibility ‘ends up by levelling 
art at the most insignificant reality, reducing it to an instrument of recreation and edifying 
spectacle.’ (Perniola 1995, 48) Demystification then, against its intention, emphasizes and 
supports a process of reification ‘with respect to the demands of a society that no longer 
has any need to maintain the relative autonomy of symbolical activities such as art, 
philosophy and, more generally, humanistic studies.’ (Perniola 1995, 49) In this set-up, of 
course, the element of transgression that once served effectively the release of religious 
transcendence and its shadow-in-denial, has been integrated solidly into art market 
strategies and institutions, has become mot d’ordre and thus ‘annull[ed] the transgressive 
effect of artistic innovation.’ (Perniola 1995, 48) The ‘third system’ extends in Perniola’s 
book to the necessary compromises (‘third’) in between what appear to be experiences of 
                                                 
95 For example in the Arcades Project: ‘Grandville extends the authority of fashion to objects of everyday 
use, as well as to the cosmos. In taking it to the extreme, he reveals its nature. It couples the living body to the 
inorganic world. To the living, it defends the right of the corpse. The fetishism which thus succumbs to the sex 
appeal of the inorganic is its vital nerve’ (Benjamin 2002a, 18/19). Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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transcendence, e.g. ‘originality’ and its construction and fetishization through societal 
operations.  
Although some of the statements about contemporary art and its being ‘levelled at the 
most insignificant reality’ are generalized in an unfortunate way, Perniola’s reflections on 
the aura’s or shadow’s potential to resist reification seem important to the present 
research. Among many other points, he achieves firstly acknowledgment of the place of 
auratic experience in the framework of social construction without denying its potential and 
significance beyond this framework and secondly to assign an ethical dimension to 
posthuman aesthetics that is based on a principal critique of binary oppositions without 
having to recruit transcendent origins (thus his thought image shadow). But at the same 
time an impression remains that the desired reconciliation of two systems, basically the 
human and the tool, thought of at first as an opposition in order to dissolve or be sublated 
into a ‘third’ that celebrates the erotic transfer of the inorganic, might be too limited.  
In a framework of Becoming or actualisation of the virtual, such a primary distinction 
would be questioned, and technology most possibly be seen as expression of possibilities 
to resolve questions resulting from the complexity of life; a view that does not necessarily 
entail a neglect of life in the sense of non-human nature. Working within such an open 
framework demands, and this is a growing objective of this research, to work out carefully 
some ethical navigation marks.  
That flux and fragment, this very specific distinction in connection to this research’s 
theme aura, could become an important complex to engage with in detail, might have to do 
the possibility that aura is neither one or the other but intricately participating in both 
without being consumed or extinguished. As an  ‘in between’ or ‘either-and-or’ it functions 
as a curiously paradoxical index, of different times, of the ambivalence of oppositions, of 
desire and abrupt shifts (as condensed in the image of the Hermaphrodite). It remembers, 
reminds and anticipates simultaneously the processual flux and its becoming-sediment and 
is thus closely linked to Becoming (which never actualizes itself), but as a material trace 
referring haptically to virtual and non-chronological time, the time of pure Becoming or 
incorporeal events ‘with all of [the] characteristic reversals between future and past, active 
and passive, cause and effect, more or less, too much and not enough, already and not yet’ 
(Deleuze 2004c, 10).
96  
The interest of my painting has been (and initially I was not conscious of this) to trap 
or trace, to get hold of the process of emerging, of Becoming itself; rather than creating 
aura, it has been the attempt to trace what I experienced as auratic element during the 
process of making: the fugitiveness of what slips away by tracing it and the blindfolded 
desire to continue with what I do. Contextualizing this practice with Splendor Solis and its - 
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albeit different formal criteria - similar departure point, has gradually slowed down this 
process; but I have not changed the fundamental element of my practice, positioning myself 
in this kind of ‘trembling’, unstable conjunction. 
How aura works i.e., what auratic experience conveys is culturally and critically valued 
depends on the slant of interpretation
97 of individual authors and their position within a 
discourse that has to engage with it. I find it striking to discover how Perniola forms with 
the term shadow a complement to aura and its etymological connections to aurum (lat.) and 
or (hebr.) that both refer to gold.
98 Both shadow and gold make allusions to what to expect 
and how to value what such an experience, made during a personal contact with art or the 
making of art, is about: one refers to light (with its associations of, for example: sun, soul, 
enlightenment, preciousness, day, the open, unconcealed), the other to darkness (‘inside’, 
earth, body, night, shadow, the uncanny, the intimate, the concealed). Following the 
paradoxical intimations of alchemists, both should be layered and interwoven in the 
fountain of the always already liquefied conjunction: as an inseparable flux of gold and 
black. 
Avoiding obscure neologisms, I will keep the term aura with an acknowledgement of 
its processual and integrative strands: as such it cannot be reified, nor is it mysterious or 
only available for initiates. As always in a state of open differentiation, it can’t be the 
subject of or directive for law i.e. no dogma or authority will contain it. The ‘splendour’ that 
Splendor Solis makes its heart, is (asserted already in these alchemical images) the 
splendour of the real, of the potential of aliveness and as such very fragile and to be 
discovered.
99 From a theological point of view a reading of aura as developed here profanes 
it, puts it before (‘pro’), outside the temple (‘fanum’). This is, of course, fully intended, and 
an author supporting such an approach seems to be Giorgio Agamben. 
 
                                                 
97 Interpretation (hermeneutics) has got, according to Heidegger, a ‘hermetic’ aspect ‘in a play of thought, 
which is more obliging than the rigour of science […] hermeneuein is that unveiling, which brings knowledge, in so 
far it is able to listen to a message’ (Heidegger 2007, 121; my transl.). 
98 Of course, here is an obvious link of aura referring to gold and the foundation of capitalism (the 
accumulation of gold) on a religiously supported and reinforced model of hierarchy, greatness and stasis, which I 
try to read against the grain and to disable in this research.  
99 I agree here in part with Perniola’s (concealed) criticism of Deleuze’s vitalism when he says: ‘ … I have 
always felt completely extraneous to the idea of life as an inexhaustible fount, as an infinite productive force, as an 
irresistible power. On the contrary, it has seemed to me that life is something extremely poor, delicate and fragile, 
which must alienate itself from things, from reality, and from the world, in order to keep itself and develop’ 
(Perniola 2000, 52). Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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2.4.5	 ﾠAura	 ﾠand	 ﾠProfanation	 ﾠ
 
Giorgio Agamben speaks, in connection to the image of the halo, which in the 
framework of this research appears as processual unstable ‘portrait’ of the aura, of ‘[t]his 
imperceptible trembling of the finite’ (Agamben 2009a, 56), placing it irrevocably into 
immanence and outside of religion. Agamben notes that the etymological roots of ‘religion’ 
are not to be found in religare (binding back) but in relegere i.e. ‘rereading’, ‘which 
indicates the stance of scrupulousness and attention that must be adopted in relations with 
the gods, the uneasy hesitation … before forms – and formulae – that must be observed in 
order to respect the separation between the sacred and the profane’ (Agamben 2007, 74, 
75). In his essay Praise of Profanation (Agamben 2007), he proposes profanation as the re-
appropriation of objects and concepts reserved for the diagram of the sacred (undergirding 
the separation between man and god) for free and experimental use. This free use allows 
stepping out of diagrams that hold the empty promises of attaining a satisfaction from lack, 
which underlie the mechanisms of capitalism and its ‘gigantic apparatus for capturing pure 
means, that is, profanatory behaviors’ (Agamben 2007, 87). The fulfilment of the capitalist 
dream, ‘of producing an unprofanable’ (Agamben 2007, 89) holds the religious diagram on 
a level of profanation: the fetishized commodity has taken the place of a sacred object, and 
pure means, free use is projected into a consciousness of lack. This phenomenon can be 
clearly identified in the current fetishization of art objects as commodities, of paintings 
becoming museums in themselves
100, which act as if they had been freed of aura. This 
understanding and association of aura is still clearly drawn from its traditional religious 
diagram that unhindered continues into its reduction to criteria for measurements of 
‘value’, of ‘greatness’ that can be indexed by the few who are in possession of knowledge of 
these criteria, of what is ingrained in the diagram.  
But such a concept of aura misses exactly its positive potential, its connection to 
Becoming and differentiation, which, in an encounter with art, might trigger an impulse in 
an individual with its deframing force.  What such a trigger evokes, must be, according to 
the results of this research up to now, marked by both: on the one hand the historical trace 
or ‘signature’
101 and its links to fragments and allegories, which are, according to Benjamin 
                                                 
100 ‘… everything today can become a Museum’, writes Agamben, ‘because this term simply designates the 
exhibition of an impossibility of using, of dwelling, of experience’ (Agamben 2007, 84). 
101 With regard to the power of signatures (as indices of diagrams), I agree with Agamben’s critique of 
Deleuze: ‘Gilles Deleuze wrote once that a philosophical inquiry entails at least two elements: the identification of 
the problem and the choice of concepts that are adequate for approaching it. It is necessary to add that concepts 
entail signatures, without which they remain inert and unproductive. It may even happen that what at first appears 
to be a concept is later revealed to be a signature (or vice versa)’ (Agamben 2009b, 76). Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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‘in the realm of thoughts, what ruins are in the realm of things’; on the other hand, the 
potential of the emergence of something from the pure past (a past that never has been 
actualised) and its links to the flux of virtual multiplicities and strands of the new. Can 
reading aura in this way be called a profanation? 
Agamben distinguishes between profanation and secularization; the latter ‘leaves 
intact the forces it deals with by simply moving them from one place to another. Thus the 
political secularization of theological concepts (the transcendence of God as a paradigm of 
sovereign power) does nothing but displace the heavenly monarchy onto an earthly 
monarchy, leaving its power intact’; in contrast, profanation ‘neutralizes what it profanes. 
Once profaned, that which was unavailable and separate loses its aura and is returned to 
use. … [T]he first guarantees the exercise of power by carrying it back to a sacred model; 
the second deactivates the apparatuses of power and returns to common use the spaces 
that power had seized’ (Agamben 2007, 77). Agamben’s ‘profanation’ alludes, of course, to 
Benjamin’s project of ‘profane illumination’ as ‘the true, creative overcoming of religious 
illumination […], a materialistic, anthropological inspiration’ (Benjamin 1999, 209), based 
on his speculation: ‘It might be worth while to investigate the origin of the dogma of the 
sacredness of life’ (quoted in: De la Durantaye 2009, 354)
102. It is an interesting twist that 
what is understood in this project as a necessary and overdue profanation of aura, exactly 
in order to free up its potential of use for the emergence of something new, not-yet reified 
(in art practice and a viewer) will cause, according to Agamben, who leaves aura in its 
secularized diagram, the loss of its aura. While Agamben’s profanation builds upon 
‘potentiality’, the conception of aura remains in its traditional religious diagram as index of 
a transcendent split. 
Would not aura - based on the knowledge of its differentiating agent, its being 
transmissibility and its resistance against fixation - respond to a situation where the 
transmission of truth, and in connection to art, the aesthetics of pleasure consumption are 
more and more disabled? Would it not contribute to what Agamben describes so poignantly 
in his essay The Melancholy Angel: ‘By transforming the principle of man’s delay before 
truth into a poetic process and renouncing the guarantees of truth for love of 
                                                 
102 Agamben’s ‘profanation’ seeks to obsolete the power of the ‘sacred’ as exclusion of what community is 
founded upon: ‘However one interprets the sacrificial function, the essential thing is that in every case, the action 
of the human community is grounded in another action … At the center of the sacrifice is simply a determinate 
action that, as such, is separated and marked by exclusion; in this way it becomes sacer and is invested with a 
series of prohibitions and ritual precepts. Forbidden action, marked by sacredness, is not, however, simply 
excluded; rather it is now only accessible for certain people and according to determinate rules. In this way, it 
furnishes society and its ungrounded legislation with the fiction of a beginning: that which is excluded from the 
community is, in reality, that on which the entire life of the community is founded’ (quoted in: De la Durantaye 
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transmissibility, art succeeds once again in transforming man’s inability to exit his historical 
status, perennially suspended in the inter-world between old and new, past and future, into 
the very space in which he can take the original measure of his dwelling in the present and 
recover each time the meaning of his action’ (in: Agamben 1999b, 114). 
Recognizing every moment as ‘man’s’ opportunity to ‘face his own responsibility’ 
(Agamben 1999b, 114) mirrors also aspects of ‘being with’ the emergence of for example a 
painting. On a conceptual level this significance of the ‘moment’ provides a tangency, not 
exactly a reconciliation though, between what I read as an ethical layer in Deleuze’s concept 
of Becoming (the moment of selection within emergence) and Benjamin’s potential of the 
instant - ‘For every second was the small gateway in time through which the Messiah might 
enter’ (Benjamin 2003, 397) – which Agamben updates in his critique of contemporary 
culture. 
The simulacrum as ontological status of the outcomes of this research in its 
connection to a profaned aura does not point to artistic production as an indifferent 
accumulation of ‘and, and, and’ (in the sense of an unreflected progressive line of vitalist 
desire-couplings) but a connective practice element to sheets of memory and those 
problematic ideas ‘of which we are effects’ (Colebrook 2002, 80) and which, if we choose 
so, are in a state of creative differentiation
103. 
The further course of this research, concerning time and its connection to aura, poses 
questions about how it affects: when and how is a moment of quality in the practice element 
of this research encountered? In which ways does the fugitive agent Becoming make itself 
felt in (this) art practice? How does it keep the attention and communicate within a process 
of actualisation? How do ‘I’ partake - beyond a purely psychological level that reduces the 
creative act to the juxtaposition of subject and object – in the ‘unfolding’ of a piece of art 
with its sensations of closeness and distance, its ‘already and not yet’?  And how can ‘my’ 
work, intended or not, affect someone else? 
 
                                                 
103 Also Sabine Eckmann, in her paper Aura, Virtuality, and the Simulacrum, comes to the result that ‘the 
concept of the simulacrum opens up another space through which to re-envision aura: since the simulacrum 
abandons the dichotomy of original and copy, making a differentiation between technology and man-made artistic 
creations redundant, we must also understand it as non-reducible’; the digital ‘carries traces of empirical reality. In 
addition then to artworks that are based in temporal situations and may enable aura through performative 
encounters between subject and object and among various subjects, we may also understand the simulacrum as a 
register of uniqueness that may enhance moments of aura – that is, experience with existence and otherness’. For 
Eckmann, ‘the post-auratic artist provides aesthetic encounters that are interwoven with, yet also detached from, 
experiential reality’; she assesses Benjamin’s aura mainly from the angle that it is ‘connected with the idea of an 
artwork as an index of human subjectivity and art as the sphere of human freedom’ (in: Koepnick and McGlothlin 
2009, 75). The present research differs here, as Benjamin’s aura seems much deeper rooted in an ambivalent 
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2.5 A Passage of Intensities 
2.5.1	 ﾠAura:	 ﾠFeelings	 ﾠand	 ﾠIntensities	 ﾠin	 ﾠResearch	 ﾠ
Drawing – diversely streaming 
    – You’re right. Secrets have to circulate (Study after Grünewald, for H.G.). 
http://www.mariusvonbrasch.co.uk/aura_research/drawings.html 
Video   – The Visit 
http://vimeo.com/mvonbrasch/videos 
 
Working on the last part of the triptych diversely streaming
104, three large-scale 
drawings (Fig. 32, 33) extending on the Grünewald works, confronted with an unexpected, 
sudden intrusion of emotions, a caesura, which addresses the difficulty of what Deleuze’s 
insistence of the ‘pre-individual’ entails in art/practice. It is the point where the rhetoric 
voice changes for a while.\ 
I started on the third drawing after completing an article about the connection 
between flux and fragment, which argues against a subject-centred image of the artist in 
favour of a field of involved forces. Thus, fragment and flux interweave, repeat and 
differentiate what appears as transformation, triggered by an agent of Becoming  (an 
alchemical threshold, an affect, a pencil, the digital), traverses and dissolves the distinction 
between media and their associated notions of uniqueness (me, the precious painting) and 
dispersion (the digital) in art.  
The occurrence of unexpected emotions, which I will examine in this section, is of 
course no coincidence, taking into account the paramount influence of ‘driving’ forces or 
‘intensities’ involved in an art practice that self-admittedly deals with and is nurtured by 
‘transformation’.  Nevertheless, the reality of increasingly personal, disturbing, non-visual 
and at first nameless feelings of grief, anger, love and loss intruding into my practice felt 
different to the fairly balanced approach of the research so far; it felt inappropriate, not 
belonging to the way I have directed my project, or if belonging to it subcutaneously then 
embarrassing. I couldn’t identify what these emotions were about. Their invigorating effect, 
though, became noticeable. Mark making and the emergence of allusions to forms 
(particularly body fragments) felt intensified; being unreservedly part of a process and an 
exact intuitive ‘knowing’ about the ‘right’ arrangement of the fragments in question became 
obvious. Due to their size (1.50 height x 3m width) these drawings provide a large open 
space to be manipulated with the involvement of the whole body, and this, the most 
                                                 
104 The title refers to a line of D.H. Lawrence’s poem Fidelity (Lawrence 1993, 476) Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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immediate medium, felt intensely sad, in love with what emerged, angry, tender, violent and 
‘myself’. How is it possible to contextualize feelings? 
In a conference talk, Mario Perniola introduced links between Deleuzian ontology and 
classical Chinese thought, the presence of Becoming and ‘emptiness’ as a space of letting-
happen, that allow percepts and affects to form beyond the emotional limits of subjectivity, 
affected by and affecting a creative c(ha)osmos. When we talk about feelings, Perniola 
observes in his book Über das Fühlen (2009, 72) [On Feeling or Sensibility]
 105, we are left to 
a ‘horizon of externalized feeling’, to clichés lubricating the machines of consumerism and 
media in luxurious and cunning ways. Perniola looks for alternatives to what he calls a 
culture of the  ‘already-felt’, the reified realm of ready-made perceptions that have lost any 
quality of intentionality and passivize the subject to being always already related instead of 
relating. Referring to ‘ideology’ as exertion of power over thinking, and to ‘bureaucracy’ as 
exertion of power over action (agency), he suggests ‘sensology’ and ‘mediacracy’ as 
exerting the same effects on feelings. Perniola makes a case for an approach toward feeling 
as a ‘birth repeating itself again and again, … a process of ceaseless transition, in which the 
place of the old is taken over by the new, which on its part passes down the old through the 
times and guarantees the continuation of an opposition to metaphysical feeling’ (Perniola 
2009, 138). Detaching from the passivity of ‘passion’, which traditionally qualifies as 
feeling, he argues for a very careful practice of awareness, a selective openness that differs 
from pure spontaneity as ‘letting-oneself-be-felt’, referring thus to a subversive strategy of 
surrendering oneself for ‘difference to become reality, event, history through us’ (Perniola 
2009, 140). This active passivity reminds me of qualities Roland Barthes ascribes to the 
‘Neutral’: ‘… as that which outplays the paradigm, … everything that baffles the paradigm, 
… [the] injunctions addressed by the world to “choose”, to produce meaning, to enter 
conflicts, to “take responsibility”, etc. … The Neutral – my Neutral – can refer to intense, 
strong, unprecedented states. “To outplay the paradigm” is an ardent, burning activity’ 
                                                 
105 I use here - due to the lack of an English one - the German translation of Del Sentire (1991), which 
translates into English as On Feeling or On Sensibility. Engelen (2009) in her survey of newer philosophical texts on 
feelings (including a review of Perniola’s book) notes that Perniola uses ‘sentire’ in its wider sense of the Greek 
‘aisthesis’, which of course broadens the scope to perception, sensation etc. The text, though, shows Perniola’s 
specific interest in ‘feeling’ in the sense of emotions, feelings and their devaluation compared to the superiority of 
‘spirit’ and thinking (reason) in the history of metaphysics. In its traditional role of ‘passion’, feeling is 
‘subordinated to the intellectual agency [activity] as an inferior state of idleness’, based on a pure agency of 
thinking (Perniola 2009, 132).  His arguments convey sometimes generalizations, for example when he claims, 
commencing an ‘archeology of feeling’, that the generation of our grand parents had not been ‘gripped, yet, by the 
externalization and reification of emotions and affects’ (Perniola 2009, 70), which would need more clarification. 
However, because On Feeling works for strategies that sidestep postmodern indifference towards ethical questions 
in the face of perforated subjectivity as much as any recourses to outlived paradigms, I consider Perniola’s work as 
very relevant for my research (which is based on similar intentions).  Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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(Barthes 2005, 6 and 7). Thus speaking of subjective feelings implicitly requires in 
accordance with Perniola’s diagnosis of diagrams of the ‘already-felt’ to touch some 
arrested, frozen and tamed shadows. It requires being aware of the danger of resigning to 
or being confused by the ‘already-felt’ on the one hand, and of the potential of the new that 
‘channels’ the intensity of a virtual multiplicity, a potential contribution to a solution into 
lived experience and art practice. Such an attitude towards art practice is obviously linked to 
‘ethical’ experience, which would be impossible if there was a destined substance to 
subjectivity ('Ethics', Agamben 2009a, 43). The experience of aura as a part of it, clearly 
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Feelings and emotions are very powerful aspects of the practice element of this 
research (and in contrast to the writing element), grades on a thoroughly reliable 
and at the same time intangible compass: they indicate new questions and 
differentiating solutions concerning virtual complexes that respond as (what Deleuze 
calls) ‘intensities’ to unresolved problems. Thus, in contrast to Freud’s notion of 
repetition, the intensity linked to a unveiling memory can indicate the differentiated 
version of a problematic multiplicity that touches both, the highly personal and what 
in a wider social field emerges as complex, as multiplicity of a question concerning 
the reality of how to live (to be) difference. 
When at this point a reconstruction of how these intensities emerged, it 
happens for the following reasons:  
1. the point in time marked a poignant threshold, which reflected in the art 
practice; as such it could be an indicator pointing to a relevant aspect of aura;  
2. in order to track - by reference to an individual experience - how aura and 
its links to Becoming might provokes the emergence of possible strands of 
‘solutions’ of wider issues (in the sense of healing) that in their minor ways, art 
works can be;  
3. to show that although this ‘event’ was experienced as highly personal (re-
presented as ‘subjective’), it is unthinkable and impossible to be felt outside the 
folds of collective questions and complexes that need to be addressed through the 
input of individual intensity and choice of expression; working with it contributes to 
the fact that ‘behind the historically different concepts of emotions are hidden 
different interests of knowledge’ (Engelen 2009, 798) as much as to the inverted 
possibility that the historically different concepts of knowledge might be influenced 
by potent affects; 
4. to allow an aspect to emerge more clearly that concerns the mutuality of art 
practice and contextualization with philosophical concepts: Pierre Hadot, a 
philosopher and historian of philosophy whose work was influential on Foucault’s 
notion of ‘care for the self’, showed how philosophy in its ancient schools was 
appreciated and applied as a ‘way of life’, a way of working toward knowledge and 
its connection to ‘values’
106 (f.e. Hadot 2002, 33). 
5. in the framework of this research the ‘confessional’ looses its bite of 




                                                 
106 Foucault adapted this suggestion in later courses, and, as easily detectable, in the above 
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2.5.2	 ﾠA	 ﾠ‘Wound’	 ﾠ
 
Before completing an article on ‘Flux and Fragment’ (von Brasch 2011a), I had 
contributed a text for Feint: tackle/wield, a publication in conjunction with a group 
exhibition in London. The 3 drawings of diversely streaming were part of this 
exhibition, suspended in a large space and avoiding one continuous ‘line’ on a wall 
space, thus reflecting in terms of installation the prevalence of fragmentation in this 
work. My text for the publication responded to the subject ‘feint and subterfuge’ and 
emphasized the presence and healing force of the ‘wound’ in art against an art 
practice that might jeopardize this potential by limiting itself to a framework of 
controlling strategies. It quotes repeatedly from Chretien de Troyes’ Perceval, a text 
that has fascinated me for many years. The article introduces Perceval briefly: 
 
‘In Chrétien de Troyes’ Perceval (1182/83) only the spear that wounded him 
can heal the king of the grail. His wound is so grave that the only thing left to do for 
him is fishing, to pull up fish like dreams from a river. And only the one, who asks 
him about the wound, can heal him by touching the wound with the lance that has 
caused it. Perceval is the one, but he doesn’t know, not even his name, and has to 
make up his name and dare to ask. After many complications he asks the question, 
is affected by the old king’s suffering, heals the wound with the lance and becomes 
king of the grail himself. 
The set Old King/Perceval: isn’t this everyone/everything holding/being a force 
field to be framed (the grail) in order to develop a temporary assemblage of self, 
wounded by the task to break the security of the frame/mould again and again, to 
become ‘larval’, as Deleuze would say? 
Perceval, on his journey: ‘“ […] Is there a bridge across  / This river?” The man 
who sat there / Fishing answered, “No, / My friend … / No boat, no bridge, no ford.” 
(Chrétien 1999: 96) 
The Perceval scenario suggests – thus encircling the feint and its identity based 
on opposition – the vital importance of pain and questions that assist processes of 
transformation. The ‘death’ of the old king, becoming-Perceval is granted only by 
being-affected - fulfilling thus Deleuze’s somewhat utopian reminder: ‘One should 
only die through love, and not a tragic death’ (Deleuze 2006a: 38). It is 
acknowledging otherness and the hurt of losing what has been a ‘reliability’ that 
brings transformation in flow.’ (von Brasch 2011b) 
 
This text makes no mention of the cause of the old king’s suffering and 
wound, which is located in his groin and traditionally refers to sexual transgression, 
and, according to the diagram of the ‘Law’ which first and foremost can establish the 
concept, to sin. Some might flinch from the overtones of pious morality detected in 
the ancient Perceval story, which are, of course, cemented in its better known 
version by Wagner, Parsifal, with an intolerable twist of degradation toward the main 
female character (and contradicting the deliriously sensuous music) onto whom all 
sensuality is projected and who ruefully, robed in sack and ashes, has to sigh out 
her soul as a maid servant to renunciation.  Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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This operatic coup affects the virtual multiplicity that the king’s wound holds 
and confirms Giorgio Agamben’s observation that the sacrifice (here the feminine, 
sensual) functions as ‘apparatus that activates and regulates separation ... sacrifice 
sanctions the passage of something from the profane to the sacred [Agamben limits 
the ‘sacred’ to ‘reserved for celestial beings’], from the human sphere to the divine.’ 
(Agamben 2009c, 18) Examining theological elements and genealogy in Foucault’s 
notion of the ‘dispositif’ (‘apparatus’, ‘diagram’), he comes to the conclusion that 
the theologically affirmed apparatus of governance overviewed and guaranteed the 
process of subjectivation; in late capitalism, with the ‘nontruth of the subject, its 
own truth is no longer at stake’ (Agamben 2009c, 21), an indifference between 
subjectivation and desubjectivation has taken over and aggravates any attempt to 
claim back the power of governance through ‘profanation’, thus restores ‘to 
common use what sacrifice had separated and divided’ (Agamben 2009c, 19)). When 
Agamben states that the potential of profanation lies in bringing ‘to light the 
Ungovernable’ and to develop the ability ‘to intervene in [one’s] own processes of 
subjectivation’ (Agamben 2009c, 24), he touches on what at this moment of my 
research appears as problem: the reality of subjectivity in a framework that departed 
initially to dissolve any separation between subject and object.  
Stripped of its moral apparatus of penitence and thus separation, the Perceval 
story is a profound parable of subjectivation through opening towards an other, 
through learning and healing: on the one hand proposing what caused the wound, a 
mysterious lance that bleeds itself as the medium of healing, on the other hand 
stressing the importance of questioning a (personal, social) wound relating to 
sexuality, power and gender. Agamben writes: ‘Like Perceval in the novel by Chrétien 
de Troyes, humans are guilty for what they lack, for an act they have not committed’ 
(Agamben 2009a, 44). 
But what, in my experience, was this auratic lance that pierced from within and 
folded with its emergence into visibility in the lines of almost synchronistic events, 
by ‘finding at the right moment’ the ‘right’ books, encounters? 
While looking for some of Foucault’s texts relating further to the notion of the 
‘dispositif’ as frame for aura, I came across the late interview Friendship as a way of 
life that he gave for Gai Pied in 1981. There he makes a poignant remark about a 
diagram of homosexuality, about what makes homosexuality 
 
‘”disturbing”: the homosexual mode of life, much more than the sexual act 
itself. To imagine a sexual act that doesn’t conform to law or nature is not what 
disturbs people. But that individuals are beginning to love one another – there’s the 
problem. The institution is caught in a contradiction; affective intensities traverse it 
which at one and the same time keep it going and shake it up. Look at the army, 
where love between men is ceaselessly provoked [appelé] and shamed. Institutional 
codes can’t validate these relations with multiple intensities, variable colors, 
imperceptible movements and changing forms. These relations short-circuit it and Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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introduce love where there’s supposed to be only law, rule, or habit.’ (Foucault and 
Rabinow 2000)  
 
Living in a long-term relationship and civil partnership, having legally achieved 
what I was fighting for in my early twenties in the gay liberation movement, I have 
hardly any reason to wrangle; yet Foucault’s remark hit a sensitive nerve. I knew he 
died of Aids-related illnesses and wanted to know more about a man who had 
obviously very similar ideas about what normally is compartmentalized into the 
notion of ‘homosexuality’, a notion that I dislike because of its pseudoscientific 
‘cohorting’ of difference or for the simple reason that it shouldn’t matter anyway. 
The more euphemistic but strangely programmatic ‘being gay’ seems better only on 
the surface, betraying a secret hope to achieve easier acceptance by being bright 
and happy, i.e. without the shadow side that every mature human being carries. So 
Foucault’s mentioning of  ‘love’ and ‘friendship’ shows a much more potent stance; 
both resonated with (what is called here) the ‘auratic experience’ during the making 
of the drawings. 
Further reading in James Miller’s The Passion of Michel Foucault (1993) led to 
Hervé Guibert’s To the Friend Who Did Not Save My Life (1991)
107 which recounts – 
but not mainly – some of Guibert’s experiences during the last months of his friend 
Foucault’s life (who appears as ‘Muzil’, thus probably alluding to Robert Musil’s 
novel about de-centred subjectivity in modernity, Man without Qualities).  
Reading Guibert’s text, a powerful, fragmentary account of his also dealing 
with the Aids-related breakdown of his own health and world caused vivid flashbacks 
of friends lost to Aids, of the shame attached to their illness, the role of shame in my 
own difficult coming-out process at the end of the 1970s in Germany with its subtle 
undertones and afterimages of Nazi culture, of degeneratedness and its cure in 
concentration camps, and the specific feelings that had accompanied early, many 
and quickly extinguishing, rarely mutually reciprocated attempts to love or to relate. 
The books that spoke with a voice ‘as if it was mine’ in this time were Roland 
Barthes’ A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments and the book on himself.  
Reading now, years later, almost compulsively whatever I could get hold of by 
Guibert confronted me with what I thought I had left behind. The fears and confusion 
around the rise of Aids in the eighties, a time where ‘life – blood, sexual fluids – is 
itself the bearer of contamination’, as Susan Sontag wrote then in Aids and its 
Metaphors (1990, 159), resurfaced, blinded from being locked away. Aids had 
                                                 
107 Guibert (1955-1991) wrote many, mostly short and sometimes experimental ‘novels’ (amongst 
them Blindsight, Incognito, My Parents) before To the friend… made him suddenly famous for its frank 
account of his Aids-related illness and being a roman à clef about Foucault’s death. This texts introduces 
a whole series of what Boulé (1999) categorizes as ‘thanatographical writing’, but there are many more 
layers to his work as his photographic output shows as well.  Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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transformed the innocence of experimentation, the reality of same-sex love between 
men in its core, equalized being gay with being contaminated, had taken the lives of 
friends and ex-lovers and been utilized to justify religious morality by mythologizing 
Aids as an answer of ‘nature’, the consequence of a way of life against ‘Law’. This 
somehow not underrated death wish towards homosexuality might be mirrored in 
Guibert’s often repeated observation of an unconscious death urge in the gay 
experience, for which he has been posthumously attacked for example by Simon 
Watney in These waves of dying friends (in: Lewis and Horne 1996, 165) for well-
meant but superficial emancipatory reasons.
108 
When in 1994 after a long drawn out decline a very close friend died (a month 
after his partner), and a previous long-term partner of mine got his ‘positive’ results, 
I felt intensely traumatized and hardly able to cope with the grief; another typical 
feeling was a guilt not to have been infected, not to have died myself.
109 
Nearly twenty years later, I thought I had left most of this behind. I had worked 
on myself for a long time, even, after a professional training, worked with, helped 
others, had followed a path along a wound that ‘existed before me’ (Deleuze 2001, 
31) as much as questioning the diagram of the gay community and its visibility, 
which on the one hand allows a ‘language’ of belonging and recognizable signs and, 
on the other hand, can limit a more radical differentiation because of an expectation 
for default options, signs and recognisability.  
In the already mentioned interview for Gai Pied Foucault supports this double-
faced critical view by combining his claim for a need of a specific gay ‘care’ for the 
self with a very Deleuzian demand for invention: ‘We’ve rid ourselves of asceticism. 
Yet it’s up to us to advance into a homosexual ascesis that would make us work on 
ourselves and invent – I do not say discover – a manner of being that is still 
improbable’ (Foucault and Rabinow 2000, 137). The emphasis on ‘discovery’ vs. 
‘invention’ roots, as far as I can see, in the distinction between the ‘possible’ as that 
which refers to already acquired options, and the invention, which connects to the 
emergence of the new that actualises a ‘solution’ not derived from an already 
existing concept.  
When this story has been fanned out at some length, it happened for the 
reason that a conceptually unprepared ‘solution’ irrupted at a meaningful point of 
this research. Coinciding with ‘mapping/tracing’ aura in Grünewald’s Resurrectioin 
while working on diverely streaming, it bevame significant, an ‘event’ combining two 
figures: Chiron the mythical personage of the one who learns through wound and 
                                                 
108 A text that confirms with its account of typical feelings related to the loss of friends/lovers 
through Aids, from grief to guilt, the above descriptions. 
109 These feeling are listed as typical in Watney’s essay (in: Lewis and Horne 1996). Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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can communicate what has been learnt, and Kairos, a moment in time with an 
intense quality.
 110  
 
2.5.3	 ﾠKairos/Chiron/Aion	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘Event’	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
 
When can we speak about Kairos, about an ‘event’? 
Kairos, a notion closely linked to Stoicism and ‘the axiom of alignment to flows 
of nature and to a physical and ethical ‘Now”’ (Ritter et al. 1971, Vol.4, 668), 
concerns  in Deleuze the more radical dynamics of the invention and the event that 
assists the breakthrough of a ‘solution’ without concept. It relates thus to Deleuze’s 
specific concept of ‘Ideas’ in Difference and Repetition; ‘Ideas’, in contrast to Plato’s 
concept of an original that can only be deduced and apprehended from its imperfect 
state of a copy or mere appearance, Deleuze’s inversion of Plato’s model unfolds the 
Idea(s) as non-essentialist multiplicities of the virtual that creatively ‘respond’ to and 
break up actual states of affairs. Thus, there is no opposition between virtual 
multiplicities or ‘Ideas’ and the actual but ‘the variety of multiplicity – in other words, 
difference’ (Deleuze 2004b, 230). The potential problem ‘solutions’
111 are triggered 
in actual experience by ruptures of kairos or the event, themselves expressions of 
the intensive nature of differentiation within the Idea. ‘Differenciation’ holds thus the 
potential of the event, and this is where the ‘auspicious’, ‘fortunate’ aspect of kairos 
suddenly gains shape. The hinge of the inseparable connectivity between the virtual 
and the actual maintained in this version of ‘Ideas’ is Deleuze’s concept of difference 
that pervades both in series of differentials as living, creative and problematic 
folds
112.  
Applied to the reality of an individual (and thus of the experimental ‘field’ of 
art practice), the response to the question posed by the event or kairos depends 
                                                 
110 There is a clear connection between Kairos and the wound in Homer’s Ilias where the related 
word kairion refers to a living being’s most vulnerable place and the opening in an enemy’s armour that 
exposes it (Ritter et al. 1971, Vol 12, 1192). 
111 Problems in connection to their genesis of solutions appear as ‘condensation of singularities’, ‘ 
… the varieties of the multiplicity in all its dimensions, the fragments of ideal future or past events which, 
by the same token, render the problem solvable …’ (Deleuze 2004b, 239). 
112 Confirming thereby Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the concept: ‘The concept is defined by 
the inseparability of a finite number of heterogeneous components traversed by a point of absolute 
survey at infinite speed. … The “survey” [survole] is the state of the concept or its specific infinity, 
although the infinities may be larger or smaller according to the number of components, thresholds and 
bridges.’  (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 21) What the concept brings to knowledge ‘is the pure event’ 
extracted from the actual, and philosophical concepts create bridges (and rhizomes) between extracted 
singularities and the ‘overflight’ – this translation of ‘survole’ used by Ronald Bogue (2003, 171); they ‘set 
up the new event from things and beings … ‘ (ibid., 33). Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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entirely on a selective decision between fear (and consequently preclusion from 
transformation) and embracing (not the ‘fate’ of the event but) the potential shift. 
Ideas, writes Deleuze,  
 
‘precipitate all the circumstances, points of fusion, congelation or 
condensation in a sublime occasion, Kairos, which makes the solution explode like 
something abrupt, brutal and revolutionary….It is as though every Idea has two 
faces, which are like love and anger: love in search of the fragments, the progressive 
determination and linking of the ideal adjoint fields; anger in the condensation of 
singularities which, by dint of ideal events, defines the concentration of a 
"revolutionary situation" and causes the Idea to explode into the actual’ (Deleuze 
2004b, 239). 
 
Obviously, I choose here to read Deleuze’s kairos on a micro-political scale (of 
making a piece of art, inventing conceptual connections) opting for an 
understanding of the infinite aspect of unfolding that pervade experience on all 
levels. What had been experienced as kairos coincided with a threshold in this 
research: I had just started to test the axis between the order of conceptualization 
and the intensity (i.e. of what resonates in images like the depth of a volcano, the 
BwO thereby continuing and varying a subject of the previous chapter, the 
asymmetrical opposition contained in the image or symbol of the Hermaphrodite). 
The specific event, the actualisation of ‘a’ wound, pointed at ‘mourning’, is a 
notion one might – at first sight – consider as neglected by Deleuze.
113 His take on 
‘mourning’ and the ‘wound’, which I like to develop here as far as it is relevant for 
my research, links to the thorough revaluation of ‘death’ and thus ‘fear’ he 
undertakes, both being traditional key holders of transcendence and closely linked 
to what Nietzsche terms ‘ressentiment’ in Genealogy of Morals, a submission to 
judgements derived from constructions around ideas of transcendence, which 
displace life beyond its embodiment and turn the embodied vitality of life against 
itself
114. The image of ‘God’ as the accusing judge compensates the anger about 
                                                 
113 There is this exception in a brief obituary for Félix Guattari: ‘Perhaps the most painful aspects of 
remembering a dead friend are the gestures and glances that still reach us, that still come to us long after 
he is gone’ (Deleuze 2006c, 387). These ‘gestures and glances’ are perhaps a connection to the specific 
aspect of ‘fragments’ that I have worked on in the last chapter. 
114 In one of Nietzsche’s late notebooks, we find the following fragment (1887, 8[2]):  
‘On the psychology of metaphysics  
This world is illusory – consequently there is a true world.  
This world is conditioned – consequently there is an unconditioned world.  
This world is contradictory – consequently there is a world free of contradictions. 
This world is a world that becomes – consequently there is a world that is. 
All false conclusions (blind trust in reason: if A is, then its opposite concept B must be as well) 
These conclusions are inspired by suffering: at bottom they are wishes that there might be such a world; 
in the same way, hatred of a world that makes us suffer expresses itself in the imagining of a different Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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death (and all its faces) with submission to ‘God’/fate and installs a securely locked 
internalized consciousness of guilt. Thus, it consoles the fear of death with 
disembodied life but causes, as Deleuze writes ('Nietzsche', in: Deleuze 2001, 68), 
‘the triumph of “reaction” over active life and of negation over affirmative thought’. 
Fear, one could infer, is the hidden cause of the separation between immanence and 
transcendence as the latter blocks the full impact of suffering or the wound, creates 
an empty buffer of protective, threatening distance. Nietzsche, juxtaposing ‘slave 
revolt in morality’ with ‘noble morality’ of ‘triumphant affirmation of itself’ (GoM I, 
10, in: 1992), counters this fear with an affirmative readiness for transformation and 
death as ‘festival’, ‘[f]ree for death and free in death, one who solemnly says No 
when there is no longer time for Yes: thus he understands life and death’ ('Of 
Voluntary Death' in: Nietzsche 1961, 99). Deleuze’s affirmation of the eternal 
repetition of difference dissolves the juxtaposition of slave/noble and becomes the 
heart of the affirmation of Becoming.  
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze distinguishes two faces of death. Both 
are ‘inscribed in the I and the self’, challenging with a ‘degradation which 
compensates for the process of differenciation’ (Deleuze 2004b, 322): on the one 
hand it is the inevitable violence ‘from the outside’ (in the sense of an 
incompatibility with outside forces), on the other hand an ‘internal power’ that 
enables the individual to grow and to stay in resonance with Becoming and the 
‘death masks’ of temporary states. To resist death’s second face equals thus to 
resent ‘dying’, which in its form as infinitive verb points with much more precision to 
death’s extension into time as ‘dying’, its presence in the arch over the past and 
future that is ‘cut’ at every moment or at every in-between of what always already 
happened or is not-yet. The readiness for ‘dying’ and acceptance of death is perhaps 
one of the key aspects of what Deleuze in The Logic of Sense calls becoming ‘worthy 
of what happens to us, and thus to will and release the event, to become the 
offspring of one’s own events, and thereby to be reborn’ (Deleuze 2004c). 
Transmutation, thus also the affect of others dying away, ‘is the point at which death 
turns against death; where dying is the negation of death, and the impersonality of 
dying no longer indicates only the moment when I disappear outside of myself, but 
rather the moment when death loses itself in itself, and also the figure which the 
most singular life takes on in order to substitutes itself for me (Deleuze 2004c, 
173/4). However, with regard to mourning and its liaison with a ‘tragic’ (or even 
neurotic) position, an impression cannot be denied that Deleuze’s insistence on 
positivity, his ‘disgust’ of ‘every type of complaint in regard of life, every tragic 
culture, that is to say, neuroses’ (Interview in: Villani 2007, 42) might be tainted 
                                                 
world, a valuable one: here, the metaphysicians’ ressentiment towards the real is creative.’ (Nietzsche 
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    173 
itself by the ‘supremely spiritualized spirit of revenge’ that Heidegger already 
suspected in Nietzsche’s aphorism about impressing affirmatively ‘the character of 
Being upon Becoming’ (in section 617 of The Will to Power), ‘of which’, Heidegger 
considers, ‘constant collision, suffering, is a part’ (Heidegger 1967, 426/7). 
The affirmation of time as that which passes away or more precisely, of every 
repetition of a differentiating instant, which equals an affirmation of the ‘eternal 
return’ of differentiation, embraces the potential of being ‘in between’ two faces of 
time: between the face of Chronos as an ordered and cyclical measure of 
‘interlocking presents’ and that of Aion, a neutral and empty present of eternity from 
which past and future flee ‘in both directions at once, towards the future and 
towards the past’ (Deleuze 2004c, 73). When Deleuze extends this, writing that ‘Aion 
is smaller than the smallest subdivision of Chronos; but it is greater than the 
greatest divisor of Chronos, namely, the entire cycle’ (Deleuze 2004c, 74), one could 
be tempted to assume that ‘Aion’ encompasses or causes ‘Chronos’. But, in The 
Logic of Sense, both times exist simultaneously: Aion does not cause anything, thus 
neither Chronos (the order of presents with their distances to past or future 
moments). It consist of ‘incorporeals’, of verbs, infinitives, of Becomings and 
questions, i.e. ‘singularities deployed in a problematic field’ (Deleuze 2004c, 66); 
thus, as we have seen above, Aion builds the line or surface on which intensities and 
potential solutions find an expression as Kairos or event. 
That the actualisation of a virtual problematic field or question is never, in 
Deleuze, a copy but a differentiated question/answer (a ‘potential’ solution in 
contrast to the merely ‘possible’ solution), is explicitly emphasised when he writes 
that both behave/relate to each other (in terms of those two readings of time) as 
‘two dissymmetrical halves of an ultimate instant’ (Deleuze 2004c, 78).  
The event itself, ‘coextensive with becoming’ (Deleuze 2004c, 11), emerges on 
the surface of Aion, on a straight line eluding the present by fleeing in both future 
and past directions at once without filling the line or surface. One must take into 
account here the Stoic distinction between corporeals (bodies with depth, nouns, 
segments) and incorporeals (effects on those bodies i.e. located on the surface, 
infinitives, ‘becoming-green’ etc.), both examined in The Logic of Sense in 
connection to the problem of sense in between bodies, events and language. 
Deleuze also uses the terms ‘depth’ for the actual and ‘surface’ for the virtual, a 
move within Deleuze’s project to reverse Platonism (the depth understood as the 
truth to be revealed behind layers covering the Idea), which leaves the Deleuzian 
Idea, involved dissymmetrically, as multiplicity, with the problematic of 
differentiation within the actual state of affairs in Chronos. In ‘depth’, infinite 
identities communicate as part, relation and the whole (elsewhere developed as 
‘discontinuity’), whereas at the surface ‘only infinitve events are deployed’, Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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communicating by the ‘affirmative character of the disjunction’ (Deleuze 2004c, 
200); this corresponds to the position of ‘philosophical stone’, which, so it reads in 
Splendor Solis, ‘is produced by means of the Greening and Growing Nature […]: “This 
stone rises in growing, greening things”’ (Trismosin and K. 1920, 17). Underlying the 
transmutations of the alchemical operations, the infinitive surface breaks through in 
the series as the depth of the actual book illuminations, which communicate as 
destabilized identities and divisions. 
Aion, as a surface and double-faced line on which singularities and intensities 
emerge, suggests a new labyrinth without any anchor points, aleatoric and 
unpredictable, which, for Deleuze, ‘commands another eternal return and another 
ethic (an ethic of Effects)’ (Deleuze 2004c, 72). The aleatoric aspect of Aion, here at 
the core of an open serialism
115, seems anticipated already in an ancient fragment by 
Heracleitos (Diels/Kranz B 52) drafting the following scenario: ‘Eternity [aion] is a 
child at play, playing draughts: the kingdom is a child’s’ (Barnes 1987, 50). 
Aion, the ‘royal child’, exerts power as if it did not have any. Thus, its random 
spontaneity suggests non-intentionality, an involvement without the prospect of a 
result, of success, but with a curiosity to ‘be with’ the emergences that every move 
of the game creates, leaves behind or projects. And the moment in between, when 
the hand moves the figure (or the dice), holds both: the divider of moments before 
and after an emergence on the one hand, and on the other hand the empty space 
that sidesteps the instants with infinite potentials and Becomings in both directions. 
Thus, the Heracleitian image encompasses qualities of the mythological Aion 
(in Homer for example) that engulfs ‘being, having been and due to be’ (Ritter et al. 
1971, Vol 12, 1192). Aion, on an early point of symbolization, is not yet split into 
Aion and Chronos, is thus the ‘older’ one who encompasses Chronos like the archaic 
symbol of the Ourorboros, a snake building a circle by biting its tail.
116 Much later, in 
Plato, Aion ‘signifies for the first time the life-time of an intelligible being, eternity 
resting in itself beyond time. Chronos, created simultaneously with the world, is a 
moving, yet eternal copy of Aion’ (Ritter et al. 1971, Vol 1, 117). Deleuze achieves 
their simultaneity by introducing difference and differentials pervading both.  
                                                 
115 Where it became a predominant feature in music of the 60s i.e. Boulez, Stockhausen and 
Barraqué; Campbell (2010) shows the mutual influences between Deleuze and Boulez. The Logic of Sense 
is built in numbered series, interlinked by transversing aleatoric elements, which reflects ‘sense’ as in-
between the series generated by language, time, becoming. 
116 Battistini shows that etymologically ouro (Coptic ‘king’) merges with ob (Hebrew ‘snake’) 
(Battistini 2005, 10). In this case, ‘king’ – as in alchemical contexts - should not be limited to its personal, 
geographical and temporal sense but as ‘reign’, following here an important distinction made by 
Agamben, which links it ‘also [to] wider issues about sovereignty and power’ (Bussolini 2010, 111) and 
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The previous significant split has a fascinating background: in one of the Greek 
myths of beginnings, Ouranos, one of the mythological personifications of Aion, is 
castrated by his son Chronos, as told in Hesiod’s Theogony (verses 146-206). The 
reason for this castration amplifies an understanding of the set virtual/actual: 
Ouranos (Heaven) hides his children with ‘Earth’ in Earth as soon as born so that he 
’would not suffer them to come up into the light: and Heaven [Ouranos] rejoiced in 
his evil doing’ (Hesiod 2000-2010). This, of course, means that the children will 
never be enabled to be the potential lines of flight or singularities ‘in between’ but 
remain in fact trapped and obstructed. Thus, the castration takes place at the 
request of ‘Earth’, and Chronos throws Ouranos’ phallus into the ocean, where, from 
the foam emerging, Aphrodite (Venus) is born. This event suggests that connecting 
to earth, body and actualisation requests the fragmentation that Chronos causes: the 
chronological, numbered, lived line of time that co-exists with Aion as its creative 
differenc/tiator. It is Ouranos’ or Aion’s desire for creativity that merges with earth, 
and with the emergence of Aphrodite or ‘Love’ from his phallus a dissymmetrical 
feminine opposition in his own multiplicity is liberated.  
A statue from the Mithraeum at Ostis (Fig. 34, Vatican City, Vatican Museums) 
shows a Roman image of Aion, contemporaneous with the Stoic movement. It is 
connected to the Mitras cult but refers to the much older pre-Islamic Iranian god 
Zurvan akarana who incorporated both sexes, ‘good’ and ‘evil’ and time in an 
undifferentiated state. Only at a later date, this god, a condensed mask of 
Nietzsches eternal return, gave birth to twins that polarize good and evil.  
Schütze notes that the snake around his body symbolizes time as ‘flowing 
without beginning or end’, which profoundly differs from the occidental 
understanding of a gradual and linear timeline (Schütze 1960, 44). Lion and serpent, 
writes Battistini, show the simultaneity of Fire and Water/Earth (Battistini 2005, 17) 
as much as the devouring aspect of linear time and the endless curling eternal 
return; he incorporates ‘all the cosmic opposites within himself’ (Battistini 2005, 17). 
The ‘eternal return’ and its problematic of affirmation of that which eternally 
repeats as differentiation, which is so important to a Deleuzian understanding of 
Becoming, seems addressed in Aion and its imagery. My suspicion of interwoven, 
even older myths in this Deleuzian concept were confirmed by a link in Vermaseren 
in A magical Time god (Vermaseren 1975) between Aion and Osiris (here again with 
the element of castration); the Roman Aion-Mithras, adopted from Zurvan akarana, 
so Vermaseren, has parallels to Aion-Osiris and Aion-Saturnus: ‘This theology of the 
myth of ‘eternal return’ was vivid [in Roman times] indeed, since there are various 
indications for the identification of the eternal Time god with Osiris … [and] with the 
Phoenix who, like Osiris himself, is a symbol of eternity and therefore the Aion idea’ 
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(Vermaseren 1975, 453). Further, the Greeks identified the Egyptian Osiris with 
Dionysos (Kerényi 1976 ; Larousse 1964, 16), and especially the aspect of Dionysos-
Zagreus who is torn to pieces and resurrects has to be read as a precursor or other 
dramatization of the god-figure of Christ at a later point. The connection between 
Dionysos and Aion is also present in Deleuze: Nietzsche, so says Deleuze,  
 
‘explored a world of impersonal and pre-individual singularities, a world he 
then called Dionysian or of the will to power, a free and unbound energy. These are 
nomadic singularities which are no longer imprisoned within the fixed individuality 
of the infinite Being (the notorious immutability of God), nor inside the sedentary 
boundaries of the finite subject (the notorious limits of knowledge). This is 
something neither individual nor personal, but rather singular. Being not an 
undifferentiated abyss, it leaps from one singularity to another, casting always the 
dice belonging to the same cast, always fragmented and formed again in each throw’ 
(Deleuze 2004c, 122).  
 
This description unfolds also Aion. The link in all of the cross connections 
above is the idea of the ‘eternal return’ as repetition of differentiation, in terms of a 
‘proper name’, of symbolism and historical change of dramatization, traversed by 






Looking back to the initial experience described, and its double as 
Kairos/Chiron,  it became suddenly obvious that there is of course a connection 
between Grünewald’s  painting, the Resurrection,  and Becoming as the ‘eternal 
return’ of difference. What I practised in the pieces for diversely streaming was to 
work intuitively with the heart of this idea or concept: fragmentation,  of a body, an 
identity, a painting, the deaths experienced  (of my friends and on other layers, 
myself), a zone of associations,  of drawn forms
117. And when the installation, the 
display of these pieces led to a fragmentation  of their ‘continuity’ as a (time-)line, it 
has only been the consequence  of what the source image, deterritorialized  from its 
religious ideological encrustation,  holds as its deframing power. It is the 
interweaving  of the event (the shock of the guard with the helmet and 
simultaneously  the realization on the face of the risen figure) and its potential of 
emergence or its question of how to emerge (the ‘risen’, differentiated,  new in a 
state of letting-himself-be-felt,  open for the imminent event of a new 
death/fragmentation  that comes towards him in the guard holding the event, the 
shock; but also the reverse order is a way of reading this emergence). 
The unexpected  event that opened up the course of considerations  above had 
a guardian of time, could actualize a key holder traversing a personal feeling. It 
showed the value and necessity of working in this practice element with what is 
perhaps most painful and what needs to be – again and again – threaded into what 
Deleuze calls ‘a’ life (2001) and reminds of a remark by Hervé Guibert about writing 
his posthumously  published Le Mausolée des amants (Guibert 2003): ‘Very often 
writing emerges when a theme or personage from inside the journal becomes too 
insistent, upsets or breaks that ordinary equilibrium’  (Genon 2005).
118   The journal, a 
‘personal’ diary that he extensively used for his books, posthumously  made a book, 
Le Mausolée des amants, is at the same time the result of a process, of reflective and 
inventive cuts into duration. Although highly personal, filled with intimate details to 
be reworked into the outside, these details convey nothing less than the 
diaappearance  of someone betraying what already circulates (the ‘intimate as 
desiring-machines’):  the subject vanishes, in Guibert’s case, from what could be seen 
as ‘personal’




117   Dr Jim Mooney pointed out (after this research had been completed) that also Jasper Johns had 
derived work relating to the Aids crisis from Grünewald’s Resurrection. It is his Perilous Nights from 1982, 
online on   http://www.nga.gov/feature/artnation/johns/index.shtm – this work had no influence on the 
outcomes of this research. 
118    ‘Très souvent un écrit naît parce qu’il y a, à l’intérieur du journal, un thème ou un personnage 
qui, devenant trop insistant, déséquilibrait ou brisait cet équilibre quotidian.’ (my transl. into English) 
119   The following short text from Guibert’s book about photography, images and memory, Ghost 
Image, might elucidate this point: 
‘”I feel completely empty now that I’ve told you this story. It’s my secret. Do you understand?” Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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Fig. 35 - Hervé Guibert, Autoportrait au papillon (Self-Portrait with Butterfly),1986. © 
Christine Guibert 
 
From this angle, the mapping of aura in drawings actualizes a diagram that the 
multiplicity of ‘working with Grünewald’s Resurrection’, including the fold of 
subjectivation with its line to a virtual wound as collective complex, holds; a diagram 
not as an underlying representation of knowledge and power but as the ‘modulator’ 
(Deleuze 2005, 84), the mark of potential deterritorialization, which constitutes ‘a 
real that is yet to come, a new type of reality’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 157). The 
diagram becomes the aleatoric mark, a differentiated repetition, a sudden 
dramatization within the digitized projection of source fragments on paper, which 
empties the drawing/paper of cliché: the diagrammatic (virtual intense) line is, as 
Joshua Ramey puts it, ‘that which is presented enters into polyvalent, unstable 
relations to otherwise imperceptible forces’ (Ramey 2012, 162) 
The aspects of dramatization of intensity attached to these aleatoric marks, of 
personal feelings evoked by aura that actually trigger emergences and appear coded 
in the fragmented and marked drawings with their digital remnants, relativize 
Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) somewhat strained and one-sided emphasis on the pre-
                                                 
“And now?” 
“I don’t want to have to ask you not to repeat it.” 
“Yes, but now your secret has also become my secret. It’s part of me, and I’ll treat it as I do all my 
secrets – I’ll get rid of it when the time comes. Then it will become someone else’s secret.” 
“You’re right. Secrets have to circulate …”’ (Guibert 1996, 159) Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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individual, the non-personal affect in art. When they for example write: ‘Affect is the 
active discharge of emotion, the counterattack, whereas feeling is an always 
displaced, retarded, resisting emotion’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 441), their 
target is of course the precarious proximity of emotion to ressentiment and its 
obstruction of actualization of affirmative desire as Becoming. With regard to this 
research though, personal feelings and emotions (even if they show an initial face-
value of being somewhat ‘retarded, resisting’), a perhaps inevitable rhythm between 
regression and emergence, provide a positive and enriching input when they are 
recognized as questions (how to transform them into affect) and thus pointers 
toward their potential of Becoming, toward singularities and more powerful events 
that might, once their potential is realized, help to question habitual (collective) 
responses. This statement aligns with a layer of what an art practice around 
transformation addresses: to take up and unfold creatively the multiplicity or 
potential of Kairos, a possibly cathartic yet modest event and not to neglect the lines 
that reach from the ‘wound that existed before me’ into the field of personal 
experience; to create the conditions for a complex act face to face with: ‘“[m]y 
wound existed before me, I was born to embody it”’ (Joe Bousquet, quoted in: 
Deleuze 2004c, 169).  
‘Letting-oneself-be-felt’, this somewhat paradoxical notion that Perniola 
develops in On Feeling, could be a determining aspect of an approach to an art 
practice open for the event in this sense, for the appearance of Hermes/Mercury with 
its evasive, yet ‘really’ transformative intensities, which extend to the possibilities of 
‘smooth’ transformation of images with digital software.  It is in accord with what 
Henri Maldiney
120 calls ‘transpassibilité’, which allows the emergence of an art of 
‘appearing’, without a ‘before’, ‘not made to be seen but to see’ based on feeling, 
not as ‘having sensations’ but ‘keeping oneself open’ (Escoubas 2010, 193-195).  
The wound, itself a necessary condition, underlies then what emerges like a 
trace or a thread, Ariadne’s thread that directs not to the monster to be slain but to 
her lover, the Dionysos-Zagreus to be torn up and resurrected, repeatedly 
differentiated towards healing, without, maybe, ever to heal.
121 
                                                 
120 Maldiney’s notion of rhythm of systole/diastole as ‘pre-objective fabric of the world that is prior 
to the dissociation of subject and object’ became important for Deleuze’s Logic of Sensation. Due to no 
availability of English translations of this important author, I refer here to the concise essay by Eliane 
Escoubas about Maldiney in Handbook of Phenomenological Aesthetics (Escoubas 2010). 
121 Ariadne, so Deleuze in Nietzsche and Philosophy (Deleuze 2010, 177), is the ‘Anima … capable 
of reconciling us with the unconscious [thus the intensities on the surface of the virtual], of giving us a 
guiding thread for its exploration’; ‘… according to the constitution of the eternal return Dionysus is the 
first affirmation, becoming and being, more precisely the becoming which is only being as the object of a 
second affirmation; Ariadne is the second affirmation, Ariadne is the fiancée, the loving feminine power.’ Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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To successfully deal with the irruption of intensive singularities, Deleuze seems to emphasize, is a 
question of a loving (I read it as fear-embracing) approach, which extends without question to art practice. 
With regard to ‘healing’: a movement toward healing is meant, which arises, as a possibility, from 
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2.5.4	 ﾠAffect	 ﾠand	 ﾠ‘Exhibition-ﾭ‐Value’	 ﾠ
 
The experience of aura with a piece of art (as proposed with the practice 
element of this research here) connects to the deframing power of the forces that 
constitute the piece of art and simultaneously the remnant questions and potential 
solutions suggested by their actualisation. Both the deframing questions and forces 
of a piece of art contain/house further potential of Becoming and traces that link to a 
problem constellation of a virtual multiplicity, which, as in a line of flight, traverses 
also the multiplicity of a viewer of art and his/her particular responsiveness. Thus, 
the viewer is a part of the emerging response to the problematic, part of the fold 
that involves her as a traversed multiplicity, a unique point of view rather than a 
preconceived structure of subjective perception. 
If this scenario binds the artwork and its latent forces into a fold or multiplicity 
that also extends to and touches the viewer and his/her involvement with ‘questions’ 
of Becoming (in a personal, societal and cosmic sense), then the experience of this 
strange virtual, yet immanent tissue of a simultaneous distance and closeness i.e. of 
aura at a qualitative moment in time equals (and here I like to refer back to Splendor 
Solis and its metamorphic, not static model of aura as ‘work’) a request to respond 
the sensation, feeling, potential triggered. Such a response is unpredictable and 
depends entirely of the viewer’s point of view
122 framework of perception. Thus, a 
strong experience in front, or better with a (finished, emerging) piece of art is 
foremost aesthetic (in the sense of ‘disinterested pleasure’) only as long as it is 
appreciated for its ‘exhibition-value’ and not for the unfolding of its further 
rhizomatic potential or the connective ‘plug-ins’ of deterritorializing strands of the 
BwO.   
Walter Benjamin, obviously alluding to Marx’s set of ‘use-’ and ‘exchange-
value’, observes a ‘cult-value’ and an ‘exhibition-value’ adhered to art objects 
(Benjamin 2002b, 106). Whereas ‘cult-value’ relates to pre-industrial life and takes 
into account the re/presentation of a distant divinity (and its aura), ‘exhibition-value’ 
has been freed from such connotations: technological experimentation (foremost in 
film) encounters nature from a position of  ‘openness’ (and this includes the 
                                                 
122 This thesis cannot cover a discussion of the ‘crypt’, the dark chamber of each single monad 
expressing one point of view within the Leibnizian fold (as read by Deleuze), demanding a ‘cryptographer’ 
[…], someone who can at once account for nature and decipher the soul, who can peer into the crannies 
of matter and read into the folds of the soul’ (Deleuze 2006b, 3). Such a crypt suggests the extinguishing 
of the name, ‘soul’ as a chamber of ‘coherence’ on a pre-individual level and would provide questions in 
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unconscious as human ‘nature’), a position of ‘play’. Benjamin’s hope rested on the 
‘exhibition-value’s’ liberating potential (demystification of world/autonomous 
play/enacting of collective drives). Against this stands film critic Serge Daney’s 
observation (from the 1980s) that the dependence of cinema on advertisements and 
economic powers has led to – however fertile – ‘contamination’ of the moving image, 
so that ‘the dominant form of cinema (the kind that “works”) has reached a post-
advertising stage. Cinema now inherits prefabricated shots, ready to use ‘clichés’, in 
short – immobile images’ (Daney 2008, 337). Is it possible to transpose this view 
onto the expanded field of painting?  
Contemporary painting/mark- and video-making is clearly ‘contaminated’ by a 
continuous flux of images (moving, still, spoken, dreamed), which are exclusively 
designed to re-create hierarchical/hieratical aura as that ‘which is not obtainable’, 
thus linking to and tapping into desire as ‘lack’ and social powerlessness: the 
concealed divinity of the cult-object makes way for a reproducible glow of elevated 
(ascended) celebrities that is as seductive as it is frustrating, hooking into the drive 
behind what Jacques Lacan names ‘jouissance’
123 towards a fulfilment beyond the 
pleasure principle with its laws of limitation, the promise of enjoyment/orgasm that 
is potentially never achieved but, with all intensity of desirable but painful 
transgressions, refers back to its imaginary and impossible dissolution of lack. Dylan 
Evans writes: ‘The term jouissance thus nicely expresses the paradoxical satisfaction 
that the subject derives from his symptoms, or, put it another way, the suffering that 
he derives from his own satisfaction [...]’ (Evans 2005, 92)
124.  
With regard to films made for this research, a certain tendency to hermetic, not 
easily ‘understandable’ imagery and usage of sound (voice and text) is based on the 
wish not to serve the readability of celebrity/advertisement on TV but to use the 
medium’s set-up of intimacy (at ‘home’). The Visit, in which the return of the 
‘wound’ of lost friends has been consolidate, combines imagery and language, 
memory, dream, reality, previous ‘models’ of imagery
125 in this way, and it produces 
for its viewer –regarding the various strands it combines – probably very obviously a 
                                                 
123 In French the word refers to both, ‘enjoyment’ and ‘orgasm’; ‘jouir’ means ‘to come’. Lacan 
discusses ‘jouissance’ especially in his seminar 20 (1972/73), ‘Encore’ (Lacan 1998a).  
124 Could the literal repetition of images circumscribe this phenomenon, given its simultaneity of 
aesthetic doubling and the futile (or ironic) attempt to posses the original? Andy Warhol’s multiples are 
probably archetypal models of exposing the mechanisms of aesthetic reproducibility in this sense, and 
creating hybrids between art and advertising that become ‘exhibition-value’ as aura.   
125 The colour scheme, the occasional use of some black and white stills in The Visit, is a conscious 
reference to Hervé Guibert’s exclusively black and white photography; it suits also the subject that I found 
not necessary to explain in what appears to be a narrative. I became aware – in terms of the use of stills 
and narrative – of slight similarities to Chris Marker’s La jetée  from 1962, but The Visit is an entirely 
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‘multiplicity’. It is a TV piece, exactly because it is designed to create a space of 
silence despite spoken language, of intensive memory becoming, dissolving into 









Fig. 38 – Marius von Brasch. Still from The Visit. Video. 5’ 40”. Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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One important question concerning aura is how it is possible to clearly 
distinguish the very momentary and singular experience of aura of a piece of art 
from ‘exhibition-value’ and its failed potential, from clever advertised jouissance that 
projects itself or is projected as art, from ‘wanting’ a piece of art because of its 
promise to project an aura of power by possessing it?  
Serge Daney, perhaps not consciously, admits this difficulty in the quote above 
by simply referring to the ‘kind [of cinema, but I expand it here to the axis between 
painting and digital] that “works”’ (Daney 2008, 337), emphasising that – 
considering how it relates to the rest of the quote – ‘it works’, triggers, proposes 
something in the new that cannot be reiterated, that liquefies ‘immobility’, questions 
the constructed judgment of ‘greatness’ (i.e. the ‘thing’, the ‘essence’), which as an 
established convention overlooks the significance of new and free use, of lesser, 
‘minor’ individual experiences with forces in (also ‘great’) art. 
Thus, the discussion of both, ‘exhibition-‘ and ‘cult-value’ leads, from the 
position and results of the research so far, back to the very different appraisal of the 
simulacrum proposed in this research, which suggests the artist’s role of 
supporting/living the emergence of a ‘not-yet’ in a field of immanent material and 
virtual forces. The focus is non-possession, or renunciation of possession of the 
‘original’ (in contrast, the aura of the ‘exhibition-value’ functions still as in index for 
transcendence: of lack), on operating in a field of rhizomatic potential, which filters 
as much through the assemblages of subjectivation and force fields as it operates as 
a trace of or vector from the Body without Organs. It filters by folding i.e., refolding 
the sensation of the echo in between the emerging piece of art and prehension. Such 
an encounter of aura or prehension of ‘echo’ of Becoming provides an augmented 
field for a ‘complex act’ against acquired (homogeneous) style: as ‘appropriating 
depropriation’ (repeating here Arnaud Villani’s paradoxical paraphrase of the ‘event’ 
introduced already in chapter 1.4.1), ‘letting oneself act, to let the virtual infuse, 
without forcing it’ (Villani 2010, 77) and working through conflicts that reach beyond 
personal feelings into collective virtual problem/solutions. Leaning towards the ‘in 
between’ of these folds implies then an augmentation of the multiplicity or force-
field of the creative process at ‘the interval between past and future [where] man has 
to face his own responsibility’ (Agamben 1999b, 114). But such an ethical approach 
can only be constituted, as Agamben stresses, on the fact that there is no ‘first’, ‘no 
historical or spiritual vocation, no biological destiny that human enact or realize’, 
because if there were, ‘no ethical experience would be possible’ (Agamben 2009a, 
43). Agamben, arguing here for potentiality and the human freedom to act upon or 
not, strengthens as much as Villani the inherent ethics of Deleuze’s philosophy of 
immanence, which reflect onto the reading of aura as proposed here, echoing the Marius von Brasch    2. Practice: ‘Mapping/Tracing’ Aura 
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task of visualizing the power and problem of virtual forces that traverse a fractured 
yet creative self of subjectivation. When media philosopher Vilém Flusser speaks 
about the human as ‘project’ (in contrast to ‘subject’), he augments this still 
somewhat romantic conception by integrating the formal, calculatory and structural 
consciousness that deploys technologies as to realize ‘knots’ of potential, of ‘selves’ 
as ‘digital dispersion’ at a point where it is impossible to make a distinction between 
truth and semblance or science and art ('Digitaler Schein' [Digital Semblance], in: 
Flusser 2005, 202). this process as machines able to crystallize time, in 
painting/drawing as well as in film 
Openness for the unfolding of something not yet confirmed, the Becoming 
towards equality of difference i.e. a positively turned ignorance of power structures, 
the integration of darkness (chaos, fear, dream) and light (conceptualization, 
practice, selection and responsibility), the work toward affect and percept instead of 
retarded emotion or copy of ‘reality’, and the weight and value of emptiness within 
what becomes as disjunctive syntheses are key points of what aura holds for this 
research. In terms of the ‘objective of the work’ in Splendor Solis (read here as 
always targeted and destabilized), aura holds an alchemical ‘request’, which is 
nothing more or less than a continuous re-posing of the question or the quest for 
how to encounter (here artistically) further individuation with the potential of 
contemporary media, following on the one hand Zielinski’s advice: ‘do not seek the 
old in the new, but find something new in the old’ (2006, 3), and supporting on the 
other hand what Félix Guattari proposes as ‘a new type of arrangement of 
enunciation’, to find against the clichés of power and order-words ‘the microfascism 
one harbors in oneself’ (Guattari 2009, 280)
126. Inviting aura in this sense releases its 
religious propositions as it cannot but operate exactly against being framed in a 
thought image. Terry Lovat and Inna Semetsky elucidate its ‘numinous’ aspect, 
which does certainly not disappear, embedded in immanence: ‘[t]he practical 
transformation of the self takes place along the vanishing transversal line at the very 
limit of human experience that therefore always contains a numinous, religious, 
bordering on mystical, aspect’ (Lovat and Semetsky 2009, 247). If it is this 
numinosity, which concerns contemporary reservations against aura, it can be, as 
proposed here, liberated from its displacement to transcendence in a Deleuzian 
framework by dissolving the yawning abyss of mysticism into univocal immanence: 
without having to deny its inherent intensity, its splendour of chiascuro, the echo of 
                                                 
126 See also in Subversions: ‘Neutrality is another illusion: We are ourselves always mixed up in the 
situation. […] Instead of conducting a politics of subjection, of identification, normalization, social control 
and setting the people we are dealing with along a semiotic track, it is possible to opt for a micropolitics 
that at least takes into account our own humble participation in the story […]’ (Guattari and Lotringer 
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folding desiring-machines that fires/breathes through the pragmatics of practice, old 
and new media, paint and software. 
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After documenting the practice-based research in chapter 2, chapter 3 continues by 
proposing a conceptual persona or ‘masked’ concept in the middle of the fold 
between practice and theory in art research. It is ‘intuition’, which in this practice-
based research involves with aura as practice as much as it holds the key for a 
method of conceptualizing its differentiations.  
3. Art Practice/Research as Suspension 
3. 1 Aura and Intuition: Hölderlin’s Empedocles at Etna as 
Conceptual Persona 
 
3.1.1	 ﾠWhy	 ﾠHölderlin’s	 ﾠEmpedocles?	 ﾠ
In the last chapter a connection has been made between Deleuze’s quotation 
‘”My wound existed before me, I was born to embody it”’ (Joe Bousquet, quoted in: 
Deleuze 2004c, 169) and individuated strands of this wound on the side of the artist 
and his/her practice. If the openness toward a ‘propitious’ moment or emergence of 
an event presupposes, as shown, degrees of intensity without which Becoming is 
hardly thinkable, then also the experience of aura indicates a beginning of an 
exploration, a trigger for potential in the viewer. It seems as if the rhizomes 
mapped/traced around/with aura in form of artistic outcomes (and writing) might 
hold a healing aspect; are aura and ‘wound’ connected, and if so, how? 
Deleuze’s quotation relates to a fracture in modern consciousness, a wound 
that he associates with the beginning liberation of consciousness from a separating 
transcendence that would leave the subject intact as a unit, but enveloped in the 
cyclical and predestining movements of fixed stars and the planets.
127  
Kant introduced time into the subject and dissolves thus the concept of circular time, 
and with this move time becomes subordinated ‘to the course of the world’, ‘as if 
bent, it becomes circular’ (Deleuze 1978). Linear time is the result of an unrolling of 
this ancient subordination to movement: ‘the circle snaps, like a spring that uncoils 
itself’, and builds a straight line with the incision of the event with its ‘before’ and 
‘after’, builds, reminding us of Jorge Luis Borges, the paradox of the straight line as 
labyrinth
128: what seems a predictable line of measurable units, a ‘manageable’ 
                                                 
127 Plato (in Timaeus 37c6-39e2) introduces them as markers of time (Plato and Zeyl 2000).  
128 Deleuze refers here to Jorge Luis Borges narrative Death and the Compass, on the surface a 
detective story about two antithetical figures, Scharlach and Lönnrot. Both hunt each other through layers 
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course, opens at any moment a fissure presenting the incongruence between 
spontaneity and representation. Thus, says Deleuze, linear time ‘no longer limits the 
world, it will traverse it’ (1978) at any moment of differenc/tiation but positions the 
subject at the disjunctions and pitfalls of a labyrinthine, only seemingly organized 
vista. In many ways, Deleuze’s multi-layered philosophy proposes (for both 
individuals and their multitude in social bodies) the affirmation of exactly this 
dilemma, the active and joyful turn of the potential of differentiation and events into 
assemblages, at the same time ‘open to internal antagonisms, to the real forces of 
destruction and decomposition’ (Hardt 1993, 121). The disengagement of 
‘difference’ from its historical dependence on comparison in philosophy is at the 
heart of this affirmation, and one could see Deleuze as ‘redeeming’ Immanuel Kant’s 
project, which against its objective to develop a rigorous (transcendental) philosophy 
of immanence had reintroduced transcendence with the ‘supersensible’.  
Freeing ‘difference’ changes the fixed stars and their projections to 
singularities on differentiating vectors of Becoming, confirming Nietzsche’s short 
Parable in The Gay Science, where it says: ‘whoever looks into himself as into vast 
space and carries galaxies in himself, also knows how irregular all galaxies are; they 
lead into the chaos and labyrinth of existence’ (§ 322, in Nietzsche et al. 2006, 232). 
The practice element as presented here, with its rhythms between spontaneous 
production and reflection, its overlapping frames and irruptive flows, resonates with 
if not directly links to this ‘wound’ (of identity). In art practice as research, this 
wound navigates, guides and challenges as a fissure, vibrating and differentiating, 
along the gap between the spontaneity of creation, i.e. of painting, drawing, editing 
and their folds into language; of Body without Organs and concept; of intuition and 
conceptualization.  
But what is circumscribed when we talk about ‘intuitive practice’, how does 
intuition work, and how could a ‘translation’ – if there is one – from intuition into 
concept be described? 
Finding answers to or layers of this questions will hopefully contribute to, in a 
Deleuzian sense, the ‘creation’ of a concept of aura, and it might be such 
preliminary steps towards a concept that practice-based art research can provide, 
due to its methods which depart from the impact of percepts and affects on 
knowledge and thus differ from the creation of concepts. ‘The concept’, write 
Deleuze and Guattari, ‘is an incorporeal, even though it is incarnated or effectuated 
in bodies. But, in fact, it is not mixed up with the state of affairs in which it is 
effectuated. It does not have spatiotemporal coordinates, only intensive ordinates.’ 
                                                 
have lost themselves that a mere detective might well do so too.” […] “The next time I kill you,” said 
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(Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 21) The notion of aura as developed in this research – a 
vibrant potential futurity of Becoming, of differenciating emergence along the ‘event’ 
that leaps into a non-static actualisation, a ‘golden shadow’ or ‘chiaroscuro’ of what 
seems to be a framed and finished piece of art – comes close to speaking ‘the event, 
not the essence or the thing’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 21) but necessarily (and 
desirably) carries along the intensities of an organized artist-body and its passages 
toward dis-organization that are indissolubly involved in art-practice/research. 
A possible (visualized) step towards a counter-effectuation
129 of the event that 
actualizes a ‘wound that existed before me’ with its vital connection to aura and 
intuition, however, could be a conceptual persona, an incorporeal that wears the 
projective mask of sensibility; on the way to becoming the infinite speed with which 
a concept surveys its heterogeneous components, the conceptual persona ‘carries 
out the movements that describe the author’s plane of immanence, and […] play[s] a 
part in the very creation of the author’s concept’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 63). As 
The search for a focus that would possibly connect some of the seemingly 
remote strands of this research, would provide a source of visual imagination and be 
intuitively accessible, lead to the figure of Empedocles at Etna, the protagonist of 
Friedrich Hölderlin’s unfinished ‘mourning-play’ Der Tod des Empedokles [The Death 
of Empedocles], written between 1797 and 1800
 130. The Pre-Socratic philosopher 
‘developed his concept of the physical world as an attempt to combine incompatible 
positions’ (Zielinski 2006, 43), suspended between a pre-individual plane of 
elements in the volcano Etna, and the ‘knowledge’ of how to create concepts and 
poetry with them. In Hölderlin’s play, he considers his endeavours as failure, too 
close to the gods, too distant to his people he is politically committed to. He 
considers dying by merging with the fire in the depth of the volcano but in fact 
remains, in Hölderlin’s version, suspended in this state of reflection. Deleuze and 
Guattari identify the potential of ‘Empedocles and his volcano’ (1994, 72), but, as far 
as I can see, limit it to his accomplished leap into the volcano: ‘The artist no longer 
risks [they refer here to Romanticism] dissipation in the milieus but rather sinking 
                                                 
129 ‘The event is actualized of effectuated whenever it is inserted, willy-nilly, into a state of affairs; 
but it is counter-effectuated whenever it is abstracted from states of affairs as to isolate its concept’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 159). 
130 Hölderlin (1770-1843) had a tremendous influence on German modernist poetry (for example 
Paul Celan) and philosophy (first on Hegel and Schelling, who were both friends of his in earlier years, 
then Heidegger and his antipodes Adorno and Walter Benjamin); he wrote poems, a novel in letters, 
philosophical, often fragmentary essays, the Empedocles play and produced translations of Sophocles and 
Pindar. The three unfinished version of The Death of Empedocles, much more a reflective literary text than 
‘stage action’, were written between 1797 and 1800 alongside his most important and complex poetic 
and philosophical texts. A few years later he suffered a mental breakdown and spent the last 40 years of 
his life in care. The translation of The Death of Empedocles from German to English used here is by David 
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too deeply into the earth: Empedocles. The artist no longer identifies with Creation 
but with the ground or foundation, the foundation has become creative’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004, 373). But exactly this ‘sinking too deeply’, the actual leap into 
the depth of the elements, effectively takes never place in Hölderlin’s play.
131 
For the context of visualizing aura, it is this denial of the sacrificial leap in the 
unfinished versions of Hölderlin’s Empedocles, this cut or freeze frame that builds 
the springboard for the argument here.  Of course, this assumes regarding as a 
solution what seems on the surface a failed project (a play never ‘finished’): the close 
encounter with aura this conceptual poetic persona embodies (in between the fold of 
creating and conceptualizing with it), indicates – following the thesis here – a belief 
in virtuality, a futurity, i.e. potential for changes in a problematic constellation.  
Deleuze connects this belief to ‘precipitat[ing] events, however inconspicuous, that 
elude control, [to] engender[ing] new space-times, however small their surface or 
volume’ (Deleuze 1995, 176). However, that does not indicate, as Daniel W. Smith 
points out in his essay The Conditions of the New, ‘that the problematic structure has 
disappeared’ (Smith 2007, 17). Hölderlin’s effective solution is Empedocles’ 
suspension, i.e. a sustained actuality of a problematic structure, a potential, which 
much later is picked up again by Zielinski when he writes about Empedocles’ 
philosophy as ‘a worldview oriented toward succeeding, precisely because it is aware 
of the possibility of failure’ (Zielinski 2006, 41). 
The assemblage of a suspended Empedocles in between the unfolding of 
difference, a plane of immanence and the emergence of art/writing delivers 
effortlessly on Deleuze’s and Guattari’s requirements: ‘the conceptual persona with 
its personalized features intervenes between chaos and the diagrammatic features of 
the plane of immanence and also between the plane and the intensive features of the 
concepts that happen to populate it’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 75). It delivers 
also, as will be proposed in this chapter, a focus for some of the positions of 
Deleuze/Guattari, Benjamin (both refer to Hölderlin frequently) and alchemical 
thought that have been relevant for the research so far.  
 
 
                                                 
131 Joseph Suglia supports my view. In his inquiry Hölderlin and Blanchot on Self-Sacrifice he writes: 
‘[In] this fragmentary work – one of the titles of which announces the death of its tragic hero – death takes 
place nowhere in the space of its presentation. The absence of anything resembling a scene of self-
immolation causes a certain interpretive distress. Empedokles “suicide” is inevitably described as if it were 
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3.1.2	 ﾠEmpedocles’	 ﾠSuspended	 ﾠSacrifice	 ﾠ
 
Hölderlin belonged to the first generation that dealt with a specific problem 
arising from Kant’s transcendental philosophy in an open-ended and experimental 
way, before the encyclopaedic systems of German Idealism (Hegel and Schelling) 
would emerge from these preliminary intuitions. His Empedocles embodies an 
independent philosophical thought as poetic and intense intervention, embodies a 
fissure or, in Hölderlin ‘s language, a ‘caesura’ in modern consciousness, which lets 
the character of his play already act as a conceptual persona. While this section 
introduces Empedocles a (historical) figure, the next will provide the philosophical 
background for Hölderlin’s project.  
The play deals with a figure (Empedocles) that exists in multiple disguises 
along a line of witnessed and imaginary history: an aristocratic leader from 
Agrigentum (Sicily) who rejected political power in favour of democratic 
developments; an eminent Pre-Socratic philosopher, whose teachings survived in 
fragments or secondary texts
132; a physician who knows about the alchemy of the 
elements; a healer whose ‘spiritual exercises’ of remembrance enable him to reveal 
previous incarnations; a philosopher admired by the people as a god who desires, as 
to confirm or repent the hubris attached to this idea, to leap into the volcano
133.  
Empedocles claims that Love and Strife are the forces that make the elements 
(fire, water, air, earth; they are called rhizômata – rhizomes in Greek
134) conjoin and 
transmute perpetually; instead of an origin or beginning he advocates an eternal 
movement, driven by attraction and destruction, or, put in more contemporary 
terms, Aphrodite/Eros and Thanatos who enter, exit and interweave, as we have 
seen, throughout this project.  
There are obvious affinities between Empedocles’ teachings and the alchemical 
‘work’, and, if we understand ‘elements’ as the components of matter, perhaps also 
Deleuze’s differential processes. The following fragment, cited by Plutarch, builds a 
thread of such affinities, showing simultaneously Empedocles’ obvious awareness of 
the gap between language (representation) and ‘truth’, which his student Gorgias of 
Leontini then developed much further (we have already encountered him in this 
research in connection with the ‘simulacrum’ or critique of ‘Ideas’): ‘Another thing I 
                                                 
132 Hölderlin and authors of his generation got most information on ancient philosophy from 
Diogenes Laërtius’ Lives of the Eminent Philosophers (3. century CE) (Laërtius 2010). 
133 Empedocles’ leap into the Etna is most probably apocryphal (Fóti 2006, 56), Diogenes Laërtius 
mentions alternative accounts. Practically seen, it seems an impossible endeavour and is thus symbolical.  
134 R. M. Torrance specifies that Empedocles calls the ‘four eternal principles – fire, air, water, and 
earth / […] “roots” (rhizômata) […] which others later called “elements” (stoikheia, literally ‘letters” of the 
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shall tell you: there is no birth for any mortal thing, nor any cursed end in death; 
only mixing and interchange of what is mixed, these things are – but men name 
them birth’ (Barnes 1987, 129; my italics).  
Empedocles departs from the mixture of elements equivalent to those of 
colours in painting, from the senses, percepts and affects involved in temporary 
composites formed by the desire of the ever changing elements: ‘speculations of 
philosophers of nature such as Empedocles belonged’, so Pierre Hadot, ‘rather to the 
domain of graphikē, where graphikē is either the art of writing letters or the art of 
painting. […] [P]hilosophers of nature seek to reconstruct the universe with a small 
number of elements analogous to letters or colors [sic]. The philosophy treatise, 
whether written in prose or in verse, then appears as a kind of microcosm, whose 
genesis and structure reproduce those of the universe’ (Hadot 2006, 207/208). 
Thus, Empedocles composes via the ‘art of painting’, as Maurice Blanchot (1993, 89) 
notes, the ‘rhythm’ of the world, its changing configurations, which captures the 
vibration of matter that accompanies the differentiation of Becoming. 
Being a composite of the elements entangled in Love/Strife himself, 
Empedocles standing on Etna is traversed by the vectors of Becoming, moving 
through different layers of time: ‘driven’, as Maurice Blanchot paraphrases 
Empedocles in The Infinite Conversation, ‘by the heavens to the sea, spit from the 
sea to the earth, spit out again toward the sun and thrown back by the sun to the 
heavens; “exiled from god and in error for having trusted myself to the frenzy of 
irritation”’ (Blanchot 1993, 26; italics original). 
In Hölderlin’s ‘mourning-play’, we find Empedocles on the outside, exiled from 
Agrigentum. His brother has taken political power. Empedocles, the ‘darling’ of the 
gods, regrets his hubris to have prided himself to be in possession of their 
knowledge, a god himself: he lost the love of the gods and jeopardizes his people. 
But also the people of Agrigentum have disappointed him. Considering sacrificing 
himself, to leap into Etna will unify him with the fiery elements and the ethereal fire 
of the gods, will affirm with an act of love the purging powers of the ekpyrosis 
(Greek for ‘conflagration’), the Stoic belief that the primal creative Fire, which 
remains present yet concealed in the concrete world, will again and again destroy 
forms in its destructive form (‘at the end of a time’)
135. Jochen Schmidt shows how 
this connects to Hölderlin: at the point of ekpyrosis Fire breaks through its 
concealment in the individual; it ‘disengages from its mediation and connection with 
the other elements where it had been live-giving. In the ekpyrosis, it becomes 
                                                 
135 The Stoic teachings around Fire are based on Heraclitus: ‘The universe is limited in extent, and 
there is one world. It is generated from fire and it is consumed in fire again, alternating in fixed periods 
throughout the whole of eternity. And this happens by fate’ (DK 22 B 30, in: Barnes 1987, 55 ; see also 
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immediate, unbound, deathly’ (in Neymeyr et al. 2008). Fire thus negates, 
extinguishes the gap between the immediate and representation that establishes 
human consciousness. 
In the play, Empedocles’ intended but not offered sacrifice fulfils a double 
function: firstly to purge a hubris and to commit an act of love for his people, 
secondly to become a personage for political (historical) ekpyrosis.  
In which way can Empedocles’ ‘hubris’ be a problem of modernity? For 
Hölderlin, it connects to ‘intuition’ of the immediate and therefore to philosophical 
representations and aesthetic visualizations of how we gain knowledge. 
The following paragraphs will introduce briefly the background of Hölderlin’s 
problem. Such an introduction seemed inevitable for Empedocles as a conceptual 
persona that directly connects the strands of the ‘wound before me’, aura and the 
method of intuition on the one hand, but also highlights the background of how, in 
philosophy, intuition could develop into a method appropriately applied to the 
developments of concepts relating to time as duration like the ‘wound’ and possibly 
aura. It revealed an unexpected encounter between Deleuze’s and Benjamin’s 
concepts of time, which extends on and refines earlier results of my research
136.  
 
3.1.3	 ﾠ‘The	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠ[…]	 ﾠis	 ﾠimpossible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmortals’	 ﾠ
 
The questions of how to link our ability to make spontaneous judgments to the 
ways we represent the world in our consciousness, and of how these conditions 
affect freedom, were a major concern for artists and intellectuals after Kant’s 
critiques had been published around the time of the French revolution.  
With the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/87), Kant proposed a model of human 
consciousness that contested any legitimacy of religious dogma by showing the 
subjective condition of our perception that can never reliably derive ‘truths’ about 
perceived phenomena or capture the ‘thing itself’ in the sense of an essence. It 
becomes obvious here that Deleuze’s project is intensely engaged with radicalising 
Kant’s transcendental philosophy. A dilemma rises for Kant with the restrictions 
consciousness meets to represent itself: ‘since the subject intuits itself, not as it 
would represent itself immediately and spontaneously, but according to the manner 
                                                 
136 Although the ‘Empedocles’-phase of the research started with a video (Empedocles: Falling/Not 
Falling, see 3.2.2), thus before researching the background in more depth, it made more sense to place 
the background introduction first; the creative work that followed the video (the paintings for Empedocles 
Assemblage and the video Deerfeathers, see 3.2) resulted from ideas arising with the theoretical 
explorations and might profit from such an introduction. 
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in which the mind is internally affected, consequently, as it appears, and not as it is’ 
(Kant 2007b, I §8, B68).
  For a German reader, the English translation ‘intuition’, 
although commonly used, seems imprecise,
 as Kant relates ‘intuition’ in the original 
clearly to ‘representation’ (literally ‘looking-at’), not to the commonly applied ‘ability 
to understand something instinctively, without the need for conscious reasoning’ 
(according to Oxford Dictionaries). 
In Henri Bergson’s view, which links to Deleuze’s take on Kant, Kant confuses 
‘the symbolical representation of the ego with the ego itself’, which leads him to 
conceptualize time as a homogenous condition of subjectivity instead of noticing 
‘that real duration is made up of moments inside one another’ (Bergson 2001, 
232)
137.  
The bracketing of and weight on subjective conditions of representation forces 
Kant also into having to link the ‘ability to understand something instinctively, 
without the need for conscious reasoning’ to agencies beyond representation. In the 
Critique of Judgment (1790), he observes that our appreciation of beauty sidelines 
the deduction of reasonable thinking from sensuous intuition and declares it as a 
symbol of ’the morally good’, pointing ‘to something in the subject itself and outside 
it, and which is not nature, nor yet freedom, but still is connected with the ground of 
the latter, i.e. the supersensible – a something in which the theoretical faculty is 
combined with the practical in a shared and unknown matter’ (Kant 2007a, § 59, p. 
181). 
With the introduction of the supersensible, Kant allows a zone immune to 
critical forces and thus takes back some of the potential of his initial approach for a 
thorough critique, which, writes Michael Hardt, ‘requires a materialistic, monistic 
perspective in which the entire unified horizon is open and vulnerable to the 
critique’s destabilizing inquiry’ (Hardt 1993, 29). 
Deleuze, following Bergson’s criticism of Kant’s model of time, uncouples the 
transcendental from its ground in empirical representation in the subject and thus 
opens the notion toward a transcendental field of singularities, ‘a pure stream of a-
subjective consciousness, a pre-reflexive impersonal consciousness, a qualitative 
duration of consciousness without a self’ (Deleuze 2001, 25), which we have 
repeatedly encountered in the course of this research. 
However, for the generation directly after Kant, his move – to infer from 
aesthetic experience, from the experience of beauty, a ‘beyond’ mediating between 
nature and reason in historical time – suggested that it must be the artist who could 
                                                 
137 In Kant’s Critique of Reason, writes Bergson, ‘[there is never any question of] a knowledge from 
within, that could grasp them in their springing forth instead of taking them already sprung, that would 
dig beneath space and spatialized time […] Yet it is indeed beneath this plane that our consciousness 
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intuit the work of nature. Frederick Beiser (2003, 83) shows how in Early 
Romanticism the rise of organic theories of nature coincided with a great interest in 
‘forces’ of nature and the rediscovery of Spinoza’s philosophy of nature as immanent 
unfolding, undivided by transcendence. Nature became an organic process to be 
intuited. 
Artistic inspiration, intuition gained from a flash seemingly originating from 
beyond the sensuous (thus ‘intellectual’) becomes a marker within the organic 
process, inflicting wounds not only on the individual but also on history. Here, at a 
point before the established philosophies of ‘German Idealism’, ‘intuition’ begins to 
form its common association of an ability to grasp the internal processes of nature, 
mirrored and completed in the production of art: in poetry, language achieves 
pushing through discourses of representation, thus touching also on problems 
engaged with writing on art the methods introduced here as to engage with aura.  
The artist, in this early Idealistic view, co-creates and brings nature to its 
reflected self, and it is ‘intellectual intuition’ that realizes the gap between reason, 
language and what they fail to grasp, irrupts and reveals that in the medium of linear 
time ‘[t]he immediate, strictly speaking, is impossible for mortals’ (Hölderlin 2009, 
336).   
A writer like Hölderlin was thoroughly aware of the radical changes indicated 
by these new outlooks and hoped for new political conditions, gained from the 
reconciliation between nature and history that would improve on what in the late 
1790s appeared to be a betrayal of the opportunities proposed by the French 
revolution. The idea for Empedocles at Etna, as a conceptual embodiment of the 
problematic intellectual intuition, endeavours to put into a processual form – a 
‘play(-ing)’ destined for ‘mourning’ – its tragic inflictions on the subject’s 
consciousness and history.  
Hölderlin – and we need to keep in mind that for him Empedocles is a tragic 
poetic character – associates intellectual intuition with the tragic: ‘The tragic […] 
poem […] is the metaphor of an intellectual intuition’ (Hölderlin 2009, 302). How is 
this possible? 
In one of his last works before his mental breakdown, the annotations for his 
translations of Sophocles Oedipus and Antigone (published 1804), Hölderlin 
describes the quality of this moment in depth. The instant, the in-between of what 
has been and what is not yet which holds the potential of ‘the fearful enormity of 
God and man uniting’, opens a gap, in which God (‘power of nature’) and man (the Marius von Brasch                               3.Art Practice/Research as Suspension 
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‘innermost being in rage
138’) betray each other by turning away from each other 
according to their differences of being time:  
 
‘man forgets himself there because he is wholly in the moment; and God, 
because he is nothing else than time. And both are unfaithful: time, because at such 
a moment it reverses categorically – [and] beginning and end simply cannot be 
connected; and man, because at this moment he must follow the categorical 
reversal, and therefore simply cannot be in the following what he was at the 
beginning. […] And thus Oedipus [stands] himself at the centre of the tragedy of 
Oedipus’ (Hölderlin 2009, 324). 
 
Oedipus, in this sense, is the gap between ‘god’ and ‘man’ or caesura in 
Sophocles’ play, and, with another emphasis, Empedocles will become the 
conceptual persona for what Hölderlin develops further as caesura in his own 
tragedy
139. 
Hölderlin suggests in his dense text that the staged experience of mutual 
betrayal in Greek tragedy confuses and purifies man by making him realise the 
urgency of an unambiguous (‘categorical’) turn. The German Umkehr, here 
translated as ‘reversal’, indicates also a political overthrow or ‘revolution’ (Editors' 
notes in Hölderlin and Schmidt 1994, 1392). Tragedy prevents God as ‘time’, 
different from the one of reflexivity, from being forgotten, and the gap or caesura, 
as Hölderlin calls it, functions ‘so that no gap occurs on the course of the world’ 
(Hölderlin 2009, 324), permeating both the subject and the course of history. 
However, at the same time the mutual betrayal between God and man signifies the 
moment where, as Deleuze, who had a great interest in this central aspect of 
Hölderlin’s work, writes, man will ‘accomplish the subjective mission of God’, will be 
liberated from the signifying regime to a ‘subjective regime or regime of passion’, as 
‘God [becomes] Point of subjectivation’ (Deleuze 2006a, 79/80).  
The moment in time of the ‘reversal’ reflects here also the beginning 
dissolution of the metaphysical separation on which, as shown, the traditional 
conception of aura as static, bright, divine ‘reward’ is based. 
The caesura (in the context Hölderlin positions it) relates foremost to tragedy 
and language, but intrinsically it provides a metaphor for the ‘tragic’ condition of 
language as the medium of reflexivity, and, more generally, of art: ‘a pure word, that 
                                                 
138 ‘Rage’ signifies here, so the editors of the most up-to-date German Hölderlin edition, less a 
common affect but ‘a state of the extreme dissolution of the individual in direction toward the absolute 
[…] a being-enraptured by the forces of nature’ (Hölderlin and Schmidt 1994, 1381).  
139 Unexpected support for my efforts to bind the alchemical Hermaphrodite to aura (and the 
connection to Bonello’s film Tiresia) comes from Hölderlin (and Sophocles via Hölderlin), when we find in 
his Notes on the ‘Oedipus’: ‘In both plays [Oedipus, Antigone], it is the speeches of Tiresias which 
constitute the caesura.’ (Hölderlin 2009, 318)
139 Again, the hermaphroditic and blind prophet Tiresias 
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which in metrics is called a caesura, in order to confront the speeding alternation of 
ideas at its climax, so that not the alternation of the idea, but the idea itself appears’ 
(Hölderlin 2009, 318). As a play, the metaphor of the ‘pure word’ becomes its 
metamorphosis, and it is a curious aspect that as an unfinished play, the metaphor 
(as metamorphosis) keeps its being differentiated into a temporal actualization alive. 
It is the caesura as ‘interruption’ of the straight line of time and semblance, 
where two theoretical positions paramount for this research meet the first time: 
Benjamin and Deleuze.  
For Deleuze, the caesura is ‘pure present’ (this means he transports a marker 
of language, the ‘pure word’, into the transcendental field), the point ‘from which 
the real which fills space and time will be produced, […] empty intuition’ (Deleuze 
1978 ; 2004b, 110/111). It seems thus another facet of the crystals of Aion as 
introduced in the last chapter, the neutral and empty present of eternity from which 
past and future flee ‘in both directions at once, towards the future and towards the 
past’ (Deleuze 2004c, 73). It is Aion/caesura, ‘pure present’ that builds the surface 
on which intensities (‘regime of passion’) and potential problem solutions find an 
expression as Kairos or event. 
For Walter Benjamin, ‘the expressionless can be no more rigorously defined’ 
than through Hölderlin’s notes on the caesura, ‘in which, along with harmony, every 
expression simultaneously comes to a standstill, in order to give free reign to an 
expressionless power inside all artistic media. […] Perceptible in tragedy as the 
falling silent of the hero […]’ (Benjamin 1996, 341), the caesura ruins the towering 
self-assurance of representation, as much in literature as (we have seen this during 
the discussion of Grünewald’s Resurrection) in painting (and, I would like to add, in 
film) when beautiful semblance is traversed by the ‘sublime violence’ of an arrest 
with the flash of pure present.  
Deleuze’s and Benjamin’s positions show one great affinity: the irruption of 
pure present into a world established on moral, ‘framed’ and rigidified models of 
being, the sudden visualization of ‘[m]y absolute present, always present, 
obsessionally present …’ , how Henri Michaux puts it in a poem ('Future', in Caws 
2004, 193).  
Benjamin can claim that with the caesura ‘truth’ irrupts, ‘sublime violence of 
the true’ because from a messianic point of view language and art must be 
confronted with their fragmentary, contorted reality, being ‘a fragment of the true 
world’, a dispersed and heterogeneous exegesis as shown in Chapter 1.1. The 
‘expressionless’ cuts with its a-subjective potential of justice into the 
surface/semblance in art, as much as into the flow of collective history that has been 
built on a destructive concept of ‘progress’. The poetic image that presents 
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“dissonance” […] so that time’, as Eric Jacobson writes, ‘no longer appears as a lineal 
string of barbarism but rather as a table of events that are bound to redemption, the 
“temporal order of happiness”’ (Jacobson 2003, 33). A brief note in the Arcade 
project sums up a somewhat different, continuously broken and fragmented 
teleology: ‘ […] knowledge comes only in lightening flashes. The text is the long roll 
of thunder that follows’ (N1,1 in Benjamin 2002a, 456).  
The latter quote could be also a very accurate description of art as research, of 
a movement toward conceptualization of what appears to emerge intuitively; 
however, Benjamin’s note must be understood as a moment of ‘translation’ back to 
the first language: ‘The interlinear version of the Scriptures is the prototype or ideal 
of all translation’ (Benjamin 1996, 263)
140; he leaves Hölderlin’s caesura in the realm 
of language, but it becomes here the marker of Law. 
It is obvious that the description of the ‘expressionless’ shares some 
characteristics of what I examine here as aura as an intense ‘event’ of the new, 
actualising a problem solution with its heterogeneity of differentiation, its openness 
or demand for ‘selection’, i.e. a fusion of contemplation and action. 
With the discussion of Hölderlin’s caesura, it becomes clearer that Benjamin 
possibly juxtaposes the aura (with its element of internalized contemplation) with 
the ‘expressionless’ in order to isolate and critically target a specific ‘Western’ 
tradition of teleological progress that prepared the aestheticization of politics in 
fascism. The problem is in my view perfectly summarized in Michael Löwy’s study on 
Benjamin’s concept of history:  
 
‘Qualitative time, studded with messianic splinters, stands radically opposed to 
the empty flow of the purely quantitative time of historicism and ‘progressism’. We 
are, here, in the rupture between messianic redemption and the ideology of 
progress, at the heart of the constellation formed by the conceptions of history of 
Benjamin, Scholem and Franz Rosenzweig, who draw on the Jewish religious tradition 
to contest the model of thought that is common to Christian theodicy, the 
Enlightenment and the Hegelian philosophy of history. By abandoning the Western 
theological model, we pass from a time of necessity to a time of possibilities, a 
random time, open at any moment to the unforeseeable irruption of the new. But, 
from the political standpoint, we are also on the central strategic axis of the 
reconstruction of Marxism attempted by Benjamin’ (Löwy 2005, 102). 
 
 For Benjamin, aura with its attachment to interiority cuts across the 
redemptive potential of the intervention of Truth in time, which in Judaism always is 
thought to ‘[take] place publicly, on the stage of history and within the community’ 
(Scholem 1971, 1). Thus, the political structure that derives from such a concept of 
                                                 
140 I am aware that Benjamin’s commitment to the Scriptures as language of Truth is somewhat 
conditional, taken into account his remark ‘My thinking is related to theology as blotting pad is related to 
ink. It is saturated with it. Were one to go by the blotter, however, nothing of what is written would 
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aura appears as designed to pacify as a diagram of ‘the false’ the historically 
unredeemed dreams of real social bodies. The caesura as marker of the 
‘expressionless’ becomes its counterpart. Benjamin’s pharmacy, ‘profane 
illumination’, intervenes as an implementation of theological messianic categories 
into a world of fragments, to make ‘the rags, the refuse […] come to their own’ 
(N1a,8 in Benjamin 2002a, 460). 
However, Benjamin’s move cements a division between ‘interiority’ and 
‘exteriority’ and forecloses the opening of this division by constituting man’s 
interiority as ‘fallen’ from Truth (Scripture, Law), i.e. irreparable. It displaces man’s 
responsibility into an exterior and transcendent futurity; thus, personal input and its 
responsibility that could pass by this division and work co-creatively for a world of 
emergences gains in this repressive and dogmatic scenario of ‘heaven and hell’ the 
merit of a melancholically settled futility. What is problematic as a departure point 
here cannot be Benjamin’s powerful and accurate response to the catastrophic 
failure of human spirit in Nazi Germany but his eschatological generalisation that 
contorts the potential of aura. 
Such concealed and signifying totality is exactly what Deleuze sets out to avoid 
by putting ‘difference’ at the heart of repetition. For him, the caesura, like Aion, 
becomes the marker of ‘pure present’ in time.  
However, whereas from Aion past and future flee ‘in both directions at once, 
towards the future and towards the past’ (Deleuze 2004c, 73), the caesura in 
Difference and Repetition is limited to the synthesis of future in the sense of the 
‘present of metamorphosis’ (Deleuze 2004b, 112), the imminence of finding oneself 
not identical with oneself during change. As the fissure of a permanently repeating 
‘doubling of the self’, the caesura becomes the image of the eternal return, and 
‘must be determined in the image of a unique and tremendous event, an act which is 
adequate to time as a whole.’ Deleuze gives examples of how such a symbol of 
integral time could be expressed: ‘to throw time out of joint, to make the sun 
explode, to throw oneself into the volcano, to kill God or the father’ (Deleuze 2004b, 
112).  
Empedocles, who – following the legend and Hölderlin’s plan for his play – 
throws himself into the volcano, is himself an image for the ‘event’, the caesura, the 
synthesis of futurity. When I use Hölderlin’s unfinished Empedocles, I can make use 
of a freeze frame shot arresting the play just before the re/turn: Empedocles 
remains suspended, time expands, the crater of the mountain becomes a place of 
overview where the strands can be visualized that run between the fiery stream of 
elements, the edge of the crater, himself and the airy or ‘ethereal’ fire of Apollo, the 
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The unfinished Empedocles grants a snapshot of the ‘wound’ with its always 
uncomplete, or as Jack Reynolds puts it (Reynolds 2007, 158), ‘scarifactory’ 
healing
141. This wound emerges as a marker within Becoming (as differentiating 
repetitions), and what becomes is an asymmetrical differentiation, i.e. what 
actualizes will never be a copy of its virtual intensity but something that emerged 
out of it, by becoming-different. Thus, an origin or ground of the wound cannot be 
traced or determined and the unfolding of future as eternal return threatens the self 
with its fracture. The ‘wound that existed before me’ with its fracture of identity 
ripples forth to minor wounds around the construction of a personal shape, an ‘I’. 
In Hölderlin’s essay Ground for Empedocles, in which he grounds his intentions 
theoretically, the determination of a ‘ground’ is made impossible. This incredibly 
modern text outlines the basis for his drama as well as a ground for the problematic 
unity of natural forces and thought (which coerces their organization). He does not 
deny, like Kant, the possibility of ‘intellectual intuition’ as being-One with the 
immediate but Kant’s claim that our faculties, understanding and imagination are 
able to organize the ‘anarchy of ideas’ and perceptions in an unambiguous way, the 
‘unity of the manifold, an order of perceptions, was indeed possible, but accidental’ 
(Hölderlin 2009, 227, my italics), thus in no way binding as proposed by Kant. For 
Hölderlin, unity or primordial order can only be reconstructed, in retrospective and 
after a transgression that induces the caesura. In a Deleuzian sense, every 
differentiating repetition into the future becomes such a potential transgression.  
When Hölderlin writes in a letter: ‘The god and man seems one’ (appr. 1799 in 
Hölderlin and Schmidt 1992, 412, my italics), he abbreviates the main strand of 
Ground for Empedocles. What will remain from ‘unity’, from the immediate, is an 
‘image of intimacy’ or ‘intensity’
142 that ‘everywhere denies, and must deny, its 
ultimate ground’ (Hölderlin 2009, 259); the closer the intimacy with the forces of 
nature, the ‘aorgic’
143, is achieved the more the subjective faculties of representation 
will be extinguished. Gaining unity with the aorgic means for Empedocles – who was 
‘in no way made for negations’ – to try  
 
                                                 
141 Reynolds describes this wounded healing in the following way: ‘it is the wound of time itself that 
is revalued [by Deleuze] in a transcendental move that tacitly diminishes the scar’ (Reynolds 2007, 158, 
my italics).  
142 Krell chooses ‘intensity’ where the translators of the Penguin version (quoted in my text) use 
‘intimacy’, which in might reflect better the German (unusual in today’s language) ‘Innigkeit’ and its 
allusions to Love and interiority (thus reflecting Empedocles’ view of the work of the elements workings as 
inner reality of changing life forms).  
143 The ‘aorgic’, a term originating from Southern German pietism known to Hölderlin, signifies 
here the ‘unconscious, speechless, imageless, dis-organising aspects of nature’ (Ritter et al. 1971, Vol. 6, 
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‘to become the master of the unknown, […] to encompass the overpowering 
natural world, to understand it through and through, and to become conscious of it, 
as he could be conscious and certain of himself, […] his spirit had to take on aorgic 
form in the highest sense, had to tear itself away from itself and its own centre, and 
always penetrate its object so excessively that he lost himself in it, […]He was the 
universal, the unknown […]’ (Hölderlin 2009, 267). 
 
The closeness here to Deleuze and Guattari’s prompt to make oneself a Body 
without Organs, with its degree of intensities and a-subjective absence of 
signification, is striking. Hölderlin lays out how such a mutual approximation, 
between (one’s) BwO and signification in linear time could be described, could be 
put in scene, gain a temporary mask. The ‘aorgic’ could be non-linear time itself, as 
Hölderlin avoids a one-directional concept of time by interweaving its strands into 
future and past. The caesura that is here embodied encompasses the differentiation 
of intuition as Empedocles’ method of knowledge, the fire transmutes between the 
realms of gods and rhizomata. Could fire in this sense be the intensified splendour 
of aura and refer to its inherent method? 
Fire, Empedocles’ ‘target’ of a-subjectivation, appears in Hölderlin’s scenario 
as ‘the violent element, the fire of the sky’. It enables the experience of ‘Apollo has 
struck me’ (Letter to Böhlendorff, Nov. 1802 in: Hölderlin 2009, 213),
144 ‘the highest 
fire, the pure spirit [that] pure intimacy [desires] in order to represent purity itself’ 
(Hölderlin 2009, 258), the excess of the immediate as ‘flight’ and ‘infinite speed’ of 
thought from which Hölderlin’s Empedocles distills concepts as ‘knowledge of the 
gods’ (his hubris); and it is the intensity of alchemy in the depth of the earth, where 
a coniunctio oppositorum between fire and water affirms the immanent presence of 
light (‘sky’) in ‘darkness’, the rhizomes that grow  between the prima materia and 
the splendour of the sun.  
 
 
3.1.4	 ﾠTwombly,	 ﾠFerragosta	 ﾠIII	 ﾠ(1961)	 ﾠ
 
The Empedocles scenario can be discovered in Cy Twombly’s series of Ferragosta, 
especially Ferragosta III, which he painted in 1961 in Rome (Fig. 39), ‘in that room 
down there when I had to stay here in August. I was completely crazy, out of my 
mind with heat in this town’ (Twombly and Serota 2007).  
                                                 
144 Hölderlin expresses a very particular classicism. Greece is for him not the realm of equilibrium 
but of ‘Fire’, complementary to German ‘soberness’; both qualities, in his thought, need to balance each 
other. Apollo is thus not, like in Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music, the god of 
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The painting follows a direction of forces from the lower left to the upper right; the 
borders of the canvas function as a chosen limitation of what to show of a flux of 
primal matter, which particles, singularities to zoom into the mark making of the 
immediate. The colour scheme of browns/reds/pinks/oranges evokes fire, blood and 
faeces on a neutral, airy ground. Ferragosta, the 15
th of August, is a bank holiday in 
Italy, originally celebrating the pax Romana established by Emperor Augustus in 18 
BCE (feriae Augusti). It is also, in the framework of the Catholic Church, the day of 
the assumption or physical ascension of the ‘Virgin Mary’ into heaven. Seen from 
this angle, the painting reflects the intensity of heat, but also an almost humorous 
comment on the denial of the intense body and desire that Mary, as a persona 
framed by religion, has to suffer. The ascension in Ferragosta is one of reclaiming 
the body she was never granted, a celebration of the flight of immanent affects and 
transmutations that loses all restraint of the movement from depth to height with 
Twombly’s gestures in which ‘every ascent is reversed and suspended,’ so 
Agamben
145, ‘almost a threshold or caesura between an action and a non-action: 
Falling Beauty’ (in: Twombly et al. 2006, 13-15). The expressive and already slanted 
verticality expands into a horizon, throwing the forces in all directions, and gaining 
simultaneously stability and silence as a freeze frame of these dynamics.  
The ‘classical’, balanced and the destructive, humorous elements of this 
image complement each other without a need for polarization; and when Nicholas 
Serota asks Twombly in an interview: ‘ So do you see yourself as Apollo or 
Dionysus?’, Twombly answers (as casually as usual): ‘In different times, different 
things. Every now and then one gets excited by nature’ (Twombly and Serota 2007). 
Could this excitement by nature be another way of talking about a closeness to the 
immediate that gradually crystallizes as an aspect of aura in this research, of nature 
as emerging disordered/ordered, never representational
146 nature (natura naturans), 
which gives Ferragosta and many other of Twombly’s works such an enormous 
presence? As such, the introduction of Twombly’s image helps to amplify the forces 
Empedocles is positioned in.  
 
                                                 
145 This quote refers to Twombly’s sculptures but applies, I feel, also to a painting like Ferragosta 
III. 
146 In her paper [Un]common Sense and Undisciplinied Gestures, Sheena Calvert looks at Twombly 
from a Deleuzian point of view. Here, his ‘work is not founded on invariable symbolic elements, nor is it 
attempting to reconstruct or diagram something which lies beyond itself, in the sense of to ‘point’, 
propose, or designate. Its grammar is non-indicative; its form non-denotational. In its inhabitation of 
matter as meaning[full]-in-itself, and its refusal to hold the figural to its promise of an uncomplicated and 
distinct relation to the ground, Twombly’s work acknowledges the potential in Deleuze’s claim that 
representational thinking based on the identical, the similar, the analogous, and oppositional (this and 
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Although both complexes of ‘fire’ seem juxtaposed vertically in the 
Empedocles scenario, suggesting heights and depths, true opposites are never 
established as they differentiate each other; and what seems above/below is in 
reality the extension of Empedocles’ a-subjective body, affects and thought forms 
that create a horizon, a plane of composition, of colours, silences, velocities, a-
subjective ‘individuating affective states of an anonymous force’ (Deleuze 1988b, 
128) as much as an ‘I’ that needs to grasp and consolidate the ‘impersonal instant 
which is divided into still-future and already-past’ (Deleuze 2004c, 172).  
Thus, Empedocles embraces the ‘fourth person singular’ and embodies 
potentially the ‘free man, who grasps the event, and does not allow it to be 
actualized as such, without enacting, the actor, its counter-actualization’ (Deleuze 
2004c, 173). This is because the problematic doubling of the self that the wound of 
the caesura with its unfolding of future evokes appears in Hölderlin’s unfinished 
Empedocles, affirmed while not disowned. The obvious consequence of such an 
affirmation must be–- based on the recognition of a degree of freedom for the new – 
to take action or responsibility for emergence, the affirmation of affirmation: taking 
up the thread Nietzsche’s Ariadne offers to find a way through the labyrinth of the 
straight line of time. Then, the caesura links into Becoming as ‘processual direction’, 
as Guattari says, ‘in the existential sense of auto-affirmation’ (Guattari and Ettinger 
2002: 244) which, rejecting ressentiment about the wound, extends also to art 
practice and research as field of forces. 
As an image for an artist in the field of art practice/research, Empedocles is 
obviously positioned in the freeze frame shot in-between: neither fully identifying 
with the Body without Organs as rebellion against the wounds of words (Artaud’s 
schizophrenia), nor becoming ashes i.e. disembodying the intensities of the Body 
without Organs for the creative derivation of pure concepts
147. Is not his hubris – that 
he had been serving ‘as fire and water blindly serve’ and could ‘never lov[e] 
humanity in fitting human ways’ – connected to being over-identified with the pre-
individual, i.e. sharing the knowledge of ‘gods’ (as disembodied velocities of 
‘survey’)? 
                                                 
147 Julie Kuhlken elucidates this point in her paper Why is Deleuze an Artist–Philosopher?: ‘As long 
as the BwO remains attached to the personal experience of an actual body, it cannot be a philosophical 
concept. Unlike art, whose percepts and affects touch directly on materiality, philosophical concepts – 
such as the BwO becomes in Deleuze and Guattari’s hands – “survey” states of affairs. Unlike artists 
properly speaking, their aim is not to create works with the BwO, but rather to free it as a “pure Event” 
that philosophically speaking, can be re-effectuated infinitely […]’ (in: Holland et al. 2009, 211).  Marius von Brasch                               3.Art Practice/Research as Suspension 
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That he does not choose becoming-ashes with all its devastating political 
associations
148, allows Empedocles to be with, to follow, to detach from and to reflect 
the tension and fertility between explosion and silence, between the pre-individual 
and chaotic tendencies of intensity and their gaining ‘consistency without losing 
anything of the infinite’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 42), to follow an axis of 
Becoming of art as much as its conceptualization.  
The speech of the gender-shifting Tiresias that marks the caesura in Oedipus 
Rex and reverberates wordlessly in this scenario of suspension questions the 
traditional symbolism of Empedocles’ environment: the cave of the 
mountain/volcano as signification of the womb/the mother, and the fire in the sky as 
logos/the father. Tiresias as the guardian of caesura releases the potential of 
futurity/Empedocles from the triadic structure of Oedipal subjectivity and positions 
it/him in a much wider, alchemical field of forces. 
In-between and embracing the impersonal instant, Empedocles at Etna is the 
suspended echo of differentiation, aura traversed by the cuts of the caesura and 
simultaneously grounded; and his rejection of a self-sacrifice intensifies his being 
‘driven by the heavens to the sea, spit from the sea to the earth, spit out again 
toward the sun and thrown back by the sun to the heavens’ (Blanchot 1993, 26; 
italics original).  
Then, the mountain on which Empedocles is placed can become earth again, 
building a horizon. It is maybe no accident that Empedocles’ last brief monologue in 
the third unfinished version starts with: ‘From this green earth and her beneficence / 
My eye should not depart deprived of joy’ (Hölderlin 2008, 187).  
Here, affirmation points at materiality i.e., also the media involved in art 
practice and their specifics, especially digital technology with its problematic 
economy: they lose their neutrality as mediators as they are interwoven in an 
affirmed earthy futurity. Being part of the affirmed wound ‘that existed before me’ 
fuses them indissolubly to a practice that needs responsibly to reflect the 
involvement of their problematic. 
 
 
                                                 
148 The aspect of Empedocles’ self-purge as metaphor for a historical radical shift or a nation’s 
renewal (‘rising like Phoenix from the ashes’) aligns with national-socialist hermeneutics that have been 
applied to Hölderlin. His work, so Karl-Heiz Schoeps in Literature and film in the Third Reich ‘reaches its 
peak “in the proclamation of the coming days of the Germans”’, misrepresenting Hölderlin ‘one-sidedly as 
a promulgator of patriotic willingness to sacrifice’ (Schoeps 2004, 61). Perhaps my repeated emphasis on 
a (precarious) balance between the forces of the BwO and concept might seem too cautious; yet, it results 
from considering such possibilities. Marius von Brasch                               3.Art Practice/Research as Suspension 
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3.1.5	 ﾠ‘Intuition’	 ﾠFolding	 ﾠPractice	 ﾠElement	 ﾠand	 ﾠWriting	 ﾠ
 
How is it possible, in this scenario, to ‘follow’ aura, or staying with the 
conceptual persona, Empedocles’ survey of the axis of Becoming? If there is a way of 
following the processuality of Becoming for Deleuze (who builds upon Bergson), it is 
‘intuition’, a method that assumes an affective yet indifferent input on the side of the 
artist (researcher), a readiness to explore intensities (as they are the key to 
actualisation) and to extend awareness to the excess of the a-subjectivation, which is 
inherent in affects and percepts; to find (create) ways to conceptualize what is 
foremost a memory of the presence of ‘making’; to work with sensations that are 
based on matter, intensity and thought; to follow the immanence of metamorphoses.  
Intuition links the ‘wound’ (in its personal and impersonal sense) and aura; 
and following the differentiation inherent in aura triggers the elements that can be 
used (by active assistance of change) towards healing. 
Hölderlin’s differentiation along the set of the ‘aorgic/organic’ in Empedocles 
suggests a concept of ‘intuition’, as we have seen, which addresses its connections 
to representation of decentred emerging intensities, of layers of ‘events’. Henri 
Bergson describes it as ‘the representation of a multiplicity of “reciprocal 
penetration”, quite different from numerical value – the representation of a 
heterogeneous, qualitative, creative duration’: philosophical intuition ‘captures the 
vital before its dispersal into images, whereas art is concerned with the images’, 
‘with the living’ (Letter to  Harald Höffding, 15.3.1915, in: Bergson et al. 2001, 365). 
But the desire, the weight of excess that marks Hölderlin’s project, is better 
characterized by Deleuze, when he states in an early text on Bergson: ‘Intuition is 
the jouissance of difference’. This suggests an intention of coinciding with 
differentiation, of transgressing the simple pleasure of determining difference. 
Jouissance faces here a frustration of never arriving at a closure due to the ‘plurality 
of acts, a plurality of efforts and directions’ ('Bergson's Conception of Difference', in: 
Mullarkey 1999, 43) that arise with the heterogeneities in duration. Intuition at its 
zero point, which to arrive at would be probably the redemption of jouissance, is 
circumscribed already by Hölderlin as the point where nature (or the ‘aorgic’) is at its 
strongest, a point – so Deleuze paraphrases in his Kant Seminar – ‘from which the 
real which fills space and time will be produced, and it’s this intuition=0, this empty 
intuition which constitutes the caesura’ (Deleuze 1978)
149.  
                                                 
149 Hölderlin’s text is ‘The meaning of tragedies …’ (Hölderlin 2009, 316). Deleuze, as so often, 
does not give a reference in his seminar; however, in my view, he most certainly refers to this short 






Following aura in art thus coincides with the emerging differentials  of a piece 
of art that unfolds and posits itself as a ‘new’ response to the intensities triggered 
by problematic  structures. The ‘hubris’ of wanting to merge with ‘empty intuition’, to 
 
flow at fastest velocity with the immediate on the one hand, and gain at best ‘full’ 
knowledge (thus also having encountered  the Body without Organs) on the other 
hand, is infused with the power of machinic, differentiating  desire: Empedocles’ 
survey (as much as the artist’s as the researcher’s),  the method of intuition is thus 
also the conflict of Love in its Strife to erase (fulfil) itself. 
It must have become clear by now that intuition in this sense is and has been 
the method that pervades and folds this research consistently,  which had begun with 
questions about a specific, intuitive sensation of a ‘distance as close as it may be’ 
typical for the process of making: challenging,  seducing to continue making a piece 
of art and understanding  what happens. It is probably right to say that what this 
research set out to elucidate has been from the start its own method, which 
intricately links to aura and needed, offering as a method an only half-heartedly 
clearly framed structure, to unveil itself as Becoming. This interdependence  might 
reflect a more general aspect of practice-based  art research as it has to deal at some 
point with a clash between language and visuals, between art practice and writing: 










The visual works reflecting the scenario of Hölderlin’s Empedocles as 
developed above build together the series Empedocles.  Assemblage  (2011/12): 
1. eight paintings, Empedocles.  Assemblage  (2011/12) that spread from one 
 
large canvas as an open wall-based assemblage,  i.e. there is no definite hanging 
order; 
2. the video Empedocles:  Falling/Not  Falling (5’ 15”. 2011) on a monitor; 
 







The assemblage  is in no way illustrating but using the conceptual persona I 
proposed in the previous section as a departure point. All three parts reflect from 
different angles the problematic  of tracing the ‘immediate’,  here in the dialogue 
between painting and the digital. The objective has been to approximate,  to get Marius von Brasch                               3.Art Practice/Research as Suspension 
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closer to what – as the emergence of Becoming, as convergence of time and ‘making’ 
in the ‘already-passed’ and ‘not-yet-arriving’ – seems already/still distant; to respond 
to qualities of aura, its vibrational field of closeness and distance in space and time 
and its potential futurity of further Becoming.  
For painting, the main question arising with such an objective has been one 
reflecting the method of intuition: how to anchor, i.e. contextualize the immediate 
happening of differenc/tiation, the cuts and shifts in duration that make a picture? 
 
3.2.1	 ﾠEmpedocles	 ﾠAssemblage	 ﾠ(Painting)	 ﾠ
 
The eight paintings Empedocles. Assemblage started from the plan to work 
only on one 210 x 210 cm canvas, in shape neither vertical nor horizontal. A square 
would hold, ‘survey’ or work with strands of the research so far, selective but in the 
sense of a consolidation
150. From the drawings of diversely streaming I had learnt 
that a move towards mark making could support a quality of immediacy, which, of 
course, continues in the ideas around Empedocles and the caesura.  
Twombly’s Ferragosta painting (Fig. 39) is clearly a bridge between drawing 
practice and painting, and the image encouraged me greatly to pursue an own way 
of breaking apart the borders between both mediums. I considered ‘tracing’ the 
picture digitally, as I had done it with the Resurrection before, but that seemed 
irrelevant: Twombly traces the invisible forces himself, makes them the visual, and it 
would be derivative to repeat this. 
Making You’re right. Secrets have to circulate (Fig. 36) and The Visit had 
shown me the relevance of allowing ‘emotional’ input without the risk of necessarily 
‘illustrating stories of my life’. Also Twombly’s painting encouraged approximating 
further the wordless intensity of the ‘fourth person, singular’.  
In this sense, Empedocles Assemblage 1 (Fig. 40) is autofiction, further 
developing an autofictional diagram in Guibert’s Autoportrait au Papillon (Fig. 35). 
How to depart from the fragmented, yet cohesive field of the suspended 
Empedocles, without trying to make a closed statement, a ‘whole’ picture; allow 
blocks of intensity that could stay undetermined, did not need to make ‘sense’; 
develop a rhizome of heterogeneous elements that would not look like a cliché-
rhizome (‘Illustrating-Deleuze’); use affective intensity without producing 
expressionism? 
I decided to paint on top of temporary projections onto the canvas, as done 
previously, of digitally manipulated source images that amplified the subject and had 
                                                 
150 A stage of this painting (testing zones with digital painting) is reproduced in the Appendix on p. 
209 (Fig. 55). Marius von Brasch                               3.Art Practice/Research as Suspension 
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been used before, especially from Splendor Solis: the motif of a butterfly with its 
connections metamorphoses and resurrection (Chevalier and Gheerbrant 1996, 140); 
a mountain being dug in by two men hoping to find the illumination of dark matter 
(gold), the ‘chiascuro’ inside. It seemed important avoiding (like in the drawings that 
take Grünewald’s Resurrection as a departure point) to construct Empedocles’ 
‘face’
151 or gaze or to imitate clichés about Empedocles
152; but, in contrast, to capture 
a scenario and an ‘in between’ the folds of heterogeneous elements, an ‘abstract 
Figure, or rather, since it has no form itself, the abstract Machine of which each 
concrete assemblage is a multiplicity, a becoming, a segment, a vibration. And the 
abstract machine is the intersection of them all’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 278). 
The intuitive aspect, for this image, felt of greater interest than, for example, 
for Paraphrases. It meant acting closer to the immediacy of duration in a 
conceptually prepared field: a canvas without high/low, left/right preference; 
contextualizing but manipulated, digitalized projections; undisturbed environment; 
prepared range of colours; waiting longer for a heightened intensity and need to 
paint. It meant also to believe in the singularities involved and forget about the 
planned, possibly already administered future of this image and to follow the 
unfolding of strands and marks of the subject targeted. I would use interruptions 
(mood swings, sudden disinterest etc.) to start anew, thus build heterogeneous 
zones.  
In between, the image would be consolidated, certain elements emphasized 
and markers or signposts introduced, like allusions to specific regions of the 
Empedocles scenario, its being situated in a frame that stabilizes and fragments it.  
A main focus of the paintings became – without any literalness - the mountain with 
its openings and levels – detaching clouds and flows of different speeds (rocks, lava) 
– its being Earth, a ‘body without organs’, as Deleuze/Guattari write, ‘permeated by 
unformed, unstable matters, by flows in all directions, by free intensities or nomadic 
singularities, by mad and transitory particles’ (2004, 45).  
                                                 
 
151 It is this literal approach that clogs up a creative response to the virtual intensities pursued 
throughout this research. Deleuze/Guattari write: ‘[…] when the face is effaced, when the faciality traits 
disappear, we can be sure that we have entered another regime, other zones infinitely muter and more 
imperceptible where subterranean becomings-animal occur, becomings-molecular, nocturnal 
deterritorializations over-spilling the limits of the signifying system’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 275). 
152 A good one we can find in Aston Leigh’s The Story of Philosophy. After quoting Empedocles’ 
famous lines about the deathless ‘mingling’ of the elements, he adds: ‘Lines whose spirit invests the 
shadowy, purple-robed figure with the piercing eyes and the flowing hair with such a halo that 
instinctively we bow before it … and pass away from the great heathen philosopher, wondering’ (Leigh 
1881, 39). The aura is postmarked here in typically naïve fashion onto a figure whose actuality vanishes, 
with its visualization in academic style, in the gap separating us from a wondrous ‘past’. Marius von Brasch                               3.Art Practice/Research as Suspension 
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The mountain (volcano) as a classic symbol of the ‘sublime’ is fragmented on 
these images into associative snippet views, or floating partial objects that constitute 
the BwO. Empedocles approaches the volcano and its explosive Becoming as a 
framed image of potentiality: a book, a stage set, a painting in his head in order to 
make a survey of the extreme difference in durations of body, thought, affect and 
earth. And this breaking-away from earth in the caesura – and likewise in this written 
discursive part of the present thesis – is paradoxically compensated by a simple 
appreciation (or, in Empedocles’ and Hölderlin’s sense, by Love) of matter and its 
qualitative colour as Becoming: ‘From this green earth and her beneficence / My eye 
should not depart deprived of joy’ (Hölderlin 2008, 187). 
These indications allowed the practice element a much stronger emphasis on 
letting the field become, the virtual, without forcing, infuse it by, repeating here 
Villani’s formula (2010, 77) for a ‘Deleuzian’ complex act, appropriating 
depropriation. The actual process provided a sensation of great freedom, of 
supporting sudden unexpected figurations and cross-connections that developed 
outside of any preconceived ideas from the materials, thoughts and affects 
(durations) involved.  
It soon became clear that the painting required ‘cuttings’ or ‘off-shoots’. The 
other seven pictures emerged like zoomed zones of certain regions from the large 
first painting. I felt that the heterogeneity of the large canvas should reflect on the 
subsequent smaller ones, i.e. be of diverse sizes and styles. The whole work would 
ideally spread on wall space, departing from the first, as a de-centered, ex-centric 
configuration. Marius von Brasch                               3.Art Practice/Research as Suspension 







Fig. 40 – Marius von Brasch, Empedocles Assemblage. 2011. 210 x 210 cm. Oil on canvas Marius von Brasch                               3.Art Practice/Research as Suspension 
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Fig. 41 – Marius von Brasch, Butterflyzone (Empedocles Assemblage). 2011. 102 x 71 cm. Oil 
on canvas Marius von Brasch                               3.Art Practice/Research as Suspension 
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Fig. 42– Marius von Brasch, Greyzone (Empedocles Assemblage). 2011. 36 x 46 cm. Oil on 
canvas Marius von Brasch                               3.Art Practice/Research as Suspension 
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Fig. 43 – Marius von Brasch, Firezone 1(Empedocles Assemblage). 2011. 36 x 46 cm. Oil on 
canvas Marius von Brasch                               3.Art Practice/Research as Suspension 
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Fig. 44 –Marius von Brasch, Mountainzone (Empedocles Assemblage) 2011. 92 x 92 cm. Oil on 
canvas Marius von Brasch                               3.Art Practice/Research as Suspension 
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Fig. 45 – Marius von Brasch, Firezone 2 (Empedocles Assemblage). 2011. 80 x 80 cm. Oil on 
canvas Marius von Brasch                               3.Art Practice/Research as Suspension 
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Fig. 46 – Marius von Brasch, Firezone 3 (Empedocles Assemblage). 2011. 46 x 36 cm. Oil on  Marius von Brasch                               3.Art Practice/Research as Suspension 
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canvas 
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Fig. 47 – Marius von Brasch, Greyzone 2 (Empedocles Assemblage). 2011. 36 x 46 cm. Oil on 
canvas Marius von Brasch                               3.Art Practice/Research as Suspension 
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3.2.2	 ﾠPages	 ﾠIII	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐	 ﾠEmpedocles:	 ﾠFalling/Not	 ﾠFalling	 ﾠ(Video)	 ﾠ
 
Following the practice of fragmentation and tracing other flows, I prepared a 
word collage from the English translation of Hölderlin’s third and shortest version, 
which summarizes the course of action of the other versions in a few lines and 
focuses, in longer monologues, on Empedocles’ decision to take the sacrificial leap 
or not. The new, associative flux of the word collage I recorded. The voice track 
would build the audio part of the film, which I realized then, would be an 
independent but third part of the Pages videos (see Chapter 2.1). The first two 
videos had been engaged with the presence of writing or mark making as a process 
of unfolding in time, and I had planned to continue this line with language unfolding 
via voice. Initially triggered by Benjamin’s writings about the unfolding of (God’s) 
language as world and the paradox that with digital film making I can set up the 
conditions for a simulacrum of writing as something that ‘happens now’, without a 
hand, and – as digitally produced and available online on my webpage – inherently 
disseminated, always reproduction. These films touch on the questions Who writes, 
who speaks, on the reproducibility of what seems to be the most personal: 
handwriting and voice, the body as medium or instrument of the immediate.  
The decision for the visuals and the text for Empedocles: Falling/Not Falling 
required considering the involvement of multiple reproductions: the real 
Empedocles, Hölderlin’s sources and interpretations, my fragmentation and collage; 
images and language around the ‘volcano’, an archetypical trigger of the ‘sublime’; 
the aspect of translation from image (volcano) to language (about a volcano) to 
image (a detached, filtered image); the aspect of using an English Hölderlin 
translation instead of the original, of reading out an English translation of Hölderlin 
with a German accent.  
I decided to layer some of these elements, and to use – as to alienate the 
explosive associations with a volcano, following the reality that I gain knowledge 
about it via books – some of the somewhat sober and static drawings from George 
Rodwell’s book Etna. A history of the mountain and its eruptions (Rodwell 1878) . 
The video starts and ends with a still of the book’s classic academic library binding. 
One of the drawings became a top layer in an After Effects composition where it got 
torn and pixellated, revealing underneath closely zoomed and altered (in terms of 
colours) zones of Grünewald’s Resurrection: an illumination of darkness and 
simultaneously a darkness illumined from.  Marius von Brasch                               3.Art Practice/Research as Suspension 
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Fig. 48 – Still from Marius von Brasch, Empedocles: Falling/Not Falling. Video. 5’ 15”. 2011 
 
A connection arises between the alchemical lumen naturae located in the 
supposed darkness of matter and the digital image on screen: the darkness of the 
screen and its haptic materiality are the place where the unfolding of alchemical 
transmutation can become a moving image, or more precisely, a moving image of its 
framing. Empedocles’ teachings of the continuously changing relationships between 
the elements (fire/water/air/earth) clearly underlie the basics of alchemical 
processes; however, applied to the digital image, they link also to Deleuze’s take on 
the identity of screen and brain. John Mullarkey writes: ‘There is an “eye” already “in 
things, in luminous images in themselves” [quoting here Deleuze (2011, 62)], for it is 
not consciousness that illumines (as phenomenology believes), but the images, or 
light, that already are a consciousness “immanent to matter”’ ('Gilles Deleuze' in: 
Colman 2009, 180). 
 
Towards the middle of the video, images of snow and fire conjoin, central to 
Empedocles’ teachings as much as to alchemy, which provided the initial keys for 
this research. Then the manipulation of the drawing from Roswell’s book turns 
retrograde; the film ends with the image of the book cover. I felt that this quite 
regular structure of A – B – C(A’) responds to the fact that Empedocles, the subject, 
lives foremost between two book covers. The spoken text, simultaneously presented 
haptic close-ups of Hölderlin’s language in translation, does not follow the A – B – 
C(A’) pattern because it reflects an invisible book of language and memory that I 
open each time anew when I intend to refine the speechless affects, when I ‘enter’ 
language/thought and start to segment duration. Although a communicating voice, Marius von Brasch                               3.Art Practice/Research as Suspension 
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communication in the sense of ‘meaning’ is perhaps reduced to the question ‘Who 
speaks?’, an orientation towards singularities.  
One of the departure points of this video has been to approach the image of 
the volcano as metaphor of the ‘sublime’, breaking its represented ‘face’, which 
gives ‘expression to notions of stability, changelessness and […] purity’ (Chevalier 
and Gheerbrant 1996, 680) down to heterogeneous strands of ‘nonsignifying 
signs’
153; following thus Kant’s description of the encounter with the sublime as ‘the 
end of our judgment, to be ill-adapted to our faculty of presentation, and to do 
violence, as it were, to the imagination, and yet […] judged all the more sublime on 
that account’ (2007a, 76). At the same time, in a framework of Becoming (including 
aura as an indicator), the ‘sublime’ as a notion looses much of its power because 
Becoming as such challenges the conditions of rational understanding (and 
especially, following Deleuze, judgments) in minor movements, and it does not need 
a volcano or even a mountain to do so (see also Fig. 44).  
Empedocles’ ‘sublime’ volcano as used here emerges from texts, translations, 
images, suggesting questions like: how could the Becoming of Hölderlin’s 
Empedocles be transposed? And if Hölderlin’s project – to embody the ‘immediate’ 
as tragedy in a sequence of language – fails, is not then the text already porous, 
fragmented and nevertheless auratic as it unfolds along the event of the caesura?  
In this film, voice becomes as a straight line in time that could provide 
narration but frustrates this expectation. The straight time line is permanently 
broken in terms of semantics but produces perhaps a new poetic field. The visuals 
reflect this element as disintegration in part A, or reintegration in C, without 
revealing (in A) or recovering (in C) anything definite apart from a depth that is not 
necessarily explosive. Tracing aura along the axis of Becoming (seen from the 
scenario of the unfinished Empedocles) does exactly not imply the literal illustration 
of a ‘sublime’ image or metaphor but rather to use the inherent question of every 
instant, the announcement of the caesura that breaks the continuity of an image of 
the sublime (the volcano, the mountain), lets it vanish, become obsolete as 
temporalized, as part of the duration of the video itself. 
 
 
                                                 
153  Deleuze/Guattari juxtapose artistic practice based on archetypes with one of ‘becoming-animal’ 
(with regard to Kafka’s various transformations or becomings). But this extends to the practice element of 
this research: ‘[…] to participate in movement, to stake out the path of escape in all its positivity, to cross 
a thresh-old, to reach a continuum of intensities that are valuable only in themselves, to find a world of 
pure intensities where all forms come undone, as do all the significations, signifiers, and signifieds, to the 
benefit of an unformed matter of de- territorialized flux, of nonsignifying signs’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1986, 13). Marius von Brasch                               3.Art Practice/Research as Suspension 
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Fig. 49 - Still from Marius von Brasch, Empedocles: Falling/Not Falling. Video. 5’ 15”. 2011 
 
The materiality of the digital allows exposing the alchemy a digital image can 
undergo in a course of time, by ‘tearing’ it, revealing its state of pixellation; the 
supposed integrity of the drawing in Rodwell’s book, from which already, with 
cartographic precision, any expressivity inherent to the metaphor of the ‘volcano’ 
and its surrounding (it depicts a basalt island near the volcano) had been erased, is 
destroyed. This process extends also to exposing the techniques of layering that 
produce depth with the images used.  
A problem of this video, of course, might be that Hölderlin’s text is not well 
known and Empedocles: Falling/Not Falling does not even make the attempt to 
follow the sparse action. On the contrary, language and image fall apart or have 
never really joined.  
Danièle Huillet’s and Jean-Marie Straub’s adaptations of Hölderlin’s Empedocles 
show a kind of structural parallel. Their films Der Tod des Empedocles (using 
Hölderlin’s first version) and Schwarze Sünde (Black Sin) from 1989
154, which follows 
the third version, had left a strong impression on me when they were released 1987 
and 1989. Both films emphasize the static set-up and the blurring effect of the 
‘rhythm of iambic pentameter’ into which Hölderlin ‘gradually [slips]’ (Krell in: 
Hölderlin 2008, 37); the viewer is exposed to the paradox that the embodied text 
(actors in mannered robes visualizing Greece as a phantom, the somewhat 
                                                 
154 The title Black Sin refers to the assessment of Empedocles’ decision delivered from the limited 
view of a priest: ‘Yet you should not / Abandon me and go down thoughtlessly, not as you are; / I have a 
word that you must ponder, my besotted friend! / For one alone in our time is it fitting; one being / Alone 
ennobles your black sin. / That one is greater than I am! … ‘ (Hölderlin 2008, 184) Marius von Brasch                               3.Art Practice/Research as Suspension 
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unconvincing robes moved only by the breeze of an authentic, Sicilian but somewhat 
‘Olympian’ setting) had been always disembodied, that image and text build a 
‘disjunction’, as Deleuze puts it in connection to Straub/ Huillet, ‘a dissociation of 
the visual and the sound [which] puts them all the more in a non-totalizable relation’ 
(Deleuze 2008a, 246)
 155 but simultaneously empties the image frame for the text: 
‘The visual image, in Straub, is the rock’ (Deleuze 2008a, 235) on which the text 




Fig. 50 –Danièle Huillet in Huillet’s and Jean-Marie Straub’s Schwarze Sünde (Black Sin), 1987 
 
These films, for some viewers unbearably artificial, for others addictive 
because of the exposure of disjunctions that create cross-firing layers of associations 
around fissures, reflect a quality of Hölderlin’s language that works – despite its 
                                                 
155 Is, questions Dominique Païni in her article Straub, Hölderlin, Cézanne (2006), this ‘abolish[ing] 
of feelings of intervals’ suggesting what Christian Metz calls ‘dry editing’?: ‘Some filmmakers intentionally 
suppress punctuation precisely when you expect it the most, and connect by a clear cut two sequences of 
an extremely different subject, tone, etc. It is no longer a question of a general “rhythm” but of a 
particular effect of brutal rupture. The clear cut, here, merits to be called dry montage (or “dry montage in 
operation”)’ (quoted in Païni 2006). 
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conception as a ‘play’ – directly against visualization. As shown, Hölderlin’s 
continuous revisions of the play approximate it more and more to his ideal of 
tragedy as renunciation of accidentals, which would pervert a poetic solution 
embodying the problematic of the ‘intellectual intuition’, the being-One with the 
immediate. But this unity has no direct visual, and language, in its attempt to 
reconstruct it, relies on its layered reconstruction in time.  
The ‘proud renunciation of all accidentals present[ing] the ideal of a living 
whole as briefly and at the same time as completely and richly as possible …’ (Letter 
to C.L. Neuffer, 3.7.1799 in: Hölderlin 2009, 146) demands the transgression of the 
shifting impressions of subjectivity. For The Death of Empedocles, as we have seen, 
‘this ascesis leads to doubt’, so Stanley Corngold in his essay Disowning 
Contingencies in Hölderlin's 'Empedocles, ‘about the communicative possibilities of 
the Bild (“image”, “metaphor”), an aporia that frustrates dramatic representation’ 
(Corngold 1999, 215). The caesura as the marker of an impossibility to coincide with 
the immediate, as the rupture of a linear promise of beginning, action and end 
exposes the limitations of theatre. Thus it has been the idea to break this alleged 
continuity in the spoken part of the video, where communication is left in favour of 
poetic language.  
In an exhibition, the three Pages videos ideally need to be shown as an 
installation, three TV monitors, juxtaposing three different, looped temporalities, 
which, as one installation embody a continuous process of differentiating repetition; 
a digital book of layers and words, handwriting, mark making and (stuttering) voice; 
an audio/visually unfolding, reading itself in a frame like all other Becomings, 




3.2.3	 ﾠDeer	 ﾠFeathers	 ﾠ(Video)	 ﾠ
 
The video Deerfeathers is an attempt to visualize, with the alienating 
possibilities of the digital materiality, the four main elements that Empedocles sees 
ceaselessly coagulating into ‘world’, through the dynamics of Love and Strife. It 
followed the very simple idea of using pixellation, tempi and rhythms in time to 
characterize fire, water, air and earth.  
The title alludes to shamanic traditions of ‘voyaging’ through different 
durations of consciousness, of ‘becoming-animal’ (see footnote 153), that had been 
the work of shamans in order to reveal cooperative ways of working with earth. 
Bernard Stiegler, the French philosopher, speaks of ‘transindividuation’, meaning by Marius von Brasch                               3.Art Practice/Research as Suspension 
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this the cross-firing influences of tradition (memory), technology, otherness onto 
individual individuation, and the acknowledgment that ‘“technics” are also processes 
of individuations’ (Stiegler and Rogoff 2010). Here, the role of the digital reveals its 
ambiguity: as a technological memory storage of humanity it has become paramount 
for the future on the one hand, on the other hand it houses ‘psychotechnologies at 
the service of behavioural control’ ('Manifesto 2010' in: ArsIndustrialis 2010): ‘This 
process constitutes the threads [trames] from which are woven the motifs of psychic 
and collective individuation, but such that these threads are overdetermined by the 
techniques and technologies of threading [trames]’ (Stiegler 2009).  
Perhaps, the voyage of the shaman is not so far off from a mythologized, 
dramatized version of the much later introduced application of the method of 
intuition applied to this research. Deer Feathers attempts to make a (micro-)case for 
care and attention for the earth elements by showing how they simultaneously can 
be ‘portrayed’ with digital technology and exist merely as administered forms 
(digitalized, named files). The film transports the images of nature not as addenda 
to aesthetized selling-strategies but, emphasized by the absence of sound, in their 
state of being appropriated by technology and emerging with it. 
This video needs in its current version (soundless) to be shown as part of an 
installation of the three drawings diversely streaming (Fig. 32, 33). Structurally, the 
pieces share the heterogeneity of elements, shards of time that a viewer either scans 
like a multi-directional script (drawings) or film (on the screen). Although the film 
‘serves’ representations, these are taken out of context and build, chained to each 
other temporally, ‘crystals’ of time like the drawings as static tableaus. 
Representation, i.e., photographic elements that are ‘stretched’ in time in Deer 
Feathers, becomes thus a vector of its dissolution; a ‘shamanic’ flight that remains 
throughout the material response to fold as an artist with the echo of an auratic 
sensation while working on the pieces. As a transformation of the elements or 
Empedocleian ‘rhizomata’ along the axis between the BwO and actual form as much 
as on the axis between material colours and After Effects manipulations, the 
installation is an attempt to involve a viewer in the immediacy and heterogeneity of 
Becoming. Marius von Brasch                               3.Art Practice/Research as Suspension 
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Conclusion 
Aura and Experience 
 
 
The practice element of this thesis has been engaging throughout the course 
of the research with experimentation around different ways of mapping intensities or 
lines of flight that lead away from fixed images of what aura could mean. This 
concerns on the one hand the sources, which directly visualize aura, yet hold a 
potential of deterritorialization of what they represent. On the other hand it concerns 
the continuous delay attached to the attempt to ‘catch’ the immediacy of Becoming, 
which relates through, so the thesis here argues, an auratic echo of virtual intensity 
(on the vector between emotion and affect) to ‘me’, a practitioner involved in ‘a field 
of experience taken as a real world no longer in relation to a self but to a simple 
“there is”’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 17). The key for research in this field - an 
involvement of one perspective, a particular practice (departing from intuitive mark 
making as introduced in chapter 1.2) with Deleuzian ontology – has been ‘experience 
as experiment’, a mutuality that Deleuze always assumes and that is a direct 
consequence of the transformations that the concept of the ‘subject’ undergoes 
when traversed by ‘difference’. Subjectivation or individuation as ‘production of a 
way of existing, […] a mode of intensity, not a personal subject’ (Deleuze 1995, 
98/9) can only become as ongoing experience, as experimental, always temporary 
dramatizations of how to respond in a transcendental field to the questions and 
problems that involve it with virtual forces and the pre-subjectivity of ‘A LIFE’. Practice 
then ‘becomes a veritable theatre of metamorphoses and permutations. A theatre 
where nothing is fixed, a labyrinth without a thread […]. The work of art leaves the 
domain of representation in order to become “experience”, transcendental 
empiricism or science of the sensible’ (Deleuze 2004b, 68).  
All of the outcomes of this research involve a crossing and layering of 
juxtaposed ‘old’ and ‘new’ media (drawing/painting and digital) as well as ways in 
which artists work (Renaissance and contemporary). They are results of an extension 
of experience and experiment into heterogeneous, not necessarily ‘bridged’ zones: 
the contrast between the explicitly secretive nature of alchemical discourse and the 
potential dissemination of any privacy provided with digital technologies mirrors the 
distances that Becoming traverses and the difficulties of pinning down the 
ontological status of art outcomes. ‘Uniqueness’ as (traditionally) auratic quality of a 
piece of art has faded in this research (with its weight on aura as a ‘chiaroscuro-Marius von Brasch                                                                        Conclusion 
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splendour’ of immanent differentiation) in favour of its status as simulacrum or 
assemblage because it 
  
‘includes a difference within itself, such as (at least) two divergent series on 
which it plays, all resemblance abolished so that one can no longer point to the 
existence of an original and a copy. It is in this direction that we must look for the 
conditions, not of possible experience, but of real experience (selection, repetition, 
etc.). If it is true that representation has identity as its element and similarity as its 
unit of measure, then pure presence such as it appears in the simulacrum has the 
“disparate” as its unit of measure – in other words, always a difference of difference 
as its immediate element’ (Deleuze 2004b, 82/3). 
 
And yet, a simulacrum/assemblage in form of one painting/drawing could, 
without a doubt, be described as ‘unique’, existing only once (in contrast to a digital 
film); it is the fold of reflection (consciousness) that declares it, as its transcendent, 
to be so as an ‘object’. This means that valuating an outcome of a process leading 
away from the subject-object division pulls it back into exactly this (temporary) 
transcendent division. Deleuze is very aware of this aspect, which in this research 
appears as the problematic of flux and fragment. However, the power of Deleuze’s 
ontology lies in the constant breaking-up of a secured relationship between subject 
and object, between ‘me’ and the ‘other’. Otherness is here foremost the 
constitution of self at the instant of ‘future’, face to face with a double and potential 
selections concerning how to select on the lines, disjunctions and fragmentations 
between ‘A LIFE’ and subjectivation. ‘A LIFE’ is thus always already the field of 
subjectivation and simultaneously, as Nathan Widder writes, ‘consciousness’s 
immanent Outside’ (Widder 2012, 151). The ‘Other’ remains in Deleuze’s ontology 
always immanent, and that reflects on aura, changes its pointing at a transcendent 
otherness to immanent and temporal Becoming, without losing in this research an 
inherent problematic concerning immediacy (which appears also for aura in a 
framework of transcendence but in form of a more static distance, staged within 
time). This is the reason why this thesis can speak only about ‘following’ aura, being 
‘guided’ by aura as ‘echo’ etc., all indicating a striving for a coincidence of practice 
with the immediacy of differentiation.   
Engaging with aura and profaning its numinous qualities into immanence 
allows experimentation as experiences ‘with the opportunities [a stratum, here 
images, pictures of aura] offers, […] find[ing] potential movements of 
deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experienc[ing] them, […]try[ing] out 
continuums of intensities segment by segment, hav[ing] a small plot of new land at 
all times’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 178); in brief, mapping aura provided 
conditions of productive experiences and production of the new with new 
technologies and within the transcendental field of immanence. A requirement is the 
willingness to feel the ‘wounds’ and affects as given in experience that stretch from Marius von Brasch                                                                        Conclusion 
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collective to personal intensity and, by being aware of those strands, to abstract 
from them. As being involved in the production of the new, a profaned aura would 
be a potential mediator of experiences beyond their loss in clichés. 
Deleuze’s critique of communication concerns a paramount strategy of how to 
put experience against the ways contemporary societies exert and establish control: 
through ceaseless, instant communication via computer and internet with the 
subsequent quest for ‘”universals of communication” [that] ought to make us 
shudder‘ (Deleuze 1995, 175). Communication, thus, appears as corruption and 
sterilized by its functional aspect of representation, unable to constitute Ideas from 
‘the passage of life within language’ (Deleuze 1998, 5), which could jolt its 
diagrammatic organisation. The prompt for the Body without Organ that leaps in-
between the words and throws fragmentation into the crystallizations of a piece of 
visual art is a strategy to develop pragmatics for ‘the new, remarkable, and 
interesting that replace the appearance of truth and are more demanding than it is. 
What is in the process of coming about is no more what ends than what begins’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 111): this is what ‘experimentation’ or experience 
circumscribes. For Deleuze thus, communication in its contemporary set-up has to 
be distinguished from creativity; ‘[t]he key thing may be to create vacuoles of 
noncommunication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control’ (Deleuze 1995, 175). 
These ’circuit breakers of noncommunication’ can be the incisions of the caesura or 
‘wound’ with its subjective/a-subjective strands that merge in a (strong) piece of art, 
when ‘[the] writer [and I extend this to visual arts] returns from what he has seen 
and heard with bloodshot eyes and pierced eardrums’ (Deleuze 1998, 3)
156.  
In fact, Deleuze’s concern with developing strategies for complex acts i.e., 
experiences that reach into the unlived potential of virtual problems and can resist 
the overwhelming presence of representation (‘branding’) in capitalist information 
and control societies, has parallels in Walter Benjamin’s thinking. 
This thesis began with a discussion of Benjamin’s critique of aura, a difficult 
endeavour due to the theological and profane strands that paradoxically interlace 
the melancholy and simultaneous hope that arises with its ‘decay’ or erasure. The 
working thesis throughout this research has been that a desire for the experience (or 
the reflection of an experience made) of something numinous might be a reality to 
acknowledge, which concerns the pragmatics of individuation and subjectivation 
‘along the vanishing transversal line at the very limit of human experience’ (Lovat 
and Semetsky 2009, 247). Such a desire for the numinous has not been resolved, as 
                                                 
156 In terms of writing for a practice-based art research that acknowledges the pained input of what 
has been seen/heard, this model of ‘noncommunication’ suggests another precarious balance, to account 
for methods, decisions and ideas with a methodological ‘rigour’ fissured by the durations that enfold the 
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envisaged by Benjamin, with the liberating aspects of mass media technologies. The 
projection of collective conflicts in a mode of play, the interpenetration of collective 
body and image seem foremost not to have become ‘bodily collective innervation, 
[nor its] revolutionary discharge’ (Benjamin 1999, 217/8). To a greater degree, the 
closeness in front of a distance framed by computer or TV screens confirms 
Benjamin’s prescient analysis of an ongoing loss of experience on a grand scale. 
What Benjamin observed when he wrote about world exhibitions, can be transposed 
to the isolated behavior in front of these screens: ‘”Look at everything; touch 
nothing”’ (G16,6 in: Benjamin 2002a, 201) or to the immobile pilgrimages on settees 
witnessing the ‘enthronement of the commodity, with its lustre of distraction’ 
(Benjamin 2002a, 7).  
Experience, which, according to Benjamin
157, in its oldest form relates to the 
storyteller (and what is a visual other then something a viewer will weave a kind of 
‘story’ around), does not aim at information as such but ‘embeds the event in the life 
of the storyteller in order to pass it on as experience to those listening. It bears thus 
the trace of the storyteller, much the way an earthen vessel bears the trace of the 
potter’s hand’ (Benjamin 2003, 316). ‘Where there is experience’, Benjamin 
continues, ‘in the strict sense of the word [erfahren suggests a path explored, 
behind the one who has walked it], certain contents of the individual past combine in 
the memory with material from the collective past’ (Benjamin 2003, 316). Benjamin 
refers here to Bergson’s ‘durée’ and the sudden flashes of memory, which lift past 
events into the present as present, whereas intended memorising declares what rises 
into present to be past. Involuntary memory (Proust’s mémoire involontaire) 
bypasses a habit contributing to the ‘self-estrangement of human beings, whose 
past is inventoried as dead effects’ (Benjamin 2003, 183). Experience becomes 
experience where an individual can ‘forms an image of himself, whether he can take 
hold of his experience’ (Benjamin 2003, 315) strategies of capitalism deny 
experience exactly there where such ‘inner concerns’ become ‘private’ because the 
‘likelihood decreases that one’s external concerns will be assimilated to one’s 
experience’ (Benjamin 2003, 315); what could link between ‘inner’ and collective 
memories, is obstructed by a focus on mere information, on ‘newness, brevity, 
clarity’ (Benjamin 2003, 316) that needs to be ‘“understandable in itself”’: ‘ Every 
morning brings us news from across the globe, yet we are poor in noteworthy 
stories. This is because nowadays no event comes to us without already being shot 
though with explanations’ (Benjamin 2002b, 147). Communication, shrivelled and 
polished into information ‘in fully developed capitalism’ (Benjamin 2002b, 147), has, 
                                                 
157 With regard to the following paragraph, I am especially indebted to Thomas Weber’s concise 
article (with its collection of references) on Benjamin’s ‘Erfahrung’ [Experience] (in: Opitz and Wizisla 
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    241 
according already to Benjamin, created social conditions, which allow ‘less and less 
hope that [experience] will come into being in a natural way’ (Benjamin 2003, 315).  
Aware of the present scope of this scenario, this research considers that a 
profaned aura, a mindfulness of the reality of creative processes and 
differentiations, of the ‘surplus’ coming with virtual intensities can instigate modes 
of experience which can sharpen an awareness of the demands to produce 
‘transparently’ i.e., in ways which let viewers addressed as consumers bypass the 
effort of ‘taking hold’ of experience. Such a profaned aura could exactly counteract 
the entertainment industry’s strategy of ‘elevating the person to a level of the 
commodity, He surrenders to its manipulations while enjoying his alienation for 
himself and others’ (Benjamin 2002a, 7). 
Andy Warhol who became famous by aestheticizing the declining myth of the 
original, played consciously with this dilemma, its commercial aspects transposing 
aura from his work onto him. In his The Philosophy of Andy Warhol he tells us: 
‘Some company recently was interested in buying my “aura.” They didn’t want my 
product. They kept saying, “We want your aura.” […] When you just see somebody on 
the street, they can really have an aura. But then when they open their mouth, there 
goes the aura. “Aura” must be until you open your mouth.’ (Warhol 2007, 77) What 
he describes here with great self-irony (as it is also him who might start speaking 
when approached for his charisma), is how it feels to sit on the other end of 
passively substituting one’s own differentiation for another’s power. Aura in this 
sense seduces to succumb to a degree of a-subjectivity (no voice, no speech) that 
has (been) split from the efforts of becoming-singular and has found its languid 
territory in becoming-commodity.  
The angle of the art practice presented here follows by purging aura, 
visualizing and following its potential for contemporary art of course another course 
(or selection) and suggests to work with an emotional aspect that for artists who 
focus on ridding their practice from such contingencies might be out of question. 
However, exactly this at times ‘being uncomfortable’ with affect and subjectivation, 
which links on the one hand to Bergson’s notion of duration and on the other hand 
to an a-subjective intensity, can be, according to Deleuze and the results of this 
research, a vital strategy to counteract a consume-oriented hunger for supposed 
‘experiences’ of ‘subjectivity’ when they have transformed into advertising strategies 
of contemporary culture; when they left ‘interiorities’ to become translucent 
commodities, a procession of quickly faltering and ever shifting variations of ‘face’, 
‘gaze’ and ‘body’: this would be jouissance, in a framework of lack, at work. In such 
an ontological framework, aura must remain trapped in an anachronistic frame and 
operate as diagram of power and shadow of its religious antecedent, which has lost 
its religious function in contemporary society but haunts it with its oppressive core Marius von Brasch                                                                        Conclusion 
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of static separation and lack; it must become a ridiculed gloriole of commodity 
fetishism.  
It is true what Stephen Zepke prompts in his recent paper The Sublime 
Conditions of Contemporary Art: ‘”And” is not enough, what we need are explosions’ 
(2011, 81). He posits against an indifference of abundance, which could be mistaken 
for new Deleuzian practice, Deleuze’s association of the Kantian sublime with chaos 
that opens up and becomes available when the cohesion of the faculties of our 
perception dissolves with the experience of the sublime. The disentanglement of 
imagination from the transcendental conditions of possibilities leaves the ‘aesthetic 
comprehension […] compromised, drowned in a chaos’. Painting, in this regard, is 
able to pick up rhythms, to reflect ‘[m]y whole structure of perception […] in the 
process of exploding’ (Deleuze, quoted in: Zepke 2011, 78/79).  
But isn’t here also a danger – by evoking the catchy image of ‘explosions’, 
which in reality concern the break-up and subversions of a comprehended self - of 
building images i.e., clichés of when intensities in art practice ‘are understood in the 
right way and not’: encouraging outcomes that copy intensities (while not 
experienced), as derivative but ‘Deleuzian’ explosions? One of the questions the 
practice element of this research works with has been, how the pre-individual can be 
reached, and this encompasses the question how intensities are sensed, how the 
field between pre-individual constellations and the conceptual re/flection on 
outcomes are ‘coloured’, intensified by them. 
Despite his preference for Francis Bacon’s mutilating actualizations, Deleuze’s 
method of dramatization of intensities leaves it open, how to experiment and 
experience the ‘new’; and thus, there is also another valuable layer of the ‘new’: 
‘[u]nderneath the large noisy events lie the small events of silence, just as 
underneath the natural light there are the little glimmers of the Idea’ (Deleuze 
2004b, 202). This quote builds a folding of differentiating silences and explosions, 
which, rather than feeding a ressentiment against subtlety (untypical for Deleuze) 
invites also the ecstasy of silence into the explosion (and vice verso) into practice
158.  
                                                 
158 This angle on the ‘new’ presents itself also in Chinese classic thought with its, as 
Deleuze/Guattari admit, ‘[…] disturbing affinities appear[ing] on what seems to be common plane of 
immanence’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 91). French philosopher and sinologist François Jullien sums it 
up as ‘silent transformations’ challenging the affirmation of ‘communication’ or ‘organisation’. The ‘silent 
transformations’ relate to ‘emptiness’ and emerge where ‘”what one sees but does not perceive” or with 
“what one listens to but does not hear”: that state where the perceptible breaks up and loses its specifity, 
disqualifies itself, “loses its taste”, without for all that lapsing into the invisible of metaphysics’ (Jullien 
2011, 33). Because time in Chinese language is not segmented in past/present/future but in a polarity of 
‘”going away: past”’ and ‘”present: coming here”’ (Jullien 2011, 104), the ‘event’ is always prepared and 
thus not an irruption as it is ‘simply produced from a disturbance, which starts very subtly until as it 
develops it suddenly one day crosses a threshold and becomes apparent. The brutality of the ‘event’ then 
amazes us, because we have not known how to distinguish the silent transformation which has Marius von Brasch                                                                        Conclusion 
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It might depend on a pluralist network of differing art practices to develop 
pragmatics which support unexpected interventions of differentiations, ‘a people to 
come’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 218) in the sense of traversing differentiation 
‘not [as] the fulfilment of an idea but the production or becoming of future ideas’ 
(Colebrook 2002, 89). The practice presented here cannot be more or less than an 
attempt to experiment with and experience one unfolding perspective (practice as 
‘base’) engaging with aura as an echo of its Becoming (as visual outcomes and 
writing): on an axis traversing old media of ‘uniqueness’ and forgotten techniques of 
transformation (alchemy), and the digital as a medium of ambivalent fluidity, 
deceptive abundance and new visual materiality.  
The perspective of the practice element of this research is mediated by an 
understanding of Deleuze’s framework as depending on action ‘which is complex in 
so far’, as Villani writes,  
 
‘as it harbours what is effectively the counterpoint of the situation, marries 
itself to the fluctuation of things themselves, and respecting the ‘way of things’ by 
furnishing their image in negative, permits not only the unscathed exit from a 
potentially deadly impasse, but even gives us the perfect example of a true ‘act of 
knowledge’ (Villani 2007, 59).  
 
Following up intuitive awareness of aura meant throughout this project 
following the unpredictable differentiations of Becoming and responding to 
‘tendencies’ (‘counterpoints’), to the eternal return of opportunities of selecting 
conditions, ‘not of possible experience, but of real experience’ (Deleuze 2004b, 83) 
and to ‘face [one’s] own responsibility’ (Agamben 1999b, 114) of actualization of 
potentiality and of intensities of a ‘subtle’ body (BwO). The research found intuitive 
awareness of aura leading to outcomes as simulacra (assemblages), which reunite 
‘the theory of forms of experience and that of the work of art as experimentation’ 
(Deleuze 2004b, 356)
159. 
A profanation of aura in this sense delivers an access to both: experience that 
can touch the new and its reflection in the folds of subjectivation (central for both 
Benjamin and Deleuze). It can support a practice that understands itself as acting 
micropolitically, touching on the alchemy of the ‘chiaroscuro’ traversing the pre-
                                                 
imperceptibly led to it’ (Jullien 2011, 129). This would indicate that ‘explosion’ and ‘silence’ mutually 
interrelate, ideally as a punctuated, dynamic equilibrium. 
159 Joshua Ramey describes this dependence of intuitive art practice on the complex act reaching 
to the pre-individual as follows: ‘Belief in the world searches for that subtle or alchemical body that would 
be a collective yet to realized, yet already uncannily present in our times. What matters will be the 
immanent adequacy of our diagrams, and the directions those diagrams map – the configurations they 
produce, the vitality and variations they enable, the uncanny joy and transgression of limitations they 
involve’ (Ramey 2012, 218). 
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individual and subjectivation, possibly with a chance of ‘crossing the line of force, 
going beyond power’ (Deleuze 1995, 98). Here, it means especially going beyond the 
dispositifs of aura that foreclose its immanent potential and leave, even turned 
negatively, the ‘sacred’ as the ‘excluded’ untouched, which still underlies, as 
Agamben shows, the determination of rules of ‘community’. The research sets out, 
in practice and its refolding in writing, to experiment at the diagrammatic line, the 
‘cutting edges of deterritorialization’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 63) that aura’s 
dispositif holds as its deframing power. The aura relates to the ‘fold that echoes 
itself, arching from the two sides to a different order. It expresses […] the 
transformation of the cosmos into a “mundus”’ (Deleuze 2006b, 33). 
The dynamics of intuition as practice and method, here affecting/affected by 
aura in immanence, merge with the potentiality of the ‘new’ at the fold of reflexive 
practice: as silent-explosive, explosive-silent differentiations, as the rhythms of 
systoles and diastoles emerging with painting in the expanded field of technologies, 
when it is ‘not a matter of reproducing forms, but of capturing forces’ (Deleuze 
2005, 40).   Marius von Brasch                Appendix 
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Fig. 51– Marius von Brasch, Study after Grunewald, coloured pencils on paper 56 x 75 cm, 
2010 Marius von Brasch                Appendix 
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Fig. 52– Marius von Brasch, Study after Grunewald, coloured pencils on paper 56 x 75 cm, 
2010 Marius von Brasch                Appendix 
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Fig. 53– Marius von Brasch, Study after Splendor Solis, coloured pencils on paper 56 x 75 cm, 
2010 Marius von Brasch                Appendix 








Fig. 54- Marius von Brasch, Paraphrase 0.. Oil on linen. 36 x 48 cm, 2010 Marius von Brasch                Appendix 








Fig. 55– Marius von Brasch, Study for Empedocles Assemblage 1. Digital file. 2011 
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